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**"If charity begins at home, should justice
begin in the clouds?"**

**"A remarkable book, it is a work of positive genius."—GEORGE
CARY EGGLESTON, *World*, New York City.**

HOW TO RIGHT A WRONG

BY

MOSES SAMELSON

(REVISED EDITION)

AUTHOR OF "THE WAY OUT," Etc., Etc.

"We congratulate Mr. Samelson on having written "The Way Out," and we congratulate the public on his having written it."—*Philadelphia North American*.

"Mr. Samelson is a thoughtful and suggestive writer, and on more than one page I have detected something like originality. I am glad to make his acquaintance as an author and to welcome him to the battlefield in which the critic is the sharpshooter."—GEO. H. HEPPORTH, in *New York Herald*.

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INTRODUCTORY.

My structure is completed: 'tis true, it is but of word architecture and build; yet if it be of truthful measure it may long outlive the most massive and durable structures of solid masonry.

In its erection, flights of brilliant fancy, illusive conceptions, and imagery with which to drape or conceal from view defective architecture, weak foundations, or false construction have been studiously avoided; and in the fifteen open chambers exposed to view, length, breadth, height, light, air, and the many other requirements of an advanced and cultivated knowledge have, I hope, been faithfully proportioned.

My purpose has not been to destroy, but truthfully to build up.

A structure, no matter how massive, can be quickly dismembered, and nothing be left to show save single atoms, which by themselves would surely be good for nothing; but put all these atoms together in their proper places, and you may detect a noble and lofty edifice.

I would not take unto myself the sole credit of its

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creation, for let a book be, as it were, of an uneven merit, if it represent and develop the working of a new system, it would be a mighty effort were it wrought out entirely by a single mind without the aid of great research, judicious pruning, and careful inquiry as to the different conclusions of different thinkers.

With this introduction, my readers, the structure is thrown open, not only to public inspection, but for public use. Walk carefully with me through the various compartments; but first divest your mind of any early predilections, preconceptions or biased and prejudiced acceptations which might disturb your reasonings, only retaining and firmly impressing upon the same that one fact that after all worldly happiness is the aim of human life, and that true happiness consists in naught but the multiplicity of agreeable consciousnesses.

In order to attain this consummation devoutly to be wished, the many must cultivate a greater conscientiousness. With this acquisition they will be enabled to truly ask and answer of their conscience the vital query:

If charity begins at home, should justice begin in the clouds?

MOSES SAMELSON.

NEW YORK, February, 1898.

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HOW TO RIGHT A WRONG.

THE WAYS AND THE MEANS.

CHAPTER I.

SCIENCE OF GOVERNMENT.

THE science to which political economy can be ascribed has been for a long time embarrassed with a crowd of systems, which clash with and destroy each other.

There can be but one true system; and that must be distinguished from the false ones by its extreme simplicity, great economy, and its universality; the less wheel work a machine has the better does it perform its functions.

There are three distinct forms of civil government: the monarchical, aristocratical, and republican.

A monarchical government is one in which the supreme power is lodged in the hands of a single person: the same name, however, is sometimes given to a government, in which the power of the king or supreme magistrate is limited by a constitution, or by fundamental laws.

An aristocratical government is one in which the whole supreme power is vested in the principal persons of state: or, in a few men, distinguished for their rank and opulence: when the supreme power is exercised by a very small number, the government is called an oligarchy; the latter word, however, is usually applied to a corrupt form of aristocracy.

A republican government is one in which the supreme power is lodged in the hands of the people collectively: or in which the people exercise the powers of legislation by their representatives.

The advantages of a monarchical government are unity of council, decision, dispatch, the preventing, by a known rule of succession, all competition for the supreme power. The dangers of a monarchy are tyranny, expense, military domination, risk, of the character of the sovereign, ignorance of the government, of the interests of the people; and the want of wholesome laws.

The advantages of an aristocracy are experience, education, and weight of character in the governors. The dangers of an aristocracy are dissensions among the rulers, oppression of the lower orders of the people, by the higher orders; and partial laws.

The advantages of a republican government are liberty, equal laws, regulations adapted to the wants of the people, public spirit, averseness to wars, the pursuit of information, courtesy, etc. The dangers

to a republican government are dissensions, tumults, factions, inordinate ambition, intrigue, delay, imbecility, and anarchy.

People are bound to adopt that form of government which, upon the whole, is most likely to produce the greatest amount of happiness: and it is the right of a majority of them concerned, to decide what that form is.

Civil government necessarily involves the relation of governed and governing.

It is the duty of the governing to make laws; and to execute them for the single purpose of promoting the public welfare; the faithful performance of these duties will afford peace to the conscience of the rulers; gratify their benevolent feelings; promote human happiness; and lead to their advancement by conciliating public confidence.

It is the duty of the governed to select the best qualified men for their public functionaries; to render them due respect, while in the performance of their duty; *and to reward them liberally for their services*: this will insure a wholesome administration of government, peace and quietude among the people, and consequently the prosperity of the commonwealth.

The maintenance of the civil government requires the enactment of laws; because harmony is essential to the public welfare; and owing to the ignorance and selfishness of man, there can be no harmony without

laws: and many of the forms of government, and the duties which they impose, being necessarily adventitious, they require enactments to explain them.

Therefore, the efficiency of human laws, and the influence of social life, become of paramount importance: were they divested of their power and influence, crime would universally prevail: so intimately connected with the well-being of society is a belief in the doctrine of responsibility, that no community has ever flourished without it; and if this belief, in all its modifications, were expunged from the human mind, an utter recklessness of property and moral conduct would ensue. Chaos would come again, and every man would do as seemeth good in his own eyes: a belief which is so essential to the public welfare must be true: there never can exist a reason for acting upon a principle which is false: that which is rendered important by the constitution of human beings to be believed must be worthy of belief; and nothing can be worthy of belief, but what is true.

The importance of the doctrine of human responsibility proves it to be a reality: were this article stricken from its creed, the result would be infinitely mischievous: the dread of a future retribution, which now restrains the conduct of human beings, would in this event be done away.

Civil evils, or the evils of civil life, are much more easily disposed of than physical evils: because they

are in truth of much less magnitude; and also because they result by a kind of necessity, not only from the constitution of our nature, but from a part of that constitution which no one would wish to see altered.

Human beings are prompted to the pursuit of virtue, chiefly by the hope of happiness; but when this hope becomes extinct, the power and even the desire for improvement will cease to operate.

It need not dishearten any endeavors for the public service to know that population naturally treads upon the heels of improvement: if the condition of a people be meliorated, the consequence will be, either that the mean happiness will be increased, or a greater number partake of it; or which is most like to happen, that both effects will take place together: there may be limits fixed by nature to both, but they are limits not yet attained, nor even approached in any country in the world.

And when we speak of limits at all, we have reference only as to provision for animal wants.

There are sources, and means, and auxiliaries, and augmentations of human happiness communicable without restriction of numbers; as capable of being possessed by a thousand persons, as by one.

Such are those which flow from a mild, contrasted with a tyrannic government, whether civil or domestic; those which grow out of a sense of security; those which depend upon habits of virtue, sobriety, moder-

ation, order; those lastly which are founded in the possession of well-directed tastes and desires, compared with the dominion of tormenting, pernicious, contradictory, unsatisfied and unsatisfiable passions.

The distinctions of civil life are apt enough to be regarded as evils, by those who sit under them: but if truthfully examined, with very little reason: in the first place, the advantages which the higher conditions of life are supposed to confer, bear no proportion in value, to the advantages which are bestowed by nature: the gifts of nature always surpass the gifts of fortune: how much, for example, is activity better than attendance; beauty than dress; appetite, digestion, and tranquil bowels, than the artifices of cookery; or than forced, costly, and far-fetched dainties?

Nature has a strong tendency to equalization: habit, the instrument of nature, is a great leveler; the familiarity which it induces taking off the edge, both of our pleasures and of our sufferings: indulgences which are habitual keep us in ease, and cannot be carried much further. In truth, so far as superfluity generates fastidiousness, the difference is on the wrong side.

It is not necessary to contend, that the advantages derived from wealth are none; but that they are not greater than they ought to be. Money is the sweetener of human toil; the substitute for coercion; the reconciler of labor with liberty. It is, moreover, the

stimulant of enterprise in all projects and undertakings, as well as of diligence in the beneficial arts and employments.

Now, did affluence, when possessed, contribute nothing to happiness, or nothing beyond the mere supply of necessities; and the secret should come to be discovered; we might be in danger of losing the great part of the uses which are at present derived to us through this important medium. Not only would the tranquillity of social life be put in peril by the want of a motive to attach men to their private concerns; but the satisfaction which all men receive from success in their respective occupations, which collectively constitutes the great mass of human comfort, would be done away in the very principle.

It is of the nature of property, not only to be irregularly distributed, but to run in large masses.

Public laws should be so constructed as to favor its diffusion as much as they can.

But all that can be done by laws, consistently with that degree of government over his property which ought to be left to the subject, will not be sufficient to counteract this tendency.

There must always, therefore, be the difference between the rich and the poor; and the difference will be more grinding, *when no pretension is allowed to be set up against it.*

It would be difficult to define all that can be ex-

pressed or understood by the term, justice: it can hardly be contained in the conclusion that it means a right, or the doing of a right: for that which is by some considered a right, in consequence of the contrariety, natures, and dispositions of the human race, and the differences in conditions from which arises the necessity for the doing of a justice, would be, and is, subject to constant disputation: for instance, a fundamental truth can never be a falsehood: yet, although it is fundamentally true, that no one possesses the right to despoil another of life, there may be occasions when the taking of life would be held as justifiable: so we immediately discover a contradiction or a falsehood to that which was just expressed as a fundamental truth.

Now, to trace the origin or derivation of the term that is expressed as justice, we discover that it can only be defined as "to command;" therefore a justice should be made to appear as something that is commanded of us, by some paramount and unquestioned authority.

Now, an unquestionable authority should, above all others, command the respect and obedience of the human race: as already expressed, the desire for happiness is undoubtedly the universal motive to animal action; and it would be difficult to conceive of a more completed authority to the human, than a regard for happiness.

In every social compact, there necessarily exists a variety of orders; and each order, in point of justice, is entitled to regard, in exact proportion to the authority it possesses: were our respect for individuals exclusively graduated by the standard of their worth, there would be an end to all government: social order would be subverted, and the elements of society thrown back to their native state: officers in the possession of the same power would be differently regarded; every individual would be governed by his own estimate of the character of his rulers; interference and collision would inevitably ensue, and the dissolution of society would be the result: hence is enjoined upon us the exercise of that justice, which respects every individual in the exact proportion to the authority with which he is invested.

If the performance of this duty is important in any country, it is particularly so in our own: living as we do under a free government, an exact and conscientious regard for the constitutionally invested power of its officers can alone impart to it harmony and durability.

The bitter and savage spirit of party politics will, if not moderated by a sense of justice, result in destructive consequences.

There can be no propriety in the action of government without adherence to fundamental principles: and one of these principles is rendering "to all their

dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom, and honor to whom honor."

Nor should we do justice merely to the external circumstances of our fellow creatures; but also to their motives and character: motives should be deemed pure, unless they are known to be otherwise. If we could see through men's motives, we should often, no doubt, discover motives of entire purity, prompting to actions of doubtful character: such is the variety of the temperament, feeling, and perception of human beings, that actions of bad tendency not unfrequently proceed from good motives: shyness often results from diffidence unmixed with the slightest antipathy; vehemence from natural warmth, free from anger and ill-will; economy from a sense of duty, without a particle of parsimony; apparent hauteur from education or temperament, infinitely removed from intended arrogance; and indications of artifice and cunning, without the slightest wish to deceive.

Scarcely anything in the scope of human inquiry admits of greater latitude of interpretation than the conduct of human beings: the differences obtaining in their mental organization; the degrees of their acquirements; the force of circumstances under which they act; and numerous other incidents, over which they have no control, often render inapplicable the same standard of action to the conduct of every one.

In regard to the feelings, motive, character, influ-

ence, and interest of our fellow beings, we, in all cases, should do unto them as we would wish in a change of circumstances to be done by: this is the golden rule, to which we are bound in all our actions to conform: so long as the present constitution of the universe exists, it will be the unrevoked and irrevocable duty of human beings to conform to the demands of justice: every consideration that binds them to any duty, binds them with equal force to the performance of this: doing justly is in itself right: and no being, in the nature of things, can be exempted from doing this.

The practice of justice contributes to our own happiness; and this object we are destined by our nature to pursue: doing justly is promotive of the best interests of the universe, and the neglect of this object is obviously criminal.

If the happy nature of the government under which we live is to be transmitted to future generations, it will be accomplished only by the selection of such statesmen, as rising above the narrow views, and selfish motives, of ignorant and wicked aspirants, will call to their aid the light of science, and the maxims of truthful and virtuous morals; the moment these auxiliaries are laid aside, darkness and chaos will come again; the fair fabric of the government will be overturned, and there will be none left to lift it from its fall.

History presents on every page the solemn and admonitory fact, that a recklessness of moral culture is productive of the most unhappy results; be the power and wealth of nations or individuals what they may, if they are destitute of moral principles, they will be fruitful sources of human wretchedness.

Man perceives and acknowledges that the only condition upon which he can hope any security for his own life and equitable privileges, is a regard in him for the life and privileges of others: it is therefore of the first importance that the right of every person to enjoy life should be universally recognized, and that certain principles should also be established and recognized, for settling questions as to the right of enjoyment, where several people desire the same thing; to secure which, people, or that which is called society, organizes or exists under, to carry out, subject to certain rules and conditions, for the fulfilment of these purposes; and from this might be determined what can be understood as the science of government; a truthful knowledge of which can only be hoped for and secured, by a cautious, sincere, and studied inquiry of all the facts, conditions, and circumstances connected with the human life: the various conditions and circumstances, in and surrounding the country to be governed thereby; and the needs, desires, education or ignorance of the people to be governed; to separate from these different and various informations

or knowledges, those facts which are connected with it incidentally, and to retain those only which we have reason to consider as uniform and essential.

In some sciences, this is accomplished by repeated and varied experiments; and in those departments which do not admit of this, it is done by cautious and extensive observation: the object in both cases would be to ascertain how many of the circumstances observed, and what particular combination of them, uniformly accompany each other; or are really connected with the effects which are produced; in the careful clearing of the statement from all incidental combinations, consists that faithful observation of nature, which forms the first step in every scientific investigation.

It is opposed to two errors, both equally to be avoided, namely, leaving out of view, or not assigning an adequate value, to important and essential facts; and giving a place and an importance to those which are incidental and trivial: in every scientific investigation, this is a process of the utmost importance; and there is another nearly connected with it, namely, to judge of the authenticity of the facts.

This also is a mental process of the utmost delicacy; in conducting it there are two extremes from which the exercise of sound judgment ought equally to guard us, namely, receiving facts upon imperfect evidence, and rejecting those which have a sufficient

.

title to credit: in other words, credulity and skepticism: both these extremes are equally unworthy of a mind which is guided by sound reason. Further, to review an extensive collection of facts, so as to discover some general fact common to the whole: this is the process which is called generalizing, or the induction of a general principle: the result of it is the last and greatest object of human sciences, and that to which all the other steps are preliminary and subservient.

An ordinary mind is satisfied with the observation of facts as they pass before it, and those obvious relations which intrude themselves upon its notice; but the philosopher analyzes the phenomena, and thus discovers their more minute relations: his genius is distinguished above the industry of the mere observer of facts, when he thus traces principles of accordance among facts, which to the vulgar eye appear remote and dissimilar.

A remarkable example of this is familiar to every one: between the fall of an apple from a tree, and the motion of that which is known as the heavenly bodies, a common mind would have been long ere it discovered any kind of relation; but on such a relation, Newton founded those grand principles by which he brought to light the order and harmony of the universe: for it was this simple fact, that first suggested to him the great principle of physical science: that

matter attracts matter, in the reciprocal ratio of their masses.

In collecting facts, it is required in the first place, that they shall be authentic; that the statement shall include a full and fair view of all the circumstances which ought to be taken in our investigation of the case; that it shall not include any facts which are not connected with the subject, or whose connection is only incidental: when we have thus formed a collection of facts, authentic, full, and essential, the statement, in as far as relates to the facts, constitutes truth: when any of the facts are not authentic; when important facts are left out of the statement or misrepresented, or when facts are taken into it which *though true* have no real relation to the subject—this constitutes fallacy or falsehood.

In considering two events as connected in the manner of cause and effect; when this relation is deduced from a full and extensive observation of the sequence being uniform—this is truth.

When it is assumed upon inadequate grounds, that is, from the observation of a connection, which is only incidental or limited, this is either falsehood or hypothesis; for the relations may be assumed upon grounds which, though not absolutely false, are not yet sufficient to establish it as true, namely, on observation which is too limited in extent: this is conjecture or hypothesis; and it is in some cases a legitimate process, provided

it be used only as a guide for further observations; and be not received as true, until such observation shall have been sufficient to confirm it.

False induction induces false causation: false causation is when the events are considered as cause and effect without sufficient reason, and which are in fact only incidentally combined; when events are considered as cause and effect which are only joint effects of a common cause; and when, of two events really connected as cause and effect, we mistake the order of the sequence; considering that as the cause which is really the effect, and that as the effect which is really the cause.

The error of false causation is most apt to occur in those sciences in which there is peculiar difficulty in tracing effects to their true causes, and causes to their true effects: these are exemplified by medicine and political economy.

A physician, for example, ascribes the cure of a patient to a remedy which he has taken, though perhaps it had no influence on his recovery.

And a political declaimer refers some circumstance of national distress, or commercial embarrassment, to certain public measures, which happened to correspond in time, but were in fact entirely unconnected: false generalization again, as was lately stated, includes general principles which are deduced from a limited number of facts: and hypotheses which cannot be

shown to be facts, but are entirely fictitious and imaginary.

Much of the confusion, fallacy, and sophistry of reasoning arise from the points connected with the same not being sufficiently attended to, and distinctly and rigidly investigated: an argument may be fair and conservative; but when we rigidly examine it, we may find that the reasoner has in his premises contrived to introduce some statement which is not true in point of fact; or some bold general proposition, which is not correct or not proved; or that he has left out some fact, or some principle, which ought to have been brought forward in a prominent manner, as closely connected with the inquiry: hence the necessity for keeping constantly in view the various sources of fallacy, to which every process of reasoning is liable, and for examining the elements rigidly and separately, before we admit the conclusion.

When a principle is assumed, which in fact amounts to the thing to be proved, this is commonly called begging the question: when simply stated, it appears a fallacy not likely to be admitted, but will be found one of very frequent occurrence: it is indeed remarkable to observe the facility with which a dogma, when it has been boldly and confidently stated, is often admitted by numerous readers without a single inquiry into the evidence on which it is founded.

When an acknowledged proposition is inverted, and

the converse assumed to be equally true: we may say, for example, that a badly governed country must be distressed: but we are not entitled to assume that every distressed country is badly governed; for there may be many other sources of national distress.

We may say, all wise men live temperately; but it does not follow, that every man who lives temperately is a wise man: it is at the same time to be kept in mind, that some propositions do admit of being inverted, and still remaining equally true.

In regard to the sound exercise of judgment, it is further to be remarked, that it may exist without the habit of observing the various steps in the mental process which is connected with it: thus, we find men of that character, to which we give the name of strong, sound sense, who form just and comprehensive conclusions on a subject, without being able to explain to others the chain of thought by which they arrived at them; and who, when they attempt to do so, are apt to bewilder themselves, and fall into absurdities: such persons, accordingly, are adapted for situations requiring both soundness of judgment and promptitude in action, but they make a bad figure in public speaking or reasoning: they are indeed possessed of a faculty more valuable than anything that metaphysics or logic can furnish; but a due attention to these sciences might increase their usefulness, by enabling them to

communicate to others the mental process which led to their decisions.

Prejudice consists in the formation of opinions, before the subject has been really examined: by means of this, the attention is misdirected, and the judgment biased, in a manner of which the individual is often in a great measure unconscious. The highest degree of it is exemplified in that condition of the mind in which a man forms an opinion which interest or inclination may have suggested; then proceeds to collect arguments in support of it; and concludes by reasoning himself into the belief of what he wishes to be true: it is thus that the judgment is apt to be misled, in a greater or less degree, by party spirit and personal attachment or antipathies; and it is clear that all such influence is directly opposed to its sound and healthy exercise.

The cultivation of a calm and correct judgment is applicable alike to the formation of opinions and the regulations of conduct: it is therefore opposed to the influence of prejudice or passion; to the formation of sophistical opinions; to party spirit; and to every propensity which leads to the adoption of principles, on any other grounds than calm and candid examination, guided by a sincere desire to discover the truth.

In the purely physical sciences, distorted opinions are seldom met with, or make little impression; because they are brought to the test of experiment, and thus

their fallacy is exposed: but it is otherwise in those departments which do not admit of this remedy: therefore sophisms and partial deductions are most often met with in medicine and political economy.

The light of nature is too feeble and remote for general use: a few philosophers only, after long and incessant labor, have been able to discover it; and its exact boundaries and efficiency have never been defined: perceptions of the adaptation of nature, depending upon deep learning, a sound judgment, and the accuracy of long and critical observation, are immeasurably beyond the attainment of ordinary minds: none have as yet been able to deduce an unexceptional system of moral duties. The ancients confessedly failed in their undertaking: system after system has followed in the lapse of time: but every one has proved to be erroneous or defective.

Nor is the light of nature, if we could obtain it in its best conditions, adequate to our wants: it affords, in regard to many subjects in which we are deeply interested, no information.

What is wanted is a Code of Laws arising from the nature, capacities, and relations of the human race: in view of human nature, as creation has constituted it, the production of general happiness appears no less natural than the elimination of heat by the action of caloric.

We not only observe in the history of all people

alternations of prosperity and adversity; but also in the same country, changes in climate, productions, diseases, and almost every other circumstance; and these changes, instead of indicating operations of contradictory agencies, are simply the varied doings and ways for the accomplishment of the final object: diversity without contradiction is evident in the whole economy of nature: in the revolution of the planets, all are changing; and yet all are harmony—the variations of their relative positions, of the centers of gravity, of light and obscurations, of the actions of the centripetal and centrifugal forces—all are of the one creation, and in harmony with the same laws.

Created by the same power, made partakers of the same hopes, and exposed to the same afflictions, it is certainly not unreasonable to cherish for one another the same feelings. Our sympathies, dependencies and interests, all indicate the propriety of conforming to the law of justice: such is the instability of our temporal circumstances, it is not improbable in the course of human events, we may ourselves need the assistance we now possess the power to bestow on others. Often can we see in the circle of our acquaintance the sudden and unexpected ruin of individuals, whose prospects were once as flattering as need be: their morning arose without a cloud; all above their horizon was calm and joyous; but a cloud lowered upon the brow of night; the spirit of a com-

ing storm moaned loudly in their ears; and the tempest, bursting on their feeble bark, plunged them into hopeless ruin.

The particular duties which we owe to our fellow creatures arise from modifications of the social state.

Every modification of society, arising merely from the suggestions of the human passions, has a natural tendency to revolution and anarchy: the body politic, though possessing in some degree the principle of regeneration, will infallibly yield to decay and dissolution, unless governed, controlled, and submissive, to all the dictates of a truly moral code.

The science of government can only be the perfection of that system by which the principles and institutions calculated to advance humankind to the highest possible degree of happiness is secured.

They who are placed to discharge high duties and to exercise authority should never consider persons; their views should be directed to things, their weight and consequences.

The disposition of the surplus is more easy to regulate than to supply scarcity.

Industry, or manufactures and internal trade, is continually making immense progress; the application of chemistry and machinery to the manufactures causes them to advance with giant strides; foreign trade, which in its results is infinitely inferior to agriculture, is an object of subordinate importance.

Foreign trade is made for agriculture and home industry, and not the two latter for the former: the interests of these three fundamental bases are diverging and frequently conflicting. They should only be promoted in their natural gradation.

Ignorance is the soul spring of all evil; they who retard the progress of intellect countenance crime; to a State, is the greatest of criminals; while that system of government which cultivates and circulates the mental light, far more precious than the visual, gives the surest benefaction to the human race.

It is a noble part of the organization of the world, that by increasing those riches which are beyond fortune, we take the surest method of obtaining those which are within the reach; or to be more explicit, of all which belongs to us, the least valuable parts can alone fall under the will of others.

Whatever is best, is safest: to determine then what is the best course to be pursued in relation to food, clothing, and habitation of the people governed, should be one of the main features of what might be termed the Science of Government; for a people who possess these properties in a sufficiency will always determine as a just and proper people.

CHAPTER II.

EDUCATION.

EDUCATION, in the full meaning of the term, implies that system of culture, whether public or otherwise, which elicits and improves the capabilities of human nature: which calls into salutary exercise, and puts under proper discipline, the intellectual, moral, and animal faculties of man; imparting to him, for the effective and graceful accomplishment of the several duties, which in the order of nature may be incumbent on him to perform.

Anything less than this, however brilliant and fascinating in its nature and results, falls short of an adequate and finished education.

To truthfully define all that can be expressed by the word or term education, would imply the perfection of that system of knowledge or training, which develops and improves all of the possibilities and capabilities of which the human nature is susceptible.

In completeness it may be likened to a river, whose head being far in the land, is at first rising little, and easily viewed; not without pleasure and delightful

winding; while it is on both sides set with trees, and the beauties of various flowers.

But still, the further you follow it, the deeper and the broader it is, till at last it inwaves itself in the unfathomed ocean: there you see more water, but no shore, no end of that liquid vastness.

In many things we may sound nature, but only in the shallows of her revelations.

We may trace her to her second cause, but beyond that we meet with nothing but the dazzle of the mind's dim eye.

While we speak of things that are, that we may dissect, and have power and means to find the causes, there is some pleasure, some certainty.

But when we come to metaphysics—or to long-buried antiquity—we are in a sea which is deeper than the reach of the line of man.

Much may be gained by studious inquisition, but much more will ever rest which man cannot discover.

Knowledge or wisdom can be likened to the atmosphere: to secure and breathe in a purified air, we must first fell the forest, drain the marsh, and cultivate the waste.

By first inviting thought, the seed that will propagate action will be effectively sown; securing the end, the aim, we all hope and seek for.

For wisdom is a palace of which only the vestibule has been entered: nor can we guess what treasures are

hid in those chambers, of which past experience can afford neither analogy nor clew.

Our contentions flow from our ignorance: we argue, and dispute, with warmth and anger: yet often of the thing disputed *upon* we are sublimely ignorant.

Were knowledge universal, then would peace reign over all.

The ancients claimed that only through virtue could we arrive at honor, and it would be just as truthful to say that it is only through knowledge that we can reach a true virtue.

Yet this would seem a sad truth for the masses were it not for the truthfulness of the conclusion, that there are some few who clear the way, and smooth the paths for the many to travel in.

It may be difficult to extricate the precepts of knowledge from error: but once discovered they gradually become maxims, *and thereby faith*: and thus, what consumed ages of studious and thoughtful men's time in acquiring, becomes posterity's acquisition at once.

Opinions, conclusions, developments of newly discovered sciences; truths sought for and revealed; that had long lain hidden in the bosom of nature; and which our earlier ignorance forbid our seeking for; truths, which often startle and astonish us, become at last acknowledged axioms, and pass into acceptance, and practice, as if they always were.

It is not wisdom, but ignorance, which teaches men presumption. Genius may be sometimes arrogant; but there is nothing so diffident as knowledge.

But as to the system of education in general use, the tutor simply wants to keep a page or two ahead of the pupil: and that certainly does not require either talent, cleverness, or ability.

The general system might be compared to a firework manufactory. They ram first this thing, and then that thing, into the empty case. So does the teacher: geography, astronomy, geology, history: as in fireworks, saltpeter, sulphur, charcoal: other information can be likened to the balls of colored fire.

The teacher simply rams, and rams: the case is full, and in place.

Then comes the examiner, who applies the match, and watches for the result.

Many burst in the wrong place, and scatter the unburned charges in a most ludicrous manner; some fly straight, and come down like sticks, after fulfilling their appointed tasks.

Yet this is not education or true knowledge; it is simply formula: like most formula it retards, rather than encourages progress.

There can be no education in which the lessons of the world will not form a share: neither can the years which convert knowledge into wisdom fail to impart finish, even to refinement.

Language is the expression of thought in any way, articulate, or inarticulate; conventional, or unconventional.

Human speech is the aggregate of these articulate sounds called words; used to express perception and thought; accepted by and current among any community.

Yet language, as well as education or knowledge, cannot be defined by any strict line or definite limits: it is in a condition of constant growth and change. If we were to read from the earliest works and forms of speech, of a Shakespeare, a Chalmers, or a Chaucer, we should find it very difficult to thoroughly comprehend the beauties, and the depth of thought, embraced in almost their every line.

Yet to no individual can be truthfully accredited the palm of creating or formulating these constant changes: we might further say, that these changes are not only confined to alterations of the uttered and audible forms of words: it applies as well to alterations in the outward form as to changes of meaning. For instance, a word may change its form without change of meaning, it may change its meaning without change of form.

It is the same with language as it is with organic beings; the growth of which consists in removal and resupply, or the accretion and the excretion.

Existence is use, and disuse is destruction. If

things that people once thought and talked about concern them no longer; even the phraseology that had been used to express their thoughts goes into oblivion, unless it be preserved as a tradition, or a memory of the past: but what we lose is more than counterbalanced by what we gain: by new knowledge, new material, new inventions, new trades, new ideas; all of which give rise to new terms or expressions, which supplement and take the place of the old terms, which shortly become obsolete. And so it is with all knowledge or education: it is the accretion and the excretion: and this is equally truthful to all in nature.

Yet man, too often by the force of his education, his surroundings, his imaginary interests, his earlier convictions, becomes so circumscribed and limited in his reasonings; so diverted from a comprehensive and a broadened view; so ambitious in his desires to justify the truthfulness of his past expressions and conclusions; so egotistic as to his own self-sufficiency, and infallibility of judgment, that he resolves his conclusions into a closer narrowness; not as he should do, if he were not governed by a bias, to a broader fullness.

Sentiment, which is but the outcome of tradition, becomes so woven and interwoven with the affairs of the life of man, as but too often to blind and confuse his reasoning powers, as to the possibility of *error*, to which he had always conceded *truth*: so when the

novelty, or the force of submitted propositions, as to modification, or a required change of existing conditions, are such as to be at variance with the general acceptations, they must agree to submit to the forces of combined opposition.

Our body is a machine, for the purposes of life: it is organized to that end; that is its nature: it is like a well-made watch, destined to go for a certain time.

Were we consummate in knowledge, we should be perfect in good.

It is the petty, not the enlarged mind, which prefers casuistry to conviction: it is the confined and short sight of ignorance, which, unable to comprehend the great bearings of truth, pries only into its narrow and obscure corners; and occupies itself in scrutinizing only the atoms of a part: while the searching eye of wisdom contemplates in its widest scale the luminous majesty of the whole.

When we survey our faults, our errors, and our vices, and trace them to their causes, we will find that all the causes can resolve themselves into one, namely, ignorance: for from this source flows the abuse of all other blessings; for we abuse things, either because we do not know their real use; or because, with an equal blindness, we imagine the abuse more conducive to our well-being.

The judgment is impaired by deficient culture: this is exemplified in that listless and indifferent habit of

the mind, in which there is no exercise of correct thinking; or of a close and continued application of the attention to subjects of no real importance: and this is one of the results of too much formula or system.

The mind is engrossed by frivolities or trifles; or bewildered by the wild play of the imagination; and, in regard to opinions on the most important subjects, it either feels a total indifference, or receives them from others, without the exertion of thinking or examining for itself.

The importance of a full development of the resources of human nature, and the subjection of those resources to the government of reason, though not sufficiently appreciated by any, is in some degree admitted by all: the contempt inevitably excited by the non-accomplishment of our duties, and the dreadful result of this delinquency, demonstrate the importance of education to be superior to that of any other human acquirement. The difference between the rude hut of the savage and the lofty, well proportioned and magnificent edifices of advanced civilization, is only faintly illustrative of that dissimilarity which exists between the individual who is thoroughly improved by education and the one who is not.

The improvement of the heart and mind of the rising generation ought to be the object of our primary and continued effort: and until this is the case,

all attempts at reform will be partial, and comparatively nugatory.

The human derives a pleasure from the improvement of the mind: every new fact or principle acquired not only affords a gratification or satisfaction, but creates a desire to still further increase his information: and so determined do we often become in our thirst for further knowledge or information, that we often forego many of the pleasures of ease and sensual gratification, in order to acquire the same.

We seek knowledge not only for the pleasure of knowing, but because being by nature selfish, it may give us advantages in the acquirement of other desirable objects.

Although it is undoubtedly true that there are many cases in which knowledge is sought for its own intrinsic worth, in most cases it is not the primary object—the true object being the securement of power and property, or selfish ends.

Yet, however agreeable the object may be, that we enjoy; whether it be the gratification of the senses or the acquirement of knowledge, it does not satisfy us or content us, for any length of time. We must be always seeking for something new.

Food, which at first may taste delicious, after a time loses its relish. Perfumes soon cease to afford us the pleasure that they at first excited. Music, which often at first pleases our hearing, if repeated or heard

too often, may at last annoy us: and it is the same with knowledge: we are not long satisfied with those facts or information with which we have already become acquainted. We constantly long for, and desire, something new.

This love for something new is no feeble incentive to the human action: we not only love novelty, but we also love variety: and this clearly indicates a desire for further information, further knowledge, further progress.

Observation, analogy, and experience, all show that the mental faculties, like the organs of sensation, acquire strength in proportion to their exercise.

Minds, inured to the process of combination, abstraction and comparison, are obviously more acute than those which have been unused to those operations.

Why did Aristotle, Plato, and Seneca acquire pre-eminence, in abstract and metaphysical discussions? Because they had been trained in early life to efforts of this description.

Why did Demosthenes and Tully possess the power to move, to rouse, and to captivate multitudes, courts, and senates? Because under accomplished teachers they had studied the arts of rhetoric and elocution: had while their faculties were yet pliant, not only resorted to the portico, the grove, and the forum, but traveled in foreign countries; and

by intense thought and discriminating observation, improved their faculties for this purpose.

Why, in later times, did Newton, Boyle and Bacon, penetrating the arcana of nature, push their investigations to the boundaries of matter, and calculate the elements of stars? Because their minds, invigorated by exercise, acquired an activity that would not be confined to objects of less dimensions.

Why did the minds of Chatham, Burke, and our own illustrious worthies of the Revolution, penetrate the dark clouds of despotism, and discover, and hold up to view, with arguments not to be resisted, the just principles of civil government? Because they had been impelled by the force of circumstances to investigate and master these intricate topics: for the development of talent and mental greatness in every instance has been owing to circumstances resulting in the production and classification of thought: and this, strictly speaking, is education, be the process by which they are acquired what it may.

Nature furnishes the elements of greatness; but exercise and discipline impart to them consistency and form.

Be the native vigor of a savage what it may, he can no more grapple with the energies of an educated mind than he can stay the tempest or direct the lightning.

The intensely thoughtful, in every period, have

acquired power, that, for good or evil, has controlled the world.

Such is the energy produced by intellectual effort, that everything ultimately submits to its government: the excitements of folly, and the delirium of passion, all yield in time to the dominion of thought: nor is the power of this agency limited to the social circle, but extends to the physical elements.

By the force of mental discipline, space has been annihilated, disease vanquished, civil liberty defined, and nature herself put under contributions to man. And while education, by concentrating and directing the mental faculties, imparts to them increased energy, it likewise extends the sphere of its operation.

This position, though ultimately connected with the one we have just noticed, is nevertheless distinct from it: intellectual strength and intellectual range may or may not coexist in the same person: be our native vigor what it may, it will necessarily be circumscribed without acquirements.

Had the mind of Newton not been enlarged by education, his mental powers would probably have been restricted in their operations to the place of his nativity; but in consequence of early and thorough training, they overleaped the limits of the world, and of the solar system, and traversed the field of space.

He not only took the dimensions of the sun, and

demonstrated the elements of the planets, but extended his calculation to the stars, and the remote wanderings of the comets.

Not exhausted by measuring the plane of the elliptic, the orbits of the planets, and illustrating their multiform laws and motions, he pushed his investigations to other systems, and applied his mathematics to other suns.

Orbs rolling in boundless space, from whose surface bodies flying at the rate of four hundred miles per hour would not reach the globe on which we live in six hundred thousand years, were subjected to his scrutiny.

Notwithstanding the native imbecility of mind, it becomes in virtue of proper training in some sort illimitable: by the light of history, it becomes acquainted with the past: by analogy, it acquires a knowledge of the future: and by mathematics, and the natural sciences, it discusses the laws and extent of the universe.

Nor does education merely strengthen the intellect, and extend the sphere of its operation, but also multiplies sources of enjoyment.

To the mind illumined by science, everything in nature is a source of comfort: the earth, with its rugged mountains, extended plains, and fertile valleys: the ocean, with its placid surface, and destructive storms: the rivers, winding their healthful and

refreshing courses to the mighty deep: and all the violent and gentle phenomena of nature present objects interesting and delightful.

Even in the retirement of the closet, surrounded by the winter's blast, and oppressed with the decrepitudes of age, the beauties of eloquence, the labors of the artist, and the splendid triumphs of science never fail to be sources of comforts.

Nor are the benefits of education confined to the individuals who receive and bestow it: but extend indefinitely to every portion of the community. He who gives to the public a well-educated child is a benefactor to his country.

The subject of that system of instruction, which develops and improves his intellectual, moral, and animal faculties; which approximates him to his possible excellence, and makes him in some degree what he ought be, is, in point of usefulness, as much superior to the wandering Arab, or the untutored Indian, as the sun in brightness is superior to a taper.

Spread before you the history of the world and tell us where the benefactors of their race have lived.

Has it been in the dark recesses of the forest, and under the conditions of savage life? Or has it not been in the temples of science, the seats of learning, and the abodes of civilization and refinement?

Who, we ask, have laid, in justice and equal rights, the foundations of civil governments? Who have con-

ducted with benignity and success the destructive and eventful operations of war?

Who have founded scientific and literary institutions, and extended the facilities of moral and intellectual improvement from the palace to the cottage?

Who have improved and multiplied the arts, spread a charm over the residence of man, and made the desert to bud and blossom as the rose?

The answer is, the educated: they, in all ages, have been the benefactors of their species: an energy, growing out of their endeavors, has extended to human beings all that is requisite to train the intellect, to adorn the heart, to please the sense, and to delight the fancy.

We are bound by the constitution of our nature, and by that of the Universe, to act in such a manner as will upon the whole secure to ourselves, and to all with whom we are connected, the greatest possible amount of happiness: from this source arises all the duties we owe to ourselves.

But to attain the highest possible amount of happiness, we must acquire the greatest possible improvement: all the faculties of our nature must be approximated by proper discipline, to the highest point of excellence of which they are susceptible: precisely in proportion to the perfection of our moral principle, and its salutary control over our physical and intellectual powers, will be our happiness in this life.

That it is incumbent on us by every means in our power to seek the improvement of our physical functions, is evident from the slightest reflection.

The sound and vigorous operation of our bodily faculties, the full enjoyment of health, and the manly and graceful performance of the several parts assigned us, evidently contribute alike to our own happiness, and to that of our fellow creatures.

The supposition which not unfrequently obtains, that the training of our bodily faculties to a healthy and graceful operation is unworthy of our attention, is not only false, but highly mischievous: such is the connection of mind and body, that if the vigor and gracefulness of the latter are neglected, the interests of the former will proportionally suffer.

If a diamond of the first water be worthy of the labors of the lapidary, to bring it to a state of brilliancy and perfection, the body, which is infinitely more valuable, must be entitled to our best efforts to improve it.

In a still greater degree, however, the culture of the intellectual faculties claims our attention.

Situation contributes much less to respectability than power and disposition to adorn it. It is excellence, distinguished excellence, in our avocations, that will secure to us the approval and regard of our fellow-men.

To insure success in this course, application is in-

dispensable. The delusive hope that genius, or any other circumstance, however propitious in its general tendencies, can supply the place of industry, ought not for a single moment to be cherished: it is labor, incessant labor only, that can result in the accomplishment of our wishes: were we in possession of the brightest and strongest intellect ever possessed by a human being, we should ultimately become the victim of disappointment, were we reckless of its improvement.

The individual who under favorable circumstances thinks most will generally possess the soundest discrimination. Genius without judgment is like a bark tossed upon the bosom of an ocean, without rudder and without ballast.

It may excite the admiration of the ignorant for a short period, but it will ultimately perish in difficulties of its own forming. It is labor, ardent and unceasing labor only, that will secure to any individual intellectual distinction, and prosperity in his calling.

Knowledge, at least that of the useful kind, dwells upon the summit of a lofty hill, and it is impossible to ascend thither without effort.

Yet the road to learning is not the primrose path of pleasure. In the successful pursuit of knowledge, an intellectual sternness, an abstraction from the soft and bewitching enjoyments of sense, are absolutely necessary.

The appetites, emotions, and passions must all be directed to proper objects; and the intensity of their operations, graduated by the value of those objects.

The exciting and conflicting elements of the mind must all be reduced to harmony, and restrained by the dictate of reason.

For the advantageous acquisition of knowledge a healthy condition of the organs of sense is essential; also, that they be brought into proper relations with external things, to receive impressions therefrom; to which must be added, a habit of mental attention to the impressions received, by which the peculiarities and resemblances of different objects are encouraged and remembered.

The mind has also the power of reproducing sensible impressions, or calling them up in view before itself; and by the combination and alternation of a small number of original impressions, can form an indefinite number of images or ideas.

By this means, with impressions from a few specimens only, we may gain a tolerable notion of whole classes of objects; for instance, by seeing half a dozen soldiers we can derive, by mental operations alone, a tolerable notion of an army of thousands.

By the same means, also, we can derive ideas received by others, and communicated through the medium of signs and symbols, as language, figures, etc.: in this manner we gain a knowledge of facts and

objects, which we could never gain by direct observation: for instance, facts which transpired ages before our time, or in situations where we could never gain access to them.

Thus we see that the means and modes of acquiring knowledge are manifold and various; and it is obvious that in order to success, we should not confine ourselves to any particular one exclusively: neither should we depend on our own observations and reflections alone; nor rely exclusively on the accounts and descriptions of facts and things by others.

For it is comparatively but a small number of facts, that come within the range of our own observation; while on the other hand, it is an indistinct, and often an erroneous idea, that we obtain of an object by description merely; without a mental comparison with something that we have ourselves observed, to which it bears a near resemblance.

Those who have a thirst for knowledge should cultivate a habit of observation and reflection, reading and conversation: preferring, when practicable, personal examination to the narrations and descriptions of others, and using both these means as aids to one another.

Neither need we expatiate on the utility of knowledge: and its ability to contribute to the well-being and happiness of the human race.

One must be a very superficial observer who has not

perceived that those who have accomplished objects, and attained to most desirable ends, have universally been persons of the most extensive knowledge and information.

It may be true, that persons of extensive knowledge have sometimes performed pernicious deeds, which they might have been incapable of had they possessed much less knowledge.

It may be, that either greater knowledge, or greater ignorance, would have prevented the evil: but the causes that induce the human to commit a wrong need not be entered into here.

The kind of knowledge most important to the human race is worthy of a careful inquiry. To know one's self, one's character, dependencies and relations, is unquestionably the branch of knowledge that is deserving of the closest study.

In fact, this branch alone can be conceded to be sufficiently comprehensive, to comprise, as it were, the whole tree of knowledge.

It is claimed by many, that practical agriculture, and mechanics are the most indispensable of all the human knowledges; but this claim is open to serious question.

To my mind, the most important of any of the particular sciences are those that treat of morality and physiology: and as these two sciences are closely united, interwoven and dependent on one another, a

truthful knowledge of the same cannot but cultivate the requirements requisite to enable a thorough understanding of all the other sciences.

For knowledge, after all, is an acquaintance with the existence and relation of things; and is mostly the result of certain impressions of external objects, and operations upon the senses, preserved by the retentive power of the mind, called memory; and digested, classified, and arranged by the reflective faculties.

Inventive genius, in regard to process of reasoning, consists in finding out relations and propositions: which are thus capable of disclosing new truths or new relations; and in placing them in that order which is calculated to show how these new relations arise out of them.

This is the exercise of a reflective mind; and there may be much acquired knowledge, that is, many facts, accumulated by memory alone, without any degree of this exercise or habit of reflection.

But both are required for forming a well-cultivated mind; the memory must be stored with information; that is, ascertained facts and ascertained relations; and the power of reflection must be habituated to discover new truths or new relations by a comparison of these facts and ascertained relations with each other; for the discovery of new truths may consist either of new facts, or of new relations among facts previously known: thus it might happen, that we had long been

familiar with two facts, without being aware that they had any particular connection.

If we were then to ascertain that the one of these was the cause of the other, it would be a great and important discovery of a new truth, though it would consist only of a new relation between facts which had long been known to us.

By the light of history, we become acquainted with the past: by analogy we acquire a knowledge of the future, and by mathematics and the natural sciences we discuss the laws and extent of the universe.

Nor are the benefits of education confined to the individuals who receive and bestow it; but extend indefinitely to every portion of the community.

The principal if not the only cause of the different faults that control the human race are ignorance, passion, and habits formed in ignorance of their legitimate consequences. The remedy is to be sought in the general acquisition and diffusion of knowledge, which will greatly assist to enable bad passions to be restrained, and bad habits to be replaced by better ones.

And the only method of acquiring this ascendancy, and control of the passions, is by study and reflection, as to the bearing of all our different actions, not only upon ourselves, but also upon our fellow humans.

Passion acts instantaneously, whereas reason requires time for reflection: therefore, we should use our best efforts, to reason seriously and studiously over all

subjects which must in a measure affect the human happiness; in which manner we may form and establish unto ourselves correct habits, as a sort of artificial passion, which may combat with some success against the bad natural passions, the worst enemies of human kind.

So strong is the propensity in man to form habits and act after them, that he will form habits either good or bad; and since the passions and appetites are always awake, whereas reason and reflection are frequently inactive, the chances are many that bad habits will be acquired, unless we observe the utmost vigilance, and use all possible care to cultivate habits of the better character; and this we can secure, through knowledge, wisdom, or what might be best expressed as education.

CHAPTER III.

MIND.

MIND is that unlocated faculty or function, the result of the action of matter, which gives significance and character to each of the individual senses, and sensations, whether expressive of pain or pleasure.

It can be divided into active or passive mind, as life can be divided into active or passive life. Active life, or active mind, is best displayed when volition or will power is in full control of its functions; or when the human is engaged in the duties, requirements, or enjoyments of existence; active life encourages the exercise of all the mind's functions.

Passive life, and passive mind, must be restricted to that portion of life in which the human rests or sleeps; or when volition is powerless.

This would determine that sleep is the temporary suspension of the faculties (of which mind is the determinant) within the power of our volition.

Therefore, from this point of view, mind displays the distinction that matter displays; that is, it is

either active or passive: from this conclusion, the inference can be deduced, that mind ceases to display either active or passive functions, when matter ceases to encourage life.

Mind cannot be restricted or limited as a function exclusively human, but its purpose must be extended to all animated matter: or matter which displays volition or will power; and this must include within its embrace all animal matter in addition to the human; for mind is simply synonymous to consciousness, which can include within its fold, feeling, memory, perception, with feeling at the base of all its operations.

It were absurd to contend that pain or pleasure, ease or suffering, which are but other terms for feeling or consciousness, was not common to all animated being; and memory is as much a part of consciousness as feeling; in fact, it would be difficult to dismember or separate either of these functions from mind action; for memory is but a recollection or a resurrection of past consciousness.

Memory can best be defined as the faculty which retains in the cell of its storehouse all the past actions, doings, and conceptions of matter; every sensation of which the human is susceptible is immediately recorded and impressed in that department of the human system to which is ascribed memory.

Perception, which can best be defined as the faculty

or the capacity of responding to some stimulus, can only arise from the fact or knowledge of either drawing upon the sense of an immediate feeling or consciousness, or a response to a resurrection of a past memory; and to this sensation we can attribute the creation of that which is defined as judgment.

Therefore, as all these different functions or sensations must spring from feeling, mind after all can be compressed into the definition as consciousness.

The objects of true science are facts alone, and the relation of these facts to each other; and this should be kept steadily in view.

Contemplation generates thought; action propagates it; without the first, the latter is defective: without the last, the first is but abortive and embryous.

The mind of man contemplates and admires this beautiful world of which it makes its highest part: neither can it dispense with that world of which it forms a part.

It is undoubtedly true, that through proper action we can create an inner or internal world far more inaccessible to chance than the external world which is constantly with us: and the means by which we can effect this internal world can be rendered equally useful to our prosperity: for the riches, which by the aid of knowledge or wisdom, that we lay by in the mind's storehouse, of which the capacity seems

illimitable, is the surest, if not the only coin by which prosperity is bought.

Yet, it is not proposed in this argument to dispute with the different philosophers, as to whether the mind perceives external things, or only their ideas, images, or species; for it certainly would be immaterial to a sentient being, whether a thing conceived is a fact, or a fancy, if the impression which it retained in either case gave an equal pleasure or pain: for it is only through pleasure or pain that the physical senses are discernible.

Neither need we extend our thoughts or inquiry into the realm of that other impossible field of discovery; that hypnotic or mesmeric pretense, or phenomena, that assumes that the mind in perceiving external things, leaves the body and comes into contact with the objects of its perception: so that the sensitiveness of a sentient being can be controlled and acted upon to such a degree as to lose its own individuality, and be made subservient to any fancy that the opposite or controlling mind wishes to display.

Writers on mental philosophy have generally ascribed to the human mind a variety of faculties; but a close inquiry would rather determine that those phenomena, termed faculties, are rather actions than separate powers; and these operations which have been denominated faculties are only the same energy, excited to different actions from various causes.

Matter is that substance of which every body is formed: the substratum of all sensible qualities: whether the parts composing the substratum be perceptible or not.

Its chief qualities are solidity, extension, divisibility, inertia, and attraction.

That the human body is material is a proposition which none need deny. It is not only solid, extended, capable of being divided, equally indifferent to rest or motion, and possessed of all the properties of attraction; but of every other attribute of matter.

It is claimed the material body is of itself insensible.

Scientists divide matter into inorganic and organic: it is evident at once that inorganic matter is insensible: with respect to organic matter, it is claimed that of elementary bodies there are not more than ten or twelve at most, from which general physiology borrows material: and that of these bodies there are only four, namely, oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and azote, which constitute nearly the whole of the composition of living beings. The material body of man is then of itself insensible, since it is only composed of oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, and azote, elementary bodies, evidently insensible: if then it appears sensible, it is because each of the innumerable parts which compose it is the envelope of the same corresponding part of

that which we express as the mind; the only body which is gifted with sensibility.

The material body therefore, has not of itself any form which is properly its own: this conclusion we arrive at from the fact that were it not from the mind, *or the life*, which makes us sentient beings; form, or distinction, as to the material body, would not be known: abstract life, for a moment, and you will acknowledge that matter of itself cannot have any particular form.

The four elementary bodies, of which our material body is composed, would not have been combined together so as to present a human form, if they did not cover a mind body, *or a living principle*, which has itself the form.

Yet see how quickly this mind or sentient body can of itself be disturbed, made non-sentient, or in fact entirely eliminated from immediate human life: and this would equally apply to all animal life: the inhaling of an ether or a chloroform into the animal system produces a loss of sentiousness; while an excess absolutely eliminates the life principle: yet either of these anæsthetics is of liquid and very volatile properties; and it is reasonable to conclude that the body, bereft of the living principle, still contains the even quantity of its elementary properties.

Yet here we encounter a great perplexity. Man has habituated himself to reason, only from the illusion of

his senses: he is accustomed only to admit with entire conviction what he seems to see with the eyes of his body, or appears to feel through the functions of the different senses: yet, we think we have clearly demonstrated that all sentient knowledge or illusion is absolutely the mind's expression; and that we can neither define or express that to which is conceded physical matter, as well as physical perceptions, but through the action of that which is expressed as metaphysical mind, or to define it more clearly, "the living principle;" yet paradoxical as this conclusion may appear, for life can only be expressed as "animation," we are driven to the metaphysical exposition for the fact, or the illusion, of the physical existence.

To illustrate this conclusion: If the human appreciates sense and form only through the medium of mind, that which is defined as the material body of man is of itself insensible, and that which is expressed as metaphysical can of itself possess no sensitiveness: for it is only to the physical that the human concedes the power of sense: and this would almost compel us to the conclusion that the organization of the material or animal body only possesses the active principle of life, viz., animation and sensitiveness when mind acts as matter, and matter reacts as mind.

When a wound is received, suffering ensues: why? We can say, because the separation of continuity which exists in the wounded part disturbs the organization

of the whole: but this is not sufficient answer: what suffers? It cannot be the body; for that of itself is insensible: it therefore must be the mind or the principle of life; and as this principle of life, which is the unaccountable and inscrutable exposition (and which to the human can never extend beyond theory) is composed of affections and thoughts, it is to the affections and thoughts that the knowledge as to the suffering is displayed.

In fact, when that which is expressed as the body is in its integrity, it is claimed the mind is then enabled to act freely, according to internal impulses; but if that same body is injured, diseased, or underfed in any manner, the mind being thereby prevented from acting freely, causes pain and suffering.

If, for example, there is separation of continuity in a part of the body such as a wound would cause, the mind at once displays a pain or suffering: in disease and hunger, there is separation of continuity in the system, and consequently there is also pain and suffering therefrom; and as excretion, which might be likened to the consumption, is constant to the life principle; if the accretion, or that which we can call the supply, is not maintained in its integrity and continuity, pain or suffering cannot be avoided.

It is contended for with great persistency, that mind is in no wise affected by separation of continuity in the system: that it is distinct and separate, and not

dependent therefore for its fullness to the system in its integrity; and the reasoning is justified on the ground, that where amputation of any of the different limbs has occurred, mind is still displayed in its fullness: yet this conclusion is subject to great doubt.

In cases of disease and hunger, mind without question constantly reverts to the effects of the sensations that disease and hunger display; while in the case of limb amputation, if after the covering and truthful healing of the wound of the amputated part, mind still displays its fullness, it simply determines that the amputated limb or limbs were not positively necessary to mind, which has been expressed as "the principle of life."

If the injured part was an organ indispensable to the general action of the system, such as the heart or lungs, the mind or life principle will cease to act, and disintegration, or division of the system, at once set in; and this determines that the heart and lungs are indispensable to mind.

In the case of amputated limbs, it is strongly urged that the remaining portions of the system are nourished with an increased intensity, in consequence of a lack of integrity in the whole; a consequence of the dismemberment.

It may be true that as far as the reasoning power of mind is concerned, it depends upon the brain matter; it being claimed that the brain is the medium of

communication with the external world, whereby we can see and feel for others besides ourselves: that is, a demented person, though sensitive in all the other organs of being, is not competent or responsible to aught that concerns the external world.

This same view might be extended to apply to one who was deprived of the use of his eyes, or his hearing: these organs of sense would only be lost to that which concerned the external world; for a sightless, a deaf or a dumb person (like one who has a dream during sleep often retains the recollection of the dream), acknowledges that objects were as distinct, and sound as clear as if they were awake, or these organs were faultless.

It were useless to argue as to cause; it must be ascribed to phenomena equally as inscrutable as "the principle of life itself."

But when we refer to disease, disorder, hunger, starvation, or cold, with reference to mind, or the vital principle of life, the exposition can be made to submit to intelligent inquiry: disease is defined as any alteration of the normal vital processes of the body, under the influence of some unnatural hurtful condition, called the morobific cause: if accompanied by change of structure, it is called organic or structural: if not, it is said to be functional.

Hunger is only a painful sensation, caused by the want of food: a warning of the vessels being in such a

state of vacuity as to require a fresh supply of aliments.

Starvation can best be expressed as extreme suffering from cold or want of food: therefore, as no knowledge as to sense can be discovered except through mind, or the vital principle of life; any perturbation of the system, such as disease, hunger, and cold display; and which must necessarily affect the happiness, perpetuation, and welfare of the human race, is well worthy of a serious reflection, and a considerate attention.

Nature continually diffuses life into the whole universe; but this life, penetrating into bodies, is modified according to the constitution in each of them; no doubt, as the natural exposition becomes more exposed and defined, its results as to the human will always tend to a higher degree of perfection: but this cannot be so readily determined as to other animal or vegetable creation, which are also created, given life and controlled by the same nature: for they are simply of the causes which sustain, encourage, and assist toward the securing of the final perfect human.

Besides, it is a conceded fact that man owes the faculty of ascending from the effect to the cause; and from the cause to the end of his particular organization; if the human had not that elevated forehead, which distinguishes him from the other animals, he would be deprived of this faculty; for experience

proves that the more the forehead is depressed, the less there is of intelligence: and that he is no more than a kind of idiot, when the depression is very great; experience proves besides, that among animals, the smaller the anterior part of the brain is relatively to the whole, the more inferior is the degree which the species occupy in the chain of animated beings.

That which has subsisted from eternity must be immortal in its nature: the eternity which is future is no longer than the eternity which is past: and that which could resist decay in the past will likewise resist decay in the future.

Besides, the human race, as discoverable to the human knowledge, are but creatures of an undivisible, illimitable, and inscrutable creation: this is evident from the fact of their composition: the human is composed of parts: these parts are a compound of very different ingredients: the elements of a composition must be in a simple state, before they are united: otherwise an effect will exist without a cause: composition must imply the union of different substances: the combination of these substances must be subsequent to the beginning of their elementary conditions: if the elements did not exist, previous to their combination, how could they have been combined? To say that a compound existed before its component parts were in being, is a contradiction in terms.

From this reasoning we can be quickly led to the

conclusion that the immortality of the vital principle of life—or that which by many is expressed as the mind, by others, as the human soul—is not only possible, but under this exposition of the case highly probable.

Death, to the human knowledge, consists simply in the derangement and separation of our corporeal particles: but this process can in no wise affect the vital principles controlling the human life; which after all must always remain beyond human inquiry.

Besides, the probability of the immortality of the vital principle of the human life is demonstrated by the works of nature itself.

Vegetation in all its varieties contains a principle of vitality, which, surviving the dissolution of its coarser parts, discloses, under favorable circumstances, the freshness and verdure of its former existence: seeds, which have been long emboweled in the earth, have been known after their disinterment, to develop a living and vegetative principle: of the correctness of this statement, we have ocular proof: and yet, to those unacquainted with the laws of nature, the perpetuation of the principle of life in seeds, after the decay and destruction of their parent stock, would appear less likely than the immortality of the vital principle of the human life.

Nor have we instances of a continuous vital principle, only in the vegetable, but also in the animal

kingdom: like the fabled phoenix, many species of beings, rising from the ruin of their predecessors, reappear in a state of increased beauty and animation: though their bodies became the subject of decay, their animal identity is still preserved: instances of this description in the natural history of the chrysalis are too frequent and familiar to require proof.

What, then, is common in two departments of nature is surely possible in a third of a similar nature.

The question has often been agitated, whether matter does or does not possess the principle of multiplying or increasing the amount of the simple elements, of which it is composed, through the instrumentality of the various gases and the vegetating principle contained in nature.

No philosophy has ever yet been able to establish the affirmative of this hypothesis: for the determination of the fundamental point lies far beyond the cognizance of any positive demonstration or analysis.

Yet, with regard to organized matter, that which is produced through procreation and vegetative instrumentality, there need be no doubt that as far as its tangible appearance is concerned, it does add both to the weight and dimensions: this can be demonstrated by planting the seed of an annual plant in a given portion of earth: when the plant is fully matured, it will be found that the earth has lost but a small por-

tion of its weight: but the earth and plant together will sometimes weigh some number of pounds more than the earth when the seed was deposited: yet, notwithstanding this apparent increase of weight, it would doubtless be found, were we able to weigh all the gases and nitrates which contributed to the growth and weight of the plants, and then were able to weigh the atmosphere, together with the other substances, from which these supports were derived, that just in proportion to the increase of the weight of the plant would be the decrease of the weight of the substances from which these supports were derived.

Reasoning from an equal hypothesis, to that of the seed of the annual plant, which receives its form, its completion, its intent, purpose, usefulness, and character from the earth in which it was bedded, in connection with the gases and nitrates, which its nature attracted and took unto itself, might we not conclude that equally corresponding influences determines and controls the human development and action? These reasonings are worthy of a candid consideration.

The disrelish that the human has of contemplating for a long time a single object, or a single class of objects, enforces the conviction that thought, as well as action, were dependent on certain physical organs, which, owing to the same general cause, become fatigued by over-exertion; and require rest and recuperation to replenish and recruit their energies.

Reason, indeed, recognizes the operation of general laws, both in the physical and moral world; but its perception of their individual application is inadequate.

Man is but one link in the great chain of existence, and is dependent on every other link for the accomplishment of his destiny.

In the vast and completed machinery of the universe there is nothing superfluous; but everything, however insignificant, is essential to the whole.

Besides, man is a social creature: the circumstances of his condition, and the constitution of his nature, all incline him to the social state; and this state is contributive alike to his own happiness and to the general welfare.

Standing as he does in these relations, he is evidently responsible: responsible to himself, to his benefactors, to his government, and to his fellow creatures.

From this conclusion probably arises the fact that we feel unpleasant at doing an injury, while aught that we do toward promoting the happiness of others gives us pleasure: it might be possible that in both these cases the motive of the action might be a selfish one; governed and controlled by the fear that we might be liable to be affected in the same manner ourselves.

'Tis true, a habit of feeling thus contracted might so expand as really to make us interested in the wel-

fare and happiness of others, divorcing us largely from selfish considerations: that such a principle exists and always existed in the human mind cannot admit of question: for the desire to enlarge and better the total happiness constantly manifests itself through the public conscience.

Whether this principle originates and holds its force through the fear of the individual; a consequence of the dread of like visitation of misfortunes unto themselves; or whether it depends on the physical organization of our bodies; or on a principle entirely freed from any physical influence, the human cannot determine: it does exist, and operates to move and modify the actions of the race.

Neither will it answer any purpose to attempt to enter any deeper into the inquiry at question. It will always resolve itself into, Is it physical or metaphysical? If physical, we could only conceive a possible solution; if metaphysical, it must always remain conjecture.

When we speak of an affection, or a thought, it is always in equivalent terms to light or heat; of love, we say that it inflames; of truth, that it enlivens: when we describe an affection, we say it is lively or ardent; of a bright thought, that it is luminous or brilliant: would not this carry the conviction that heat and light control and govern the material man, as that heat and light govern and control the material world?

It may be claimed that the scientist, with the use of the scalpel, cannot locate or find anything whatever, that can be expressed as the principles of affection or thought: that he fails to discover the least particle of imponderous matter, to which might be accredited the seat of affection or thought: but an assertion is in no wise a fact, for although in the material world we deduce many of our conclusions, or as it may be facts, from analogy or analysis, in the metaphysical inquiry we can never extend them beyond conjecture or desire: in either of which we are largely governed by the forces controlling our physical senses; and that these senses are material is conveyed to us through the mind functions, or that vital principle of life which is claimed to be immaterial.

There is naturally such a dissimilarity in the operation of the human intellect, even on the most simple and ordinary topics, that the moment we enter the region of conjecture we fall into contradictions: and metaphysics must always remain conjecture.

This conclusion need however in no wise displace the conviction to which the greater part of the human race has at all times assented to: and that is a firm and sincere belief in a metaphysical existence: they have disagreed and disputed in what wise, or manner, they should prepare for this metaphysical existence; the casuist may reason against it till he bewilders himself in his own arguments: he will never be able to eliminate

this consciousness, desire, or sensation, away from the human assent: although the unknown will always be immeasurable, it will excite the mind's conjecture to a greater degree of intensity than that which we can express as a known physical fact.

Yet both are equally sensations: and although there will undoubtedly always be a sympathetic affiliation, an indescribable yet yearning affinity, which wraps the physical existence in the embrace of the metaphysical conjecture; such is the nature, hope and wish of human kind, that life would be despoiled of its most distinct charm, its most alluring future, were the possibility of their separation a human acceptance.

You cannot tear them apart: they are clasped and bounden together by the rivets of eternity: they are inherent to life, and will always withstand the onslaughts of the philosopher's batteries.

So it should be. Physical life is too real to satisfy the mind's fancy, that all ceases with its existence: if our thoughts could not wander to a more blissful future, but were tied to the realism of a too earnest present, animal or sensual existence would be the aim of all: and morality, justice, and truthfulness would lose their sway: and this is not possible to an ever-growing and beneficent nature.

CHAPTER IV.

MAN AND THE OTHER ANIMALS.

THE rules of action that are best calculated to subserve the interests of humankind and further the human happiness can only be successfully anticipated by reflecting and reasoning upon the nature of things, their bearings, and relations upon the constitution, habits, and nature of the human race; and the manners and habits of conducting not only ourselves, but also as to all of our relations and conduct with reference to each other.

The naturalist, in describing the peculiarities of animals, advises us as to the different distinctions that exist between them and other material bodies.

Yet, although animal life is not the only form of life which results from the operations of nature, arising from the different modifications of matter, it is the only form, as far as the human mind can conceive, which possesses the powers of sense and voluntary motion: yet, although all growth, all that accretes and excretes, the increment and the excrement, must contain as part of its properties of matter, *the living*

power; it is only to that part of creation which possesses the power of sense and voluntary motion, of thought and action, to which the human concedes the possession of that principle which can be most fully expressed as *the principle of life*.

Assuming the correctness of this conclusion; assuming that it is only animal creation which is endowed with the power of voluntary action, of sense and motion; if we hope to learn the wherefore of their doings, and which doings are so often contrary and inconsistent with the ways and doings of each other; we must study, reflect upon, and consider the motives, or the causes, which induce or compel them so to act: and therefrom to deduce conclusions which in a measure should determine what actions would be best calculated to promote the ends which they propose to themselves, as that which would be most effectually conducive toward securing their pursuit to a worldly happiness.

In one particular essential all animal (including human) creation agree; no matter how different they may be as to their different powers and capacities, or the different degree of perfection in their separate organization—that is, they seek all that is pleasing or agreeable; and avoid all that is painful or disagreeable.

This can be most fully exemplified by stating that the nature of the thing sought for or avoided, and the

sensations produced by and through the use or actions of these things, seems to be understood by the animal seeking or avoiding the same. On this hypothesis all the actions of the animal creation seem to be governed.

To avoid and appease the disagreeable sensation of hunger, they all seek food: yet the food sought for is always different, according to the different species of the animal creation which seeks the same; each seeks their own kind of food: some prefer the animal food; others vegetable food: some are specially agreeable to sweet products; others to the very reversive.

Yet to the human mind it must be obvious that these different kinds of foods must be specially agreeable to those creations that respectively seek them; and we further must infer that the most powerful motive of action that governs that part of creation which is indued with what we call the principle of life, viz., the power of sense and voluntary motion, is to obtain such food as is most agreeable to them.

Abiding by this conclusion, the mind is confronted with a most serious perplexity: all food, whether animal or vegetable; all growth that contains the properties of increment and excrement; possesses, and must possess, a principle of life (possibly, not that principle of life to which the human concedes senses and voluntary motion, yet a principle of life, whereby it is enabled growth and decay); yet one in which all

human happiness may in a sense be involved: and that is, whether the human or the animal is in any wise governed and controlled in what we term its voluntary motion, through the taking of the food by which it retains its power of life.

Results can be very immediate, but causes that produce these results are often very remote: the human race, however, is so prone to dispute and argument, so compendious and precipitate in their conclusions, as to fail to give sufficient scope to their inquiry: attributing all effects to supposititious immediate causes; which however, may yet be absolutely foreign from the actual causes which produce the effects.

The power of motion, or life power, that all animals possess, depends upon the vital principle of muscular contraction: that is, the contraction at will of certain fleshy parts of the body, which, acting through the medium of tendons attached to the bones, produce the motions of the body, upon strictly mechanical principles.

This life power, or power of motion, is not the constant aim or desire of all animal creation; for on many occasions they seek those conditions which require but little action or contraction of the muscles: for on such occasions food is no longer a requirement or agreeable.

Freedom from the necessity of muscular action is

what is termed ease or repose; and is also agreeable to all animal creation.

We should not, however, conclude that ease is more agreeable to life power than action; for action is constant to all life: for this conclusion would be inconsistent with the truth; which affirms that the accretment and the excrement are of the elements of nature; and of the maintenance and sustenance of all life; and can only cease of action, with the vital principle of life itself.

We further observe that muscular action, when not too forcible or constrained, is more agreeable to the young than to the old; who without any apparent motive, or cause, frequently turn from a state of ease and repose to one of lively action.

From this we might infer that the actions and motions of all beings are largely controlled by and through the action, and the property of the elements of which all life is composed.

Further, all animal creation seeks the presence and intercourse of their own kind: and the different sexes, of the presence and intercourse of one another. All these objects must be agreeable to life; otherwise they would not be sought for, but avoided.

Those objects which are carefully avoided must be disagreeable; or the converse of those which are sought for and agreeable. Hunger is avoided, and food sought for; excessive heat or cold is avoided, by

seeking those situations which are agreeable and congenial to their different natures; and this would determine that whatever is agreeable constitutes happiness or contentment: while all that is disagreeable, the converse, or what can be expressed as misery.

The universal motive therefore to all living actions is to secure happiness and avoid misery.

As a means of securing the end sought for, all seek to pursue that course which is calculated to produce the direct gratification of some of the senses, without any view to the remote tendency of their actions, or the manner in which it might affect others.

With few exceptions, all animal creation—man excepted—eat the foods which best please their taste; satisfying their present appetite, regardless of their own future wants, or others' necessities.

A hungry animal will seize and devour whatever is agreeable to its taste, without giving any thought to the consideration that by saving part of it till it had greater need, it might avoid the pain of hunger another time: also disregarding the pain occasioned by taking the life of other animals, whose flesh might be agreeable to its sense of taste.

There are, however, some few remarkable exceptions to this rule, which it is interesting to note, as it serves to illustrate the wonderful works of nature, in its many and various features; as in these cases we might infer that a thought or mind power lies.

Take the ant, one of the smallest and most insignificant of animal creation: the bee, the squirrel and nearly all gnawing animals, who show a provident care for the future: who, with great toil, besides supplying all present needs, lay by a store for future needs when food is plenty, showing thereby a regard for future as well as present comfort: their object must nevertheless be future happiness: submitting to present toil, to secure future plenty. The female oft finds more pleasure in feeding and caring for her young than in satisfying her own appetite: this, however, need not imply that she prefers hunger to a satisfied appetite; but because she finds a pleasure in contributing to the needs of her offspring.

These facts illustrate some of the objects, which serve as motives, to modify the actions of the lower animals.

We might here state that all animals, with the exception of the human, follow nearly the same course of action, according to their kind and species: and though some changes may be produced upon their manners by domestication and training, no important results can be hoped for, from our reasoning upon the subject; for they are incapable of following us in our conclusions.

Nevertheless, the motives and the tendencies of other animals besides man, though they might be considered irrelevant, may serve to illustrate principles

which operate upon the human race, in common with other animals.

We further discover that the action of all animal creation have other effects, beside and remote from, and often contrary to, their immediate influence upon the senses, and the sensual appetite: though these seem to be the most common incentives to action: for instance, our appetites or desires may induce us to eat or drink so excessively, of some pleasant food or drink, as finally to induce pain, disease, and death.

We often spend our last dollar to gratify a passing whim, from the consequences of which we might be compelled to undergo the pains of hunger and cold.

Thus we are instructed that we should consider the remote as well as the immediate consequences of our actions, in order to truthfully determine the influence that they exert in effecting the object we always have in view, viz., the attainment of the human happiness.

Crime, insanity, viciousness, are but part of the natural exposition, and can never be totally eliminated from the human life, except the ideal perfectibility of the human race, both physically and morally, were attained: each display but a physical or moral defect of the human system; and one is but the outgrowth of the other.

The passions exhibit but the outburst, or the sensation, of a pain or a pleasure: and are therefore physical, and in a great measure uncontrollable: yet, in the

individual case, they as readily tend to what society expresses as a crime or a viciousness, as to a virtue or a morality.

In this measure can be seen the close relation which binds the physical to the moral life: a mild and moral mannered person, by an intemperate use of intoxicants, can become so divorced from a truthful deportment as to display brutal attributes, and temporarily be lost to all sense of conscience or moral action: yet on a passing off of the effects of the stimulants, display a great remorse for acts that were momentarily beyond control.

A violent outburst of passion may tempt to deeds of violence, that years of penitence and future good behavior in no wise alleviate the remorse occasioned therefrom.

In all this we find that there are causes, which affect and control the human action, too remote to trace the origin of.

If a person cut the throat of another asleep, and get behind a partly opened door, to notice and gloat over the astonishment of the dead person when he opened his eyes and discovered he was dead, the conclusion would lie, that the total action would be that of an irrational or insane person: yet watching to discover the effect produced displayed in a measure rationality: were there no reason displayed, and reason indicates rationality, we might anticipate absolute

forgetfulness as to the deed itself, in addition to remorse.

A jealous person will often display as irrational or passionate outburst of an uncontrollable passion and action as an insane person; but it would seldom be extended beyond the one against whom the supposed grievance lies; and which in many cases might be but an imaginary grievance.

Jealousy is oftentimes as irrational and violent in its disposition as insanity; yet it is never expressed but as one of the passions: it is often closely allied to envy, which can also be expressed as one of the passions: yet although envy is always a base passion, having the worst passions in its train, it seldom leads to such irrational and violent outbursts as jealousy but too often leads to.

Yet the defense of insanity would not be conceded to a jealous person, who commits a violent and death-dealing action on another: yet in what truthful measure do they differ? Both at a special time seem to be completely deprived of a sense of consciousness as to the wicked deed itself. 'Tis true, the one to whom is conceded the defense of insanity, as a palliation for the act, may in no wise be immediately sensitive as to a wrongdoing, and therefore conscience-free: while the jealous person, though powerless as to a self-control, may be conscious as to the deed itself, and gloat over the accomplishment.

A choleric person may also at times, without premeditation, display an uncontrollable disposition to deeds of violence; yet, directly following the act, be cognizant and remorseful for the deed itself: neither would one be allowed in such a case the defense of insanity.

Science defines choler as a passion: a development caused from a bilious temperament: it is characterized by black hair, often curling; black or hazel eyes, and dark, yet often ruddy, complexion; a hairy skin, and a strong, full pulse.

Here are presented physical characteristics, from the possessor of which might be anticipated, as an uncontrollable disposition, deeds of violence; yet it has never been submitted that choleric persons should be treated as insane persons, and allowed an insanity defense, in the case of a deed of violence.

Love and hate, two further human passions, also display widely divergent and contrary attributes: either passion is also inclined, under certain stimulus, to an uncontrollable desire to violent deeds: to love has been ascribed the divine afflatus; but this would be rather a strained conclusion; for love has often been turned to hate, and is therefore not worthy of a too ennobled distinction: both love and hate are simply human passions, the outbursts of physical affections.

All of the human passions have at times displayed an inclination and an uncontrollable desire to deeds of

violence, when a sudden ebullition of temperament encouraged such a condition: and this would lead to the conclusion that all these ebullitions are purely physical affections: therefore, the deeds resulting therefrom can no more be prevented or avoided than the acts or deeds of the conceded insane person.

Yet insanity can only be expressed as a physical affection, simply measuring a difference in degree, as to the temperaments displayed by the consented passions: the principal distinction that is discoverable in the insane is a lack of the incentive cause, that should stimulate to and encourage deeds of violence: yet there is oftentimes more method, and a presumptive meditation, in the acts of the insane, than is displayed or discernible in the sudden and uncontrollable ebullitions of temperament, and thereby action, that the passions at times display.

Insanity, defined as unsoundness, unhealthiness, is nothing further than a disease; in which, as the scientists express, the encephalic nervous textures are primarily involved: it is a physical defect, in which, by appropriate treatment of the structures affected, the perverted functions might be restored.

This equal reasoning can be as truly applied to all wild ebullitions of temperament displayed by the different passions: they are also physical defects, or diseases, and should be looked upon and treated with the same object in view, viz., the restorement of the per-

verted functions of those parts of the affected structure requiring the same.

In all the conditions of the different human temperaments heretofore cited, all the outbursts of the different passions seem to be uncontrollable; and all have a tendency toward the same purpose—that is, the doing of a bodily harm to another human—and this appears to be necessary to appease and subdue the excited functions.

We also find that many of these passions are closely allied to each other. Love, the passion which in its purity should lead toward the complete human happiness, often determines as its own inveterate and destructible foe, by its tendency toward jealousy, the most unreasonable and irrational in the exposition of the failings of the human structure: jealousy toward envy, a deplorable, discontented and heart-rending weakness: envy to hate, the most despicable of all the passions.

It is the property of animal bodies that they are constantly undergoing changes in the material elements, or particles, of which they are composed—that is, as elsewhere expressed, all animals, which include the human, all things or beings that possess the vital principle called life, accrete and excrete; certain portions of matter are continually passing off by perspiration and otherwise, which require to be replaced, in order to preserve the health and vigor of the body;

this accretion is accomplished by the food which they receive and the air which they breathe in; a portion of which is circulated through all parts of the body, by means of the various fluids and vessels, and deposited wherever it may be required to supply the place of those portions of matter which are passing off by excretion.

It is on this property that depends the necessity of animals for food, so that if they are deprived of it for any considerable time, they suffer pain, debility, and death: it is often claimed that hunger and cold are the two greatest enemies of mankind: and it is undoubtedly true, that to avoid the pains occasioned from either hunger or cold, the greater part of the actions of all living beings are controlled and performed.

It does not require great reflection to be convinced that to procure food and clothing, and to erect habitations to shelter us from the weather, form the greater part of our studies and thoughts.

It may be that we are treading on dangerous ground; but this is what all science leads us to—to investigate and inquire into that which was hitherto unknown, and by induction and experiment determine the truthfulness of a higher and a fuller knowledge for which humankind craves.

The relations that exist and should exist as between the human family and the animal creation are of an

equal importance and effect, as to the final happiness of the human race; as the relations that should exist as between the different branches of the human family.

We are greatly interested and concerned as to what our relations should be as between each other; and frightfully interested and selfish as to what our individual relations should be as to inanimate things, which might best be expressed as property: might we not therefore, with good cause, seriously investigate our relations and actions as to animate things, namely, the animal creation; to seek cause from effect; and from the knowledge acquired, and the betterment to the human life that this knowledge may secure, make the giant stride in the growth that civilization is constantly striving for: the growing of the human conscience to the acme of its growth, with virtue and benevolence as its chief embodiment; and the elimination of remaining viciousness, its serious purpose.

The relations that exist between the human and the animal creation can best be expressed as the relations between the different kinds and races of sensitive beings.

All inhabit and are dependent upon the earth for life sustenance; and in this respect they are equal to and similar to the human race; they are all capable of pain or its converse, which we can express as happiness: though no doubt in this respect the capacity

varies greatly, as to the different species of the animal race.

In intellectual endowments and capacities for improvement, the human is greatly the superior; but in physical force and faculties, in many cases, the human is greatly inferior: from the consequences arising from which, the human often becomes their victim. Let this fact be borne carefully in view.

Then there are other animals, indued with a certain venom which they use instinctively, for defense and attack, whereby the human life is frequently destroyed: it is hardly probable that these animals possess or are governed by any code of morals, or any conscientious scruples, which might induce them to any consideration as to the human rights: therefore, the relation between the human and these vicious animals which are in the habit of attacking the human is one of warfare, in which the human is usually on the defensive; though there are undoubtedly cases in which the human, not to be outdone in ferocity, chooses to be the aggressor.

Now, it may be natural for us to destroy our natural and perpetual enemies; just as much so as we would destroy those enemies of our own species who declare war and destruction against us; and in this we feel justified by the law or maxim of self-preservation, though in all cases our benevolent and sympathetic feelings should cause us to regret the necessity for violence.

Yet our conscience or sense of justice cannot be offended, where our action does not extend beyond our desire or purpose of a self-defense; more particularly where we are the defensive and not the aggressive party.

Yet even violence under the just expressed conclusions need not be carried to an unnecessary extent; for the moment it extends beyond an absolute necessity, it loses all right as to a justification: therefore, to pursue even ferocious and venomous animals, for the sole purpose of destroying them, simply indicates a viciousness, and not a justice: and conscience itself should at once repudiate such a purpose.

All have like relations and dependencies to the earth for their being and subsistence; and none has the right to complain of the existence of the other: all come into existence *by necessity*, and not by any conscious volition of their own: consequently, the animal has the same natural right to subsistence that the human itself possesses: for what other right does the human possess to the materials and products of the earth, but the mere fact of his existence and necessity? Should not this fact alone convince us of the truthfulness of the conclusion, "That all creatures have an equal right to live," and derive the means of subsistence from the earth?

None can doubt that the pain or happiness of any sensitive being, of whatever kind or species, should in

itself be considered of as much importance, according to the amount of suffering or enjoyment, as that of any other living being, no matter how differently the latter may rank in what the human calls the class or scale of existence: for we have yet to be convinced that any animate or sensitive thing has been placed on the earth, without an object or a purpose.

The principle, therefore, should be incontestable, that the human as a rational and conscientious being should regard and treat all sensitive beings according to the same principles of moral equity that he admits to be just, as between the intercourse with the human race, viz., to do as they would wish to be done by: and a just and true conscience would be content with nothing less.

Yet it does not admit of dispute that in a sense we are all conscientious beings, *nolens volens*. It is true, many possess the ignoble faculty of restricting the influence of conscience to its narrowest limits, while in many other cases it may be misdirected, by bad examples and defective reasoning: and it would be difficult to find the human being but who feels, even if he does not admit it, that certain courses of action are good, just and desirable, independently of any direct personal influence.

Yet it is indisputable that the human is far more selfish than conscientious, and bent on promoting his own individual interest and happiness: it may be true

that conscience may be the offspring of the selfish principle, namely, that when we do and deal with others justly and equitably, it is solely with the view to induce and compel others to an equal justice; it in nowise affects the good and lasting influence; and there can be no doubt as to the different actions between the different members of the human race, no matter how great may be the difference between pure conscientiousness and the narrowest selfishness, that the two principles are truly consistent with one another; for the more justly and conscientiously the human deals with each other, the better will he subserve his individual interests, and promote his own happiness.

It is true, there may be isolated and insulated cases, in which an obtuseness of moral feeling in an individual may be turned to account in increasing his apparent means of enjoyment: yet these cases must be exceptions to the general rule, and be but few in number, for it is but too ready of conception that derelictions from just and conscientious conduct must have a strong natural tendency to be reflected back upon their sources.

But in the intercourse between the human and the animal creation, the case in a sense assumes a different phase: the animal in general cannot avenge the injuries done to themselves or their kind, as the human can: therefore, moral dereliction can be practiced with impunity, provided the human conscience will submit

to practice a deception upon itself: and this makes it a matter of serious moment and inquiry, how far we should suffer scruples of conscience to interfere and regulate our intercourse with the animal creation.

If we could divest ourselves of all sympathy for any animal but man, we would simply destroy all that might in any wise annoy us, and compel all others to minister to our wants and caprices, as suited our fancy: and in this we should suffer no questions of conscience to deter our actions: and their lives or their death would be placed fully at our mercy, to please a passing whim, or satisfy the cravings of a selfish desire.

The manifold comforts or benefits, real or apparent, that would result from an unconstrained control and use of animal creation are truly innumerable: and if these comforts and benefits were the only consequences, no doubt need lie that it would be to the interest of the human race to be absolutely without sympathy or conscientious feeling toward all but the human itself. The animal would then be, like all inanimate objects, to use according to our will and convenience: and our true interests would be to smother any twinges of conscience, or any sympathetic outbursts, for the abuse and sufferings of any beings but the human.

Were such the state of man's moral feelings toward other animal creation, animal creation should be placed on a footing or plane with the made articles of

property: the same as the mineral and vegetable productions, or the products of the mechanical industries; and subject to the same laws and rules in force in regard to the acquisition, possession, and disposition of the same.

Man's moral or immoral sense—you can choose the truthful word from your own inner consciousness—seems to have settled the principle, that the animal should be made to subserve his interests in any and every way his ingenuity and power can devise and put into practice, regardless of the interest or right of the animal, or its happiness, and that the animal might be made to suffer ever so much, to promote, as it is expressed, the human happiness ever so little.

Indeed he has so carefully trained his conscience not to allow it to interfere or inflict any compunctions for any abuses or cruelties that might be inflicted upon any animal other than himself.

Whether this is a desirable state of the moral feeling: whether it were wise to go on in the work of smothering conscience, and put out the last flickering ray of sympathy for the other animals; or whether they should be allowed a place in our conscientious regards and sympathies, is well worthy of our serious inquiry.

The true interests of the human, sensual, moral, and intellectual, must be the touchstone by which the value of every principle must be tried.

Undoubtedly, selfishness will favor no regard for sympathy or benevolence as regards our relations with the animal creation: otherwise we must dispense with the savory meats of turkey, pig, or poultry: with the pleasant carriage or sleigh rides, which have their evil, as well as their good: the exciting sport of the field and the forest; the use of the comfortable robes and furs: all these would have to be foregone.

It is therefore natural that the human seizes and abides by all arguments that sustain and defend him in all his doings; that encourage him in his selfishness; and indulges all his sensual pleasures; and turns these arguments to whatever account they are capable of: while the facts and influences of an opposite tendency and character, where they exist, lying more deeply and remote, and producing their effects in a more remote manner, are never noticed; or, if noticed, are viewed as things at a distance, that need not interfere with man's immediate comfort; and therefore have little effect on his actions or doings.

But there are arguments, the reverse of those held by most men, with regard to their relations to other animals; and these arguments favor the preserving and cultivating conscientious and benevolent feelings; and they are of paramount importance to the final happiness and perfection of the human race.

Both benevolence and conscience depend upon a principle that is single and undivided in its nature;

we cannot have one principle that invites feeling of benevolence toward each other, and another which excites contrary feelings toward any other of the animal creation: the principle is one and the same, and the effects the same. Smother the feelings in regard to one class, and the same feeling will extend to all classes.

The human cannot be heartless toward a brute, and yet display a fine sensibility as toward his fellow. Habit may work innumerable anomalies and paradoxes in our character and feelings, but cannot completely subvert them: as soon as we become insensible to animal suffering, we are but one step removed from callousness; and shortly we will become insensible to human suffering.

And this would be the natural consequence: it may be true that men in the pursuit of a conceded duty, namely, in assisting a fellow being in distress and suffering, can amputate a human arm or leg, or cut from out of the body a cancer, or carbuncle, and appear as if they were callous to the human suffering: yet they may be ordinarily more than sensitive to any suffering which does not come within the line of relieving a greater distress; but in general whenever and wherever there is a want of conscientious regard for the interests and happiness of the lower animals, and of sympathy for their sufferings, a conscientious regard for justice, and the equitable rights of men

will also be found to be a scarce commodity: the slightest dereliction from moral rectitude, even in relation to the animal, is sure to expand itself so as to affect the whole human race: the savage man, who in moral practice is but little above the savage beast, finds the flesh and skin of the beast capable of furnishing him with food and covering; and because he can destroy with impunity, thanks the good spirit that made all animals for man's use.

He little thinks that he himself is establishing a precedent, by which his own neck will soon be brought under the yoke, and his back to the scourge.

Aristotle would never have said that nature intended barbarians for slaves, if the savage had not first said that nature had intended animals for the use of man: and this was but the natural stride in the progress of wrong and violence: and the same tendency has prompted every species of tyranny among men: in fact, in every age the weak and simple have been about as much under the control of the strong and crafty as the races of animals have under the control of the races of man.

Wherever anything like what we term civilization has existed, the great mass of humankind has been oppressed, and depressed as low as the few crafty, designing and unprincipled minds have deemed it their interest to do so; their condition has always been to perform all the labor that nature would support: and

get the least from it that would barely support nature: the surplus has always been taken to increase the wealth and thereby the power of the rich and crafty.

Where this condition has not been the rule, we must look to the causes that enabled it as one rather due to circumstances beyond human control, rather than to those moral and conscientious principles which should prevent one person from even wishing to enjoy the fruits of another's unrequited labor under any pretense.

Where can be the conscience of the unjust oppressor who takes up where he laid not down, and reaps where he sowed not—where can his sympathy be for those who labor, so that he may enjoy? Where can be the conscience of that same poor oppressed laborer, and his sympathy for the poor animal that works hard and enjoys little—that is granted just enough food to support nature, and enable just as much labor in return as nature will support? Where is the conscience of him who will rob the dam of her offspring to slaughter for his meal? They have both gone together, and will doubtless both return together.

As long as the human fails of sympathy or interest for the sufferings and rights of his fellow animals, just so long will he fail of a just regard and proper sympathy for his fellow man: for to fail in our regard and sympathy for the other animals, we adopt a

course which is sure to blunt all the finer sensibilities of our nature, paralyze our conscience, and sap the foundation of the whole moral fabric.

Conceding the truthfulness of this conclusion, in view of the imminent consequences to the human happiness—which must result from a contrary state of feeling and habit—it becomes a question of serious import how our actions and conduct should be shaped and regulated with regard to the principles now in mind.

Nature does not seem to have set its seal of disapproval as to the worrying and destroying of one animal by another: in truth, this seems to be a necessary condition of their continued existence. Scientists claim that at every morsel of food received, and at every breath inhaled by the human, life is destroyed, and the pangs of death inflicted: at all events, whether this is strictly true or not, it no doubt is true that no one can specify with positive certainty a single moment of their existence, that they may not be instrumental in destroying life.

And this fact is constantly set forth as a justification as to the abuse and taking of animal life. It is held that myriads of infinitesimal beings or animalcules constantly float unperceived in the air, which through our inhalation find a tomb in the cells of our lungs, often breeding pestilence and disease: fancy the quantity therefrom daily ensepulchered in the stomach,

taken in with their food and drink: as we walk the earth, we may be crushing them to death or destruction in enormous quantities; and even the fuel that we consume harbors and contains innumerable beings that are hurried into scorching flames without feeling or warning: in fact, almost every act of our life means destruction to other animal life: and this is the strong plea of the animal life-taker.

It is claimed that the human cannot enjoy life without knowingly inflicting pain and death on other animals: the natural relation in which he is placed operates necessarily in a sense as a school of violence, in which the discipline is most effectual toward making him an accomplished cutthroat; viewing all other beings as but imperfectly organized, whose manifestations of suffering can but slightly affect the sympathies.

The moment that we can accommodate our conscience to the conclusion that the inflicting this pain and misery is a necessary and unavoidable condition, it at once becomes a difficult matter to define the lines of demarcation, by which we could distinguish necessity from brutality.

It is no doubt true that the human cannot enjoy undisturbed life without knowingly and sometimes even purposely inflicting pain and death on other animal, and this fact in itself seriously mars the prospect of our ever attaining that high degree of

moral excellence and perfection that the human family should greatly desire.

Nevertheless, he must either suffer evil or commit violence; and it therefore becomes natural that he should inflict, rather than suffer: therefore, he inflicts with impunity, and regardless of the suffering occasioned thereby.

And this condition no doubt has a tendency to avoid and harden the human sympathy, and give to conscience its apology for any wrongdoing as to the human destruction to other animal life.

Besides, all humans are not equally conscientious and kind: and the further the object is removed from equality and similitude with man, the less sympathy or regard does he express for its sufferings: we show less sympathy for a worm or mosquito than we do for a bird: less for a bird than we would for a human: less for a stranger than for our countryman: and in this measure our regard and sense of feeling is removed as the object itself is removed from consented similitude, natural consanguinity, or as society itself determines as class equality.

And these are facts which do not admit of dispute. A community may be conscientious and just toward those whom they consent to as equals, or from whom they might anticipate a retaliation in kind: while at the same time they could be abusive and cruel toward weaker, or, as it might be expressed, inferior grades

and races: generally the individuals of such a community would be fairly secure from the violence of each other: yet the least conscientious among such a community are better prepared and more liable to abuse their fellows than the worst members of another community, in which the general moral sentiment requires strict justice and equality toward all human beings.

Yet reason and experience teach us that life and rights are all but secure even in these communities, where although the moral sentiment will not sanction derelictions from rectitude with respect to the human, it will yet submit to or sanction abuse and violence toward other animals: for as to the moral dereliction, or human conscientiousness, it is but a question of degree: and this soon finds its apologists, when in the minds of the least conscientious the cruelty displayed in the case of the innocent animal will extend itself with impunity and unconcern toward the human.

From all that precedes, we are led to the conclusion that the willful taking of animal life, even for the express purpose of use as food, has a tendency to debase, demoralize, and in a measure retard the growth of what can best be expressed as the moral rectitude; and the philosophy of the reasoning seems to determine that the human race is passing into a life from which the wild, and finally the domesticated animals

will be eliminated: the cruelty and brutality so often displayed, which did not even possess the virtue of being claimed as a possible necessity, such as hunting or fishing, which many would-be moralists claim as harmless sports, in common with those other acts which are claimed as necessities, will absolutely pass out of the human life, enabling its growth to that high degree of both physical and moral perfection that all should aspire to.

All must concede that change is constant to human existence: that all organic beings exist by virtue of the accretion and the excretion—that is, in the removal and the supply of matter. This matter of supply contains certain of those constituent properties which are essential to all life; these properties are of the elements: as to the measure that this supply, or the accretion, bears upon the human life and the human mind, or the faculty of thought, and thereby action and doing, must always remain an immeasurable quantity: yet it were natural to conclude that as these elements are of the essence of life itself, and as like begets and encourages like, that the properties of the accretion will display itself in the development of the life nourished by its acquisition.

That when man led a nomadic life, and fed almost exclusively upon the animal, on the fish and the hunt, he developed and displayed the bestiality and the brutality that his food encouraged the growth and

development of. Take the animal itself: the eating of a hog, that possessed trichinæ, would develop the acquisition in the human system: a cow, that grazed on an unclean and undeveloped grass, and satisfied its thirst from polluted waters, would give as its milk a disease-bearing product; and this would be in keeping with the laws of cause and effect, producing its legitimate results.

Animal food will always encourage animal nature; and morality and conscientiousness are not of the animal, but of the human life.

The human has been so long and so extensively dependent on the lower animals for many of the comforts and luxuries of life, that to many their continued use is regarded as an absolute necessity. It is true, an immediate and simultaneous disuse of the animal creation might result in many evils and inconveniences; but such a condition is hardly within the range of probability or possibility.

The change in the conditions is being effected gradually, even though imperceptibly, producing no extraordinary convulsion; yet, to the inquiring and investigating mind, it must be clearly apparent that animal life and animal use is passing from out of the human life; and this is in keeping with the human progress.

Habit and prejudice are mighty tyrants, and in the days of ignorance and thoughtlessness the human

And

suffered himself to be led by his animal nature (which was fed by the food which he used), by his lusts and passions, into a course of life that vitiated his moral, physical, and intellectual character.

But the laws of cause and effect are producing and have produced results that even the tyrants' habit, prejudice and custom are impotent to stay the progress of; and the giant strides and running leaps that the progress in all the human arts and sciences is carrying into the heart of the human life is encouraging a development in the intellectual and moral improvement of the human race, that cannot fail to carry us to the "*ne plus ultra*" in our career toward a moral perfectibility, and the cultivation of a conscientious regard for justice and rectitude.

Man never can be perfectly satisfied with his progress while he remains the necessary instrument of pain and violence to any sensitive being, either voluntary or otherwise: and this he cannot avoid as long as he continues the use of animal flesh-eating as part of his diet.

And this appears manifest from the fact that those who, in their aspirations after a higher state of moral excellence are most in advance of the race in general, are among those who largely abstain from the use of animal food: and the conclusion that can be deduced from these facts need not be determined from a vegetarian point of view (for with many, their inclinations

or natural propensities are not as yet disposed to abide by this view), but from a humanitarian.

It is unquestionably true, that since the age of primeval man, many races of animals have become entirely extinct: it is also an unquestionable fact that the progress made in all the arts and sciences, which has enabled enormous increases in all the productions which the human race has become habituated to, or their necessities demand, has already affected, and will in time cause a disuse of what was at one time acknowledged as an absolute requirement to secure the needs of the race, namely, the domesticated animals; and disuse must finally eventuate in destruction.

As once before expressed, existence is use; and disuse is destruction. It is equally true that in the earlier progress of the race, their change from a nomadic to a pastoral and agricultural life caused the destruction of the wild animals in vast quantities, driving them from their accustomed lairs and haunts, disturbing their means of sustenance, and by degrees eliminating them entirely from the human life.

It is claimed with much seriousness and truthfulness, that nothing can ever be eliminated from off the face of nature: that what is of nature always was of nature—will always be of nature: that everything that contains the active principle of life, of being and doing, consists, in certain measure and degree, of those parts of the elements that scientists define as

oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and carbon: that either of these properties or elements are simply indestructible: that what we define as death itself in no wise changes the elements of which the life itself was composed, but divides its action, fixity, or form, whereby the human gave it its distinction: that the true union or life-giving properties of these elements are absolutely and solely of the natural purposes: that these elements, passing from one life form or distinction, give form, distinction and life to another form of the natural purposes.

The eating of animal food no doubt subjects human-kind to innumerable disease and sufferings, which are exceedingly deleterious to their physical well-being: yet for reasons heretofore cited an early release from the habits and customs that have been practiced for ages is not to be immediately hoped for, as the moral progress can only with great difficulty be effected, while the human remains so intensely selfish in all their desires and actions: yet, it is always well to hope and strive to secure its accomplishment; and the straightening of a bend here, and avoiding a hill or a slough there, may, by slow degrees, make the road of life smoother and straighter, and thereby nearer to the purpose sought for: for the human quickly accommodates himself to all new conditions, particularly when the conditions are such as to encourage a purer and a better life.

CHAPTER V.

DEGENERACY.

TRADITION says that in the earliest period in the mythological history of almost all nations, those then existing were supposed to live in perfect innocence, and the enjoyment of every pleasure; and that the earth produced all things necessary for their support, comfort, and enjoyment in the fullest abundance; and all animal creation were at peace with each other.

The Egyptians believed in successive conflagrations and deluges, occurring at uncertain intervals; these were designed by the gods to purify the earth from guilt. After each of these judgments, man was again so regenerated as to live for a time in a state of virtue and happiness: after which degeneracy again established itself, continually gaining strength till the next catastrophe; but this is mythological history.

Let us see what exposed history displays, as to the condition of civilization two thousand years ago.

At the time in question the slumbers of a deep sleep had fallen upon the world: ignorance, superstition, and idolatry had overwhelmed both natural and re-

vealed religion: the most enormous profligacy was almost universally practiced, not only with impunity, but with approbation and reward.

Crime, in its blackest form, entered into the essential constituents of the Gentiles' worship: and the grossest ignorance, superstition, and hypocrisy were characteristic of the Jews' religion.

The people were too much debased by ignorance and sensuality to yield or even to listen to the voice of reason. Plato, Seneca, and Socrates might as well have given their lessons to the wind as to the great mass of their fellow-men: to talk to them of the reasonableness of the human obligation was to discourse in language they did not understand: of these principles they were ignorant and reckless; and arguments drawn from them of course would be inoperative. Plato, an eyewitness, hath told us that whatever is set right, as it should be, can be so done only by the particular interposition of the gods: and the dark or mediæval ages did not disclose a much brighter page.

To-day, in the human race, prepollency of good over evil—of health and ease, for example, over pain and distress—is evinced by the very notice which calamities excite. What inquiries does the sickness of our friends produce? What conversation, their misfortunes? This shows that the common course of things is in favor of happiness; that happiness is the

rule, misery the exception: were the order reversed, our attention would be called to examples of health and competency, instead of disease and want.

Degeneracy would compel the opposite conclusion. It is those things which are so common as to call no attention that pass without notice in the affairs of life.

Were we to concede the truthfulness of the proposition, that original man was pure and true, yet free and at liberty to follow all of his inclinations, it would be impossible in what wise we could conceive that his inclination would lead or tempt him to evil: except that from evil he could derive a greater pleasure or good than from purity or truthfulness: for all the results or doings of life's purposes either lead to a pain or a pleasure: and it would be absurd to say that pain was more desirable than pleasure.

Now, if evil or vice was more conducive to the human happiness than virtue or purity, the only object that the human could possess to give up a positive pleasure, such a one as was expressed by the physical senses, would be the exchange of what was conceded to be life's pleasures, desires, and sensations, for the conjectural happiness of a promised eternity.

And this would be in direct contradiction of the object and purposes for which the senses were given to the human in his creation.

It might be claimed that through the senses the crucial test would be applied, as to the human's

worthiness to the higher life (and this would unquestionably be the truthful test to a worldly superiority or moral pre-eminence), but it would appear like a wicked conclusion, and inconsistent with a true beneficence, that punishment should follow the gratification of granted and possibly uncontrollable passions or sensations.

Besides, to argue that such was the established order of things in the human creation, namely, that the human was created pure and true, we must extend the argument still further, and take within its embrace all animal creation, to which also must be conceded a purity and truthfulness of purpose—a conclusion totally inconsistent with our knowledge of the different animal disposition and nature.

It has never been contended that the animal, other than the human, was endowed with the functions of willing and thinking, and governing and controlling its actions at the pleasure and decision of either of these functions; yet we would be compelled to the fullness of this conclusion did we not consent to the truthfulness of this last-mentioned proposition: for if we accept the proposition that original man was pure and undefiled, all other animal creation must have been pure and undefiled, and to have equally fallen from their high pedestal; for otherwise, as animal nature is displayed to present man, they would have freed the universe of original man's presence; therefore, to

carry the argument to a truthful sequence, all animal creation, including man, both in nature and desire, were subverted from the design of their first creation.

Will this proposition submit to the earnestness of a candid inquiry? Man, subject to error, can perfect his work only on the condition of revising and correcting it: if he be an honest legislator, he will only form his code after a long meditation: and having promulgated it, his laws will still remain subject to the changes which experience shall introduce: and this would indicate that foreknowledge or wisdom is, to say the least, not positive to man.

It will not answer a truthful purpose to say that opposition to good produces evil, or opposition to truth gives birth to falsehood: for both evil and falsehood must first be, and must possess greater human attraction than good and truth, to encourage and foster a desire to their control.

Yet this would also be the natural sequence to the proposition itself. It would conform more fully to the human intelligence to submit that that which we express as evil, and which is natural to a free, undisturbed, and uncontrolled display of the animal senses, or passions, always existed: and that as the animal senses or passions are, through natural causes, brought, though insensibly, more and more under the human control, the evil passions will become subverted and the good discovered: it would therefore be

far wiser to submit that opposition to evil produces a good; or that opposition to falsehood gives birth to a truth; and through the opposition hope and believe that evil will eventually, if imperceptibly, disappear from the life of man, encouraged and assisted thereto through the causes and the purposes of the natural exposition.

Therefore, when we are told that there was a time on earth when everything was in a state of integrity, if such a condition ever existed, which must always be a doubtful proposition (for nature itself is constant antagonism), how could that fact ever be discovered, if those contrary or evil conditions from which such a knowledge could be made manifest had no existence?

It appears wiser to conclude that all was evil or brutal; and that the causes which developed and encouraged the enlightening were natural causes, the discoveries of which were effected by accident; and the benefits which were derived therefrom, the natural purpose: for there can be neither favor nor malice in the natural creations; but a truthful and intelligent order and purpose in its exposition.

That human beings were designed for the social state is evident from their wants, their instincts, the benefits of that condition, and the nature of its conservative principle.

So numerous are the wants of man that a supply of them in an isolated condition is impossible: had he

never entered the social state, he would have continued to the present moment more unhappy than the wandering Arab or the Indian savage.

Roving in a trackless desert, exposed to the vigor of the changing seasons, and oppressed with hunger, he would be less comfortable than the beasts of the woods: the social state is necessary to the preservation of his existence.

Nor would his dangers be much diminished by the acquisition of experience and strength: savage in his habits, and unsocial in his feelings, man would be to man the surest and the sorest foe: armed with the weapons of the forest, and stimulated by predatory passions, a war of extermination would be the object of his pursuit: nor would he find his fellow-man the only cause of apprehension and alarm: the beasts of the woods, urged to madness by their hunger, would hunt him for their prey: insulated and consequently helpless, they would exterminate him from the earth, and govern, without a rival, the empire of the forest.

Nor are the instincts of man less active in the formation of society than his necessities and wants: the voice of nature, in this respect, can neither be silenced nor misunderstood.

But while an insulated or solitary condition is to human beings intolerable, the social state contributes to their comfort; the great diversity of situation aris-

ing from this condition is admirably adapted to cherish sympathy and benevolence.

Conducted by a destiny as uncontrollable as discriminating, the human family presents a contrary of circumstance, both interesting and mysterious.

Some are raised to the summit of human glory, and others are depressed to the lowest point of humiliation; some are possessed with vigorous and shining intellects, while others drag out an existence in perfect fatuity; some enjoy health for fourscore years and ten, and then drop into the grave without a struggle, while others are afflicted with every evil that flesh is heir to; some possess estates in every quarter of the world, ships in every ocean, and palaces in town and country, and others have not wherewithal to meet their daily wants.

Nor is the social state less conducive to the gratification of our best feelings. Men at all times have derived from the society of their fellow-men the sweetest and purest comfort.

The judicious gratification and government of our social nature not only give flavor to existence, but impart to character its brightest ornament; and to prevent their legitimate exercise, or to place ourselves under circumstances in which they cannot be employed, is to counteract the design of nature, and extinguish our best enjoyments.

And while the social state contributes to indi-

vidual and general happiness, it is well adapted to our improvement. Scientific and literary associations, combining the experience of past ages with the present, and uniting the efforts of varied talents and acquirements, cannot fail to advance the objects of their pursuits.

The results of such associations adorn the brightest pages of history, and present upon the world's map imperishable monuments of utility and grandeur. By the efforts of social industry, sterile rocks are converted into fruitful fields; and towns, cities, and sumptuous edifices now rear their heads, where only the trees of the forest once grew.

Had our predecessors remained in a savage state, we should behold upon the wide earth naught but the wastes of time and the wildness of uncultivated nature.

To contend that the human who lived in earlier ages, before the printing press was discovered, before letters were generally known, was equal in intelligence, in morality, in humanity, in government, in mode and purpose of life, to the human who lives to-day, would be to contend for an absurdity.

The scandalous turpitude of former ages, the libertinism and profligacy of most of the ruling classes, belong to a past age, and cannot again be revived, unless the circumstances and conditions under which

they existed should again return; and that is impossible.

Before such a change can take place the upper classes must again degenerate into a state of absolute idleness, so as to have no other occupation but licentiousness. The spirit of industry, which now animates and elevates the minds of people in the middle ranks, must be destroyed, and finally, the lower classes must be again plunged into that state of subjection and degradation which once reduced them to the level of mere beasts of burden: now all this is henceforth impossible: public morals are therefore on the rise: and it may safely be predicted that they will gradually improve all over the world.

Besides, vice is nearly always individual, and scarcely ever collective.

Though it may with truthfulness be said that virtue is often seen in rags and poverty, and vice in opulence and luxury, it in no wise affects the conclusion and the knowledge that virtue conduces to the human's happiness, though the happiness may be internal, not external.

Virtue is not more exempt than vice from the ills of accident or fate, but it contains within itself an energy to resist them, and oftentimes an anodyne to soothe.

One knows but little of the human heart who imagines we cannot do a good action: yet he knows

still less who imagines we can always be doing good actions, until man becomes perfect. Daily we hear of great crimes being committed, but we cannot find a wretch so depraved as to be always committing crime. The human cannot be perfect, even in guilt.

To-day the masses of the human race enjoy benefits to which they were formerly strangers; their food and clothing are better and more abundant than ever before, their dwellings more substantial and convenient.

Improvements in agriculture, manufacture, and the useful arts are no longer rejected merely because they are new: experiments are made in every branch of labor, and the methods that prove to be the most advantageous are substituted for old ones: the succession of crops is better understood, and improved plans of cultivation augment the produce of the soil.

With all this progress pertaining to the physical life, the moral and the intellectual progress displayed a corresponding advance. Significant, therefore, is the question of the historian: Was there not moral progress displayed from Melendez to Roger Williams? from Cortez and Pizarro to William Penn?

Yet greater reformation in the lines of moral excellence can only begin, as it did in the past, with the individual; for the passions are not to be suppressed, but directed; and when directed, rather to be strengthened than subdued.

Virtue must emanate from principle, not emotion. Principle, to the mind, is what a free constitution should be to the people: without that principle, or that free constitution, the one may be for the moment as good, the other as happy; but we cannot tell how long the goodness and the happiness will continue.

In earlier and primary ages, there was so much of dependence, and what can best be expressed as a superstitious spirit among the people, that many doubted whether the crops would ripen as usual, except with the ruler's consent, and the paying of the tithes: now, although the ruling impulse of improvement may be impeded and repressed, it cannot be destroyed.

Undoubtedly, perfect happiness in our present state is impossible, our nature being inseparable from desire; and the word desire implies that our present felicity is not complete.

But there is one way of attaining what might be termed at least mortal happiness: and that is to retain a sincere and unrelaxing activity toward securing the happiness and prosperity of others.

It is claimed that man is a free moral creature, to do and to act as seems best to himself. It is true, did we not concede to this proposition a certain sense of truthfulness, the basis of all religion, morality, and law would fail of purpose; for were compulsion the force which governed human actions, religious rites

would resolve themselves into simple superstition; rules of morality become deceptions; and punishments of law, wicked injustice: yet it is undoubtedly true that this sense of liberty is after all but one of degree, and not unlimited; for nature in all its divisions seems to be governed by antagonisms, or antagonistic forces; and unless we concede (which seems absurd) the proposition that primary man was pure and perfect, and free of wile, vice or sin; if we are to be guided in our conclusions by the open pages of history (for the legends of prehistoric man are totally unworthy of acceptance) primary man was far more degenerate, immoral and brutal in all the actions and purposes of life than present man displays.

Degeneracy was undoubtedly more common to the earlier human races: then not only were there no legal restrictions, or moral sensitiveness, operating against consanguineous relations, but among the ruling powers, in order to retain their supremacy and acquisitions, it was even greatly practiced. Such a condition no doubt encourages and develops a physical as well as a mental degeneracy: in many cases, a complete imbecility: 'tis true, power and consequent wealth command educational and knowledge acquisitions which often for a time act even as a physical and mental support; but no doubt such degeneracy finally carries the victim into oblivion.

In modern life, among those of large property

acquisitions, in order to increase or hold the same intact, consanguineous relations (but not in so close a degree) are also practiced, and with an equally bad result: nearly always developing a degeneracy, an imbecility, or an idiocy.

It might be worthy of a serious thought or inquiry, as to whether the centralization, or the lack of a necessary diffusion of the so-called wealth of civilization, is not the fountain source of that which is expressed as the vicious or degenerate life.

The human can only reason wisely and intelligently, by deducing conclusions directly from a careful and painstaking research into the exposed history of civilization; and more so by truthful research into the actual conditions of the life that we are surrounded by, and not by fretting over the subtle distinctions of an intricate and delusive philosophy, which oftener confuses than enlightens the judgment.

Unfortunately, philosophy, as it has been taught to humankind, has been nothing further than an extenuation or justification of all existing conditions; using all established formulas to justify its conclusions, and maintain its fallacies: carefully avoiding any reference to the advanced knowledges that are constantly being displayed to the human discovery, through the exposures that the opening up or the enlargement of every discovery in the arts and sciences develops.

Vice and vicious modes of life are mainly discov-

erable in one of the two extreme classes that society divides itself into—that is, in the extreme rich and the extreme poor; the great medium class holds it in check and prevents its spread; if this were not truthful, society or government could not maintain its purpose, and vice and consequent anarchy would triumph.

When exposed in either of these classes, it is greatly to be attributable to idleness, for idleness is a sure source of viciousness: in both cases it may arise from a want of intelligent employment. In many cases idleness may be both consented to and willing; but in the case of the poor, it is more often a compulsory condition; for the need of life sustenance is too urgent to encourage even a willingness thereto.

Idleness, whether from desire or compulsion, encourages immorality and vice in its every form: in the rich, it cultivates the desire to satisfy a craving for any discoverable or novel animal sensation, no matter how wicked or abominable in purpose or result; in the poor, either their ignorance or the hardship of their conditions often makes them insensible to either shame or virtue; and thus in either case it carries its victims lower in the moral grades, until they determine as mere brutes.

But this condition, fortunately, is not general to civilization or the civilized life, but greatly exceptional. If, as some contend, this degenerate condition was

growing and common to civilized life—and the term civilized itself would have to include the most advanced class of humans, both morally and intellectually—the vicious and immoral habits would rapidly grow, and the human race would quickly decimate; for whatever may be the origin and laws of habit, it indubitably exerts over the human mind a prodigious influence: it is this which forms the character, controls the disposition, and directs the movements of individuals and nations: operating directly upon the most active and efficient principles of human nature, it not infrequently assumes over them a paramount control.

There is no doubt that the spirit of exclusivism, or as some none-too-wise people construe and enlarge it, of human superiority, has been more pernicious in effect, and more destructive to the peace of the individual, as well as to that of society, than even the commission of many of the so-called crimes: it disseminates its poison throughout the entire social fabric, producing the bitter fruits of jealousy, envy, malice, and hatred. None should be deprived, merely by chance of position, out of the respect and consideration which virtue and intelligence ought to acquire: for virtually through this spirit alone vice and ignorance are promoted and perpetuated.

Knowledge is in no wise diminished by its being imparted to others; neither are grace and virtue

destroyed by any public exposition: while every interest, every consideration, would dictate that the more publicity to which they are exposed, the wider all knowledge and virtue are extended, the public welfare will be correspondingly bettered.

The spirit of exclusivism is in a great measure responsible for many of the crimes of society: it is the demon and foster spirit that cultivates the distinction of class and caste.

It encourages the human to cheat and steal, so that things and property can be acquired which will allow association with others who, possessing property, assume claims of superiority; and refuse to associate with others less wealthy: hence questionable means are resorted to, so as to obtain that property, which affords the claim to respect and consideration.

But say what we will, degenerate races tend toward an extinction, not a multiplication: the civilized races are increasing, the savage decreasing.

Immorality is common to savage life: it arises from an ignorance. Morality is the outcome of a superior knowledge, that discerns good from evil. Good tends to a regeneracy, and evil to a degeneracy.

Civilized life is regenerate: it is a false and an ignorant knowledge that will seek for isolated cases of a degraded immorality among civilized nations, heralding them forth to the world of civilization as a true evidence of moral degeneracy.

In earlier and less enlightened or more ignorant ages, that which in our age would be stamped as viciously immoral, was of so common and continuous occurrence as to cause no comment or attention: the general intelligence being too limited to discern a right from a wrong.

In such a condition of society, vice and immorality would be common, if not congenial to the then existing races: while in this age of advanced knowledge, its discovery makes it conspicuously prominent, and calls upon it an unqualified condemnation: this presents a distinct evidence that we are a regenerate, not a degenerate race.

Were immorality, licentiousness, and viciousness of life growing and common to the growth of the human race, it would not be noticeable as an injustice, but rather as a natural condition, a necessity, or a justice.

Further, a degenerate and immoral life would sap the root of the physical life: physical degeneracy will always resolve itself in an extinction: the civilized races are in a steady growth, not a lessening; and this fact, in itself, can be accepted as a conclusive evidence that human degeneracy is not common, but exceptional, to the civilized races: all knowledge is progressive, is light: and light shows clearly the bright paths that lead only to virtue and morality.

CHAPTER VI.

ECONOMY.

SCIENTISTS, economists, statesmen, moralists, church and state, never fail in their efforts to impress upon the mind of man the necessity and the importance of that which is expressed and defined by the word or term economy.

Economy should only be defined as intelligent utilization. A scant utilization could only imply a niggardliness, a parsimoniousness, *or an ignorance*; and either of these conditions should incline to a deserving pity, if not a condemnation; not an encouragement. An extravagant use might incline to a waste; but in spite of the constant exhortations to which the world of humankind has been at all times warned and appealed to abide by, namely, to adhere to what has always been defined as economy—*i.e.*, a watchful or guarded use, and not a complete utilization of all the natural givings—it is a question worthy of serious moment, whether even a wasteful use of all the natural productions is not more worthy of the human

encouragement than the practice of a scant or parsimonious utilization.

It would be difficult to conceive how a positive waste can ever be determined; but a refusal to a complete and intelligent utilization displays an absolute ignorance. Human life at its fullest is but a measured quantity, and to deny to it at all times its full measure of sensuality, or enjoyment, without which life itself might be compared to a sere and yellow leaf, the expended, not the animate existence, would be like flaunting in the face of nature a higher claim to knowledge than nature itself displayed in its givings.

All things that enter into and come within the human life, and to which the use or term economy, as it is expressed or defined, can be applied, are in, of, and from the earth—*i.e.*, they belong to either the animal, the vegetable, or the mineral kingdom; they are either animate or inanimate; their value to the human life only extends in so far as they can furnish food for life sustenance, coverings to shield the body, habitations to shelter from the inclemencies and variations of the atmosphere, or any of those things that go toward securing the satisfying of those sensations or desires that are expressed as the comforts and luxuries of the human existence.

All these different things belong to and are part of the elements of which nature itself is composed.

A query might arise in what manner or measure can

any or either of the elements of the earth become wasted or lost, while accomplishing or securing the purposes for which (as far as the human knowledge can discover) they were created. A waste can only intelligently be expressed as a lavish, prodigal, or exuberant use.

The foods that we use maintain life: a wasteful or excessive use destroys life. The human is endowed with knowledge, and when he has sufficient to satisfy his cravings, needs, or desires—that is, when he has taken of a plenitude—a step beyond that, or an excess, falls upon the sensuality of appetite, and creates a disgust, a nausea, or a pain; and this the animal instinct alone would avoid.

Further, food is of the earth; it can be expressed as the completed natural product. Where found in its primary state, it is native and congenial to its own soils and temperatures. In such cases it springs forth in the fullness of its birth to accomplish and provide for all the purposes that nature itself resolves. Its production is spontaneous—that is, it comes into purpose and use without either human cognizance, shielding, training, or labor. It is often discovered in the fullness of its growth, even to the completeness of its decay.

As science instructs, all productions of the earth possess certain chemical properties. The combination and proportion of these properties that nature itself

resolves upon are of the elements themselves: in their growth and development they attract unto themselves those properties which are their natural affinities; when this chemical combination attains its plenitude, it bursts forth a finished product.

When these productions are of spontaneous growth, *i.e.*, freed in their growth or care from human knowledge, if no sentient beings or creations were near, who could use or utilize such products, they would go through a natural dissolution or decay back into the very elements from which they sprang. In economy this could be defined as *an actual waste*: its production determined a completed labor; for, in the material world, we cannot conceive the possibility of a perfected design without a prior designer; or a finished production without a pre-existing producer. Neither can we content our mind with the reasoning that aught which had taken labor and knowledge to produce had been produced without a purpose or a use; as this conclusion would not accord with the human knowledge. Yet there are innumerable natural productions which, to the human perception, after attaining a full and completed perfection and growth, pass into decay and consequent extinction, without a visible accomplishment or securement of a purpose or a use for their being. It neither admits of dispute nor doubt that what is of the earth, or of the elements of the earth, always has been and always will be of the

earth—that is, it existed from eternity and will exist or be to eternity, using the term eternity from the fact of its being immeasurable.

In the course of the natural purposes, it may take and join unto itself parts of another element, but in no wise disturbs or destroys its original property. Growth, or life, is but a taking on or union by adhesion, attraction, or amalgamation, of the affinitive portions of the different elements requisite to the being or life of each and every natural creation or purpose. Death or decay is but the disintegration, disruption, or decomposition of these attracted or combined properties into their created and indivisible elements. Man oftentimes, in his insatiable thirst for a completed knowledge and a longing hope that he may yet pry into the undiscoverable mystery of the spring of life itself, by synthesis builds up a seemingly duplicative but artificial production, that in a measure may assist in accomplishing the same purpose that the natural production provided for; but in no wise has he ever yet created life. His synthetical productions possess no reproductive or life-giving power, that is common to the natural products. He simply takes and combines, of the different elements, portions productive of a given result, their total purpose ceasing with their first utilization. The human knowledge never can extend to the creation of the elements of nature. They may extend to an infinite

and indefinite utilization of all their different attributes; they may fill the heart and the mind of man with awe, wonder, and admiration, at the purposes which may yet be accomplished; from the fountain source, they may carry light, which is true knowledge, heat, sustenance, health, luxury, comfort, ease, unto the very heart of the human existence; but for all this, homage is not due human: human was not creative: he is but the laborer in the natural vineyard.

Yet, were we to define economy as human has preached and impressed its definitions and necessities to the human race, nature, from which the actions and results of all the human requirements, motives, and actions should be founded and guided, displays a greater prodigality, lavishness, and wastefulness than ever would be possible for human to display.

All our acts should spring from and be guided by the natural results, and when so guided and controlled cannot fail of a truthful purpose. Yet nature oftentimes displays what in the human could only be expressed as an intense prodigality; for its givings are often so profuse as to fail of a possible utilization, or, as far as the human mind can discover, of a purpose, passing into decay and disintegration back into the very source and soil from which it sprang.

Yet the warning is constantly impressed upon the human mind (by so-called economists) as to the necessity and wisdom of a studied and measured use of the

natural productions, so as to watch and ward against the possibilities of a condition which would impugn the beneficence of the natural purposes; and it must be perplexing to the thoughtful mind how such a reasoning can ever be justified in the face of the natural results. *A waste* can only be truthfully expressed as a positive loss; that is, an expenditure, a consumption, or a use, which had received no equal or valued return.

If it were the intent of the natural purposes to destroy animate being through the want of sustenance, there could be no avoiding the certainty of its accomplishment.

In the natural world, whatever is, has always been, will ever be: all things created, and creative, are and must be composed of the elements of nature—and that which is of the elements cannot possibly be eliminated, destroyed, or lost. In the course of the natural purposes or uses, the union or combination of the elements, and which union or combination determines the different things, natures, and purposes for which they are created and designed, will on the perfection and completion of their several purposes disintegrate, each returning to its own native element to repeat and continue whatever is determined in the course of the natural designs. This determines that the properties of which all things on earth are composed are indestructible, and therefore can never become lost, or

lose their intent and purpose. All that can ever be lost, destroyed, disrupted, or made useless is *the labor* that the human may expend in the furtherance, development, or perfecting of the natural product to answer any of the requirements, desires, or luxuries of the human race. Although the natural product can never be lost, its individual identity may constantly, during the natural purposes, be disturbed and hidden: but the separate properties from which all nature springs and consists of will ever remain. To illustrate: Iron ore, when extracted from, or in the mine, is composed of certain properties and portions of the natural elements. To make this ore of use and purpose to the human requirements, it is submitted to certain treatment, which thereby adds other properties or parts thereto; which, though not of the original iron ore, must also be of the natural elements. We now have a composition or a combination, the production of man's knowledge *and labor*, and encouraging to man's uses. Let this now resolve itself into a completed production. Of the properties of which this completed production is composed, no part can ever be wasted, destroyed, or lost, *but the human labor*, which had been expended in forming this production into a special human usefulness, so as to assist in any of the many purposes of the human life; which labor also represented a property, and is the vital factor to which the word or term economy can in any wise

be made applicable or become affected: for instance, a cooking utensil, which would represent the metal of which it was composed, *i.e.*, the natural product, and the labor which gave it form and usefulness, *i.e.*, the human product.

There is great obtusity of reasoning as to what can be expressed or defined by the word or term economy: yet, as it enters fully into almost all of the affairs and conditions governing the human life, it is worthy of a far more serious and cautious inquiry than is usually conceded to it. It is true that the human is too precipitous in determining conclusions, and being governed largely by traditionary sentimentality, dreads the entertaining of any proposition or thought which in any wise may conflict with their predetermined and inworked acceptations. Yet the true inwardness of what a faithful and true economy should determine would greatly tend toward developing that condition which seems to be the constant aim and hope of ever-growing humanity.

Every sound, word, or term that the human gives utterance or expression to denotes a pain or a pleasure—a human thought, desire or wish. Yet the word or expression economy is more various in its many diversifications of construction, and enters more fully in the many ramifications of which the human life is composed, than aught another word, which may define a human thought, a faculty, or a passion.

The betterment of the human life appears to be the uppermost thought affecting the minds and actions of all material existence, and should be equally pre-eminent in either the individual or the collective sense. Yet there may be a vast discrepancy of conclusion as to what constitutes a truthful betterment. Many seek a physical, others a spiritual betterment. Some hope the ideal life would be attained with the securement of property or worldly possessions: while others concede to the mental acquirements the superiority over all other worldly acquisitions. Unquestionably there is a certain plausibility to be discovered in all of the different reasonings, yet they are but the natural expression or outgrowth of the different and many temperaments of the different individuals.

In nature economy can best be defined as its operations in the generation, nutrition, and preservation of animals and plants—the regular, harmonious system under which the functions of living animals and plants are performed. A system of matter: *a distribution of everything, active or passive, to its proper place.* A human economy, based upon the natural lines, could never fail of an equal result.

The most happy and contented era that any people enjoy is not that one in which so-called economy is fully practiced, and all hoard and store the gifts of nature against a possibility of coming hardships (for were this the rule, it would but encourage the condi-

tions that all should strive or desire to avoid), but that era in which labor was eagerly sought for, and the quantities of the productions secured but slightly in excess of the demands for consumption. In this latter condition an ability to a reciprocal exchange value lies, both as to the labor and the commodities that labor requires and consumes. The hire is then worthy of the labor given; and the laborer should always be worthy of his hire. The first condition would just be reversive in result; for a full consumption cannot be maintained or secured, without a full employment; whereby a reciprocal exchange value to the necessary interchanges of the commodities would be assured. The value of a commodity or a necessity to the human need can only be measured by its usefulness. The storing or hoarding of the same in no wise displays a usefulness, or even the certainty of a future usefulness, but only a possibility (or to extend this conclusion to its furthest limit, a probability); for the very elements which encouraged and enabled production can also effectively destroy production. Rot or worm life can enter into its vitals; fire or water consume or destroy its properties; or a further excessive production, which is mastered by the natural purposes, control its disposal or exchange value.

It would not be economy in the human to deny to himself a sufficiency of food, an ample covering to the body, or a suitable habitation, so as to encourage a

physical health, in order to add to or maintain his worldly possessions or properties; for wealth or property can only be considered as such from the fact that it is useful; and its usefulness can never extend further than its ability to secure to the individual the purposes just mentioned; for a refusal or an inability to secure these necessities can be destructive and detrimental to the extension of life itself.

Besides, economy, as expressed and defined by the individual, is rather inclined and impelled to, through a dread or fear that future conditions might possibly arise, from causes that could not be foreseen, which might deny to the individual the obtainment of the aforesaid necessities.

Were the individual guaranteed and assured that these necessities could always be obtained, in exchange for a willing labor, in a reciprocal degree to the value of the necessities desired, the use for the word or term economy would soon pass out of the life of man; as it would thereby lose its anticipated or feared usefulness to the human purpose.

Conceding the truthfulness of this last statement, why is the term economy applied with such earnestness and perseverance to expenditures incurred by and through governmental purposes?—where the reasoning applied to the individual purpose, namely, as to dread or fear that might arise from a possible future want as to life's necessities, cannot possibly lie.

It is clearly obvious in the individual case, except where avarice or parsimoniousness controlled the human, and these conditions are exceptional, not general, to the total human nature, that the motive to which economy owes its force is largely the dread or fear arising from a possible future want; but, as already noted, this motive cannot be made applicable to the control of governmental affairs; neither could avarice or parsimony be so contorted as in any wise to enter into its purposes. Yet government and collective individualism being synonymous, and collective individualism being but the means or measures of expression of the total of the single individuality, is largely swerved by and dictated to, as to method of control, by the same sentiment or tradition that governs the majority of the individual; whereby the individual errors of conclusion are transposed and transmitted into the different governmental purposes: for an error or falsehood can in no wise be converted into a truth through a change of the medium of communication.

In fact, as heretofore expressed, the term economy as defined is a sophism—and has no legitimate or valid claim as to acceptance, except as *to waste*: which change of term would completely disturb its applicability as to human affairs, as expressed and understood by the world of civilization. To illustrate: Waste is best defined as an expenditure, without a

valuable or equivalent return, *i.e.*, to spend vainly, foolishly, or uselessly—to squander: while a truthful economy would always exemplify an intelligent utilization. To verify the truthfulness of the reasoning of this exemplification, the following premises must first be conceded as irrefutable.

That wealth or property is the product or the result of an expenditure of labor. That that which is expressed as wealth or property owes its value, otherwise its usefulness, to the fact that with and through its possession it enables the individual to secure the food necessary to life sustenance, clothing, and habitation to protect and shelter the body from atmospheric excesses. That self-preservation is the first law of nature. That property cannot be truthfully and morally acquired, except by or through a reciprocal or equitable exchange of another property: *or by or through a labor representing an equal service or value to the property desired.*

That the possession of a wealth or excess of property beyond the possibility of any individual use or consumption cannot be in line with the natural purpose or design; neither can it be the securement or the result of an individual labor expended; or of the return of an equal service or value.

That if the individual is willing and desirous of giving a reciprocal exchange labor, so as to be enabled to sustain life, but that the condition of the individual

industries were such as to deny the securement of this purpose; nevertheless, punishment as for a crime would be the allotment of those who, in order to abide by nature's first law as to self-preservation, should help themselves out of the superfluity of others.

That a wicked and absolute criminality lies, when a willing industry is denied the right and the ability to preserve its own existence. That this criminality not only extends to the State or government, but to each and every individual within the State, whose property, securements or net results exceeded the reciprocal exchange value of the services rendered.

That this criminality is far more deserving of a merited punishment than many of the so-called crimes for which punishment is meted.

That this criminality also as fully lies against those who, taking advantage of any harshness of industrial conditions, deny a reciprocal exchange or pay for a service rendered.

That theft is the taking from another of a property or a usefulness without giving an equal property or usefulness in return.

That where force is an accessory to a crime, it simply changes the degree, not the crime.

That the ambush of law to legalize a theft or a crime, which forces the victim, in order to sustain life, to submit to unnatural and therefore dishonest condi-

tions, can only change the degree of the crime, not the crime itself.

That a murder secured through the poisoning of food, in order to avoid detection, is equally as malicious and culpable a murder as lying in ambush and stabbing the victim to death.

That where a sufficiency or superfluity of the necessities of life is common, yet willing, industrious and capable humans are forced to suffering, want, and starvation, in consequence of a false economy, or pernicious economic conditions, the culpability extends not only to the State, but to each and every individual within the State whose possessions exceed his needs.

That the greater the possessions, the greater the degree of crime.

That this conclusion need in no wise be strained to imply that possessions indicate crime; or that the human ambition, as to the accumulation of wealth or possessions, should be in any wise curtailed or lessened; but only as to the proper adjustment of a truthful economic and necessary diffusion; which would comply with the exposed natural purposes; which would add to the total wealth; which would encourage the betterment of the human race; which would prevent the waste of human life.

Let the letter A represent the government; in the

execution of its many purposes, 100 of the population are fully concerned.

Letter B, the total of the population, taking 1,000 as the unit or base.

Letter C, the number in active employment, taking 781 as the unit or base.

Letter D, the number of the unemployed, taking 119 as the unit or base.

Letter E, the amount absolutely necessary to the support of each of the population; taking the conceded valuation given to the various necessities or conveniences, fixing the unit at \$100 per annum.

Letter F, the average value of the yearly production of each employed individual, placed at \$200.

Letter G, the ordinary yearly expense of the government, at \$20,000.

Letter H, the total agreed wealth or property of the population unevenly diffused among the employed of the population C, \$3,510,000, which must be conceded to represent anything and everything that can be of use or service to the human life—either as to food, raiment, shelter, desire, luxury, commodity or convenience: which can also be divided so as to comply with the different vicissitudes and mutations to which human affairs have always been subject, into seven different classes, each inferior class representing a great disparity

both as to increase in number and decrease in value of wealth or property of its superior class: and this would appear to be a just approximation as to how wealth is diffused as to population. To illustrate:

Class 1, 1 of the population owning \$1,000,000 of wealth and Class 2, 2 of the population each owning \$500,000; Class 3, 2 of the population each owning \$200,000; Class 4, 6 of the population each owning \$100,000; Class 5, 30 of the population each owning \$10,000; Class 6, 140 of the population each owning \$1,000; Class 7, 700 of the population each owning \$100; or a total of 881 population with a combined wealth of \$3,510,000.

Now as most of the things to which is accredited the distinction, as the wealth or property of civilization (although not strictly in all cases what is understood as perishable) are nevertheless destructible, such as the food we eat; the raiment that covers our bodies; the habitations that shelter us; the animals that enter into our different uses; all the different mechanisms or machineries of the world of industries; the conveniences, necessities, luxuries or comforts of our private or public life; all have their day of being; and if not supplanted or replaced within that day by equal new productions, would in time impoverish the world of all its valued possessions. (Strange as it may appear, those articles or commodities, not to be strictly

included in the above, and which are the least destructible of those things accounted by the human as wealth, and which are in no wise absolute to the human life, are of the things most eagerly sought for, viz., such as gold, silver, jewels, paintings.) Yet these things can represent but a tithe of the total wealth.

If we concede to population as heretofore illustrated (which concession has for many generations been obstinately denied by so-called economists), that the production of the wealth or property of civilization was double the necessities of the requirements of life (a rather un-Malthusian conclusion), it would give a life of about forty-one years to that which is generally expressed as wealth or property to simply retain its own fixed quantities.

Taking the total human experience, what remains of that which has been a use for forty-one years, such as horses, cows, sheep, carriages and furniture, machinery, food, raiment, all of which is wealth or property. It will not answer the purpose of an intelligent inquiry, to submit the proposition that a great and perpetual wealth lies in the land itself, to which indestructibility can be practically conceded; or in the habitations of the land. This would, however, be a human sophism unworthy of acceptance. Value in no wise can be made to lie in land, but only in the results secured from the labor expended on the same. Land itself is indestructible; but the results secured

from the labor expended are destructible, the habitations or shelters used by the human are destructible; and although their life, value, or usefulness may extend beyond the forty-one years allotted above to the life of most other properties, it is only by constant care, repair and attention that their life or usefulness can be extended: for being composed of properties of the earth, decay or disintegration must be their natural attribute.

That which is indestructible can only belong, of or to, the direct elements; and in these elements no value or property can ever lie, or be inherent or inborn. The human may place a visionary or reputive value on the land, and the habitations or shelters on the same; but the mutations or fluctuations to which all human affairs can be made subject, can effectively disturb and destroy these visionary values. Truthful value cannot extend beyond the usefulness of the thing valued to the human life; and as consumption and decay is the natural allotment of all material things, it must be obvious that the production is vastly in excess of the actual use: for if conceded as double the consumption, there could hardly be an appreciable increase in the total wealth.

The united wealth has grown rapidly; and as this united wealth, if truthfully rated, must be wholly the result of the product of labor, it necessarily follows that the productions vastly exceed the consumption.

Affixing a fictitious or reputive value to the productions in no wise increases the wealth, or adds to its plentifulness; for wealth can never be better expressed than "things:" while a bag of wheat, sugar or coal will in no wise be increased either in quantity or usefulness, whether truthfully valued at one cent a pound, or reputively valued at ten cents a pound. Another equal absurdity often enters into the human reasoning when viewed from what is expressed as the economic question, namely, that interest for the use of money or other property can be resultant of an actual increase of wealth. It can never be made to extend beyond the fact that it simply takes from the store of the impecunious, improvident, or unfortunate, and adds it to the store of the more unscrupulous or the more fortunate; but it cannot possibly either lessen or increase the total wealth. It may change its class location, but not its given quantity. With these preliminaries we will complete the illustration.

Assuming the correctness of the figures given in the illustration, which are, however, simply illustrative, and only submitted as a base to deduce a truthful conclusion from: each one million of population would represent a united capital or wealth of \$3,510,000,000: to which large sum, neither through reputive increase of value, added through the fallacies of the human reasoning or the absurdities of the human folly, can a

single fraction be added, except when secured from the surplus of the following yearly productions, or the yearly increases of production over consumption of the actively employed of population. A completed inquiry may help to unravel the sophisms enveloping the economic acceptations. It would be absurdly irrational to contend that existing wealth or property was not subject to decay or extinction; yet to justify the truthfulness of the propositions here submitted, and to make the syllogism complete, this contention will be conceded. Yet economy as expressed can only lie where the wealth is maintained or increased: therefore, the greater the increase or the things secured that are a usefulness, a security, or a pleasure, to any of the individual or collective purposes of the human existence, the more evident the prosperity and economy of the community.

The total wealth as displayed at (h) represents \$3,510,000; which amount to avoid contention will be conceded as permanent; (b) the total population, 1,000; (a) the government contingent, 100; (c) the employed population, 781; (d) the unemployed 119, equal to 1,000; (f) the entire production; 781 of the population (yearly production), \$200 equal to \$156,200; (e) the absolute consumption necessary to life's purposes each year, 1,000 population at \$100 each, \$100,000; leaving a net yearly surplus of production after caring for the life of the population of \$56,200.

H, the combined accumulated wealth estimated \$3,510,000: from the net surplus of production grows and accumulates the only possible wealth or property of civilization.

There is no method or measure that the human can devise which could add to or increase the total wealth, but that which is secured from this net surplus of production; and although this wealth or property may be added to, and more than sensibly increase yearly, which would greatly enhance the amount of the total wealth, there would be a given percentage of this accumulated wealth which was constantly being eliminated, through consumption, decay and consented uselessness: while a cessation from labor, if this were possible to the human existence, would quickly obliterate all of the wealth that civilization possesses.

As neither A nor D are in any wise producers, they must look for life support out of the labor of C, the property that would be required for this purpose being drawn from F.

In the case of A, C willingly consents to the support, and also consents to the expense as called for in G.

In the case of D, however, contention arises: as D not being enabled to, or possessing a reciprocal exchange ability, must either be cared for out of the labors of C, or suffer the pains of hunger and final death, which C's humanity opposes.

It must be clearly obvious to the discerning mind that if there were not a sufficiency or an excess of productions, common to the individual industries that supplied all of the many wants and luxuries of the human race, the condition displayed at H as to the combined wealth could not be maintained, neither could the condition displayed at F be truthful, and in consequence D would be forced to starvation.

It must also be conceded that although the figures given are used as a base to deduce conclusions from, and not as truthful data, they can in no wise affect the justice of the conclusion.

If the condition displayed at F was not truthful, and the productions or wealth of the different uses were not abundant or excessive, it would require the labor of D as a party to the production; and this would enlarge the total yearly gain of wealth to \$80,000, viz., the employment of D 119 of the population each producing \$200 worth per year equals \$23,800 which added to the \$56,200 displayed at E, equals \$80,000; an increase in the total gain of wealth of over 40 per cent.: for D would then care for his own life: which truly from the economic view, if economy can be properly expressed as a saving or a hoarding of wealth or things, and not as an intelligent utilization, would be a very desirable securement.

Yet wealth, property, or things possess their value; first, from the extent of the usefulness to which they

can be applied to the human need or desire; secondly, from their reciprocal exchange value as to the labor and ability expended to secure the production.

The excess, or scarcity, of any of these wealths, properties, or things, which mutates the visionary or reputive values, in no wise adds to the quantity or the usefulness of the thing, property, or wealth itself.

These visionary values but display the cunning, unscrupulousness and viciousness of the human reasoning; which, by distorting the truth, can thereby rob the unwary or simple of their truthful gain.

To illustrate: A bushel of wheat, a basket of potatoes, a ton of coal, a horse, a wagon, a pair of shoes, all represent a usefulness to the human needs; which thereby implies that these things would be accounted as belonging to the wealth of civilization.

Their truthful value, as between the many interchanges of the many different commodities, cannot extend beyond a reciprocal exchange value, or a value based on a correlative exchange of the labor, as well as ability expended in any of their different productions.

This for the purpose of verification can be expressed by the unit one, as a truthful and reciprocal exchange value.

If the human's folly, conceit, or lack of moral discernment encourages him to stultify the truth, by affixing two as the value, in place of one, it would in no wise accomplish a valid, but simply a visionary in-

crease of wealth; for as the wealth consisted of the different things heretofore enumerated, of which the unit one was a truthful exchange value, and the quantity of the things themselves being in no wise added to, their usefulness, and thereby their wealth or value could in no wise be extended beyond the quantity of the things themselves; whether rated as one, which would be truthful, or two, which would be false.

Besides, like all things false, these visionary or reputive values, given to wealth or property, become finally the source of great discontent and suffering; for when redemption or cancellation takes place, and values shrink to their truthful status, the disturbance created thereby, where supposed affluence is subverted to comparative poverty, carries many painful conditions as its consequences.

If A, through the medium of C, kept D in constant employ, in bettering, adding to, or enlarging the many forms of usefulness that A could intelligently devise, and which would determine as an education, an enlightenment, a betterment, *a wealth or property*, a need, or a luxury to B (B representing truly the total of A, C, D), such as the building and maintenance of public colleges, public museums, public parks, public roads, public horticultural, botanical, zoological, gardens; public hospitals, public schools for physical culture, public schools for instruction in all the many

different arts and sciences, and other measures almost innumerable: all of which to be free to B, under uniform and proper regulations, *the cost to be borne by H* (and which would effectually remove all need for that which is commonly known as the different individual or sectarian charities; and which so-called charities are but too often deprived of a truthful conception, by the illiberality, deviousness, and narrowness of their control; the cost for the maintenance of which must nevertheless also be derived from some portion of H, although possibly in unjust proportions), the economy to B would be practically and truthfully assured: also assuring a happy and permanent prosperity and wealth.

For A to employ D, through the medium of C, at an equal compensation to that conceded at F, would involve an expenditure of \$23,800 to be drawn during the process of expenditure out of H; but the expenditure cannot possibly either be wasted or lost, but must always remain with and belong to B.

While the result of the product of the labor expended by D would increase the total wealth of H equal \$23,800 yearly.

Thus could a truthful and moral economy pave the way to a brighter future—eliminating the false conceptions and viciousness of a traditionary sentiment, that covered with the cloak of ignorance, and the perverseness and persistency of acquired habit, under the

guise of a supposititious virtue, termed economy, encouraged the human race, not only to a denial of the utilization of the natural bounties, but also to a quiescence, an apathy, and a deplorable individual selfishness, which reckes not the loss of the human life.

An intelligent and truthful economy would promptly determine to utilize the givings that a beneficent nature provides: to avoid all unnecessary pressure, on an already abundant and commercially depressed individual industry: to maintain the stimulus to all human ambitions and emulations: so as to encourage and cultivate a still greater human betterment: to increase the total wealth of the community, and thereby insure its truthful economy, by an intelligent employment to all the inhabitants, and thereby check the waste to human life.

CHAPTER VII.

CO-OPERATION.

THE law is laid down, "He who will not work, neither shall he eat:" this simply exemplifies that work is imperative, and therefore enjoined as a duty.

Idleness always inclines to viciousness, and viciousness is immoral: it is inexpedient, wasteful, and relaxes the vigor of the body and the mind: it is therefore greatly to be deplored.

Of course, this rule, like all others, has its exceptions. To ask the imbecile, the aged, the infirm, the crippled, the sick to work, would be an absurdity, as well as an injustice. None should ask or hope for impossibilities; therefore, they could not be justified in requiring work from those incompetent to the task.

Yet labor is a necessity to civilization, and a strengthener both to the mind and the body; and no measure should be neglected, which in any wise would create and encourage its constant demand.

To secure this desirable result, however, interferes with and disturbs that which many thoughtless minds deem a just and necessary regard to what is expressed as the laws of economy.

The philosophy which governed former generations did not make the question of the rights to a full labor an economical one; but labor was rather expressed by society, as dishonorable and degrading, and unworthy of any care or attention by the ruling powers; and it required much and constant effort, and many a bitterly contended for and hard-fought battle, to effectually explode their false reasonings; but then, labor was considered servile, and the laboring classes either slaves or serfs.

Yet although labor to-day is considered honorable, it must be further considered as imperative, not optional, to all physically competent human beings; for without it, not only can we not hope for sound minds and bodies, but, in the present condition of civilization, we cannot secure the necessities of life sustenance.

More primeval man subsisted by the fish and the hunt; but this would not be possible to present civilization.

Yet here we are confronted by a serious perplexity.

Conceding the truthfulness of the proposition that idleness tends to viciousness and immorality, and labor to a truthful and virtuous life, the question of serious moment that presents itself is, How can we grow toward the virtuous and moral life, and avoid the vicious and immoral life?

It has heretofore been submitted that labor was im-

perative, not optional to life: it has also been noted that this condition could not, or should not, be extended beyond the physically competent; yet we find it as a growing truth, that civilization, which indicates growth, knowledge, education and consequent regeneration, seriously interferes with and disturbs the securing of this purpose.

It is often said that idleness is a voluntary, not a compulsory condition; that none need be idle, but where the disposition was inclined thereto; that with a willingness to labor, none need ever be idle: this statement is inconsistent with the truth, therefore deserves careful inquiry.

Idleness can be both voluntary and compulsory; it may in a sense be voluntary, because compulsory: that is, in the physically weak, crippled, aged, or infirm, idleness must be both voluntary and compulsory; the physically competent may in small measure be inclined to voluntary and desired idleness; but constant idleness, either voluntary or compulsory, is contrary to nature, and would tend to physical debility.

Further, the human cannot sustain life in idleness: the hunt and wild surface productions, which was the support of primeval man, has passed out of the life of present man: the conditions and requirements of growing civilization established a new order, which makes labor an imperative condition toward securing

life sustenance: therefore, hunger itself would drive men to labor, in order to appease its pangs and pains, even were they desirous and inclined to idleness.

If idleness were the inclination of the human race, it would never have attained its present high perfection; but if not have passed out of existence, would have determined the same toward the lowest bestial conditions; there would have been no stimulus or incentive to encourage the human ambitions and emulations, and all this would have been contrary to the natural exposition and purposes.

The human race is disposed, inclined, and willing to labor; it is an essential and requisite toward a physical health.

Idleness, therefore, is seldom voluntary: it is often compulsory.

Civilization has established the dictum, that he who will not work, neither shall he eat. It has also established, among other equally imperative and dictatorial conditions, thou shalt not steal: yet if one work not, nor steal, and to steal also implies labor, and therefore secure nothing to eat, *he must die*.

Still we are told that self-preservation or self-sustenance is nature's first law, to which all human laws, or society's dictums, must, or should be, made subservient: yet we are confronted by a very serious, anomalous, and paradoxical condition of society's laws, which interferes with and proposes to deny nature's

first law. To exemplify: Labor is imperative: if one does not work or labor, neither shall he eat: yet to eat is as imperative, or even more imperative, than to labor; for the human cannot subsist without nourishment.

Further, one shall not steal, even so that he shall eat (though to steal also implies labor), yet idleness is more often compulsory than voluntary; because voluntary idleness would not be in conformity with the laws of nature; as it would lead to physical degeneracy, which the human would carefully avoid: yet how shall one eat if he should be compelled to idleness, and yet he shall not steal?

It is a libel on the human race, it is in contradiction to the natural laws, to say that idleness is voluntary, and that the human would rather die than labor.

When the human idles, the idleness is compulsory, not voluntary. (This need not be extended to embrace the wealthy few, but the many poor. The wealthy can idle, if so disposed, and yet subsist; they can sustain themselves from the savings of a past industry, which need not necessarily have been an industry of their own creation.)

What makes this idleness compulsory? The laws that society enforces, and growing civilization encourages, constantly interfere with and lessen the need of the human labor.

In the present condition of civilization, labor must be employed by capital, or it will cease to be; it can-

not exist without capital's co-operation: capital can only employ labor to the measure of its wants: these wants are exclusively governed by commercial laws; and these laws are always determined by the laws of supply and demand.

The supply can be created and greatly enlarged upon by mechanical and artificial ways, using the term artificial in contradistinction to the term human: the demand must be wholly human.

The supply will not surrender to the demand, for less than a reciprocal exchange value. Should it do so, *it would infringe upon its own life*; this would not be natural.

As the artificial supply grows more, the natural demand lessens; as it will always grow further from a reciprocal exchange ability; as its ability must always be in an inverse ratio to the growth of the mechanical and artificial supply.

As this ability lessens, so the compulsion to idleness increases; for the supply can only be likened to capital, the demand to labor.

Capital will always buy in the cheapest market, and sell in the dearest; and this is also in conformity not only with the commercial laws, but with the natural law.

When capital can produce the supply cheaper mechanically and artificially than by the human labor, it will always do so; and this is truly natural, for the

production is after all *the design*; the mechanical or the human labor but the *means*.

The success of the design, *or the way*, is always accepted as a full measure for *the means*; and thus idleness becomes compulsory; and the human may therefore die, for the lack of life sustenance; for the law is imperative, "He who shall not labor, neither shall he eat," and this is further strengthened and enforced by society's laws, "Thou shalt not steal." It is the compulsory condition enforced through the progress, constantly manifesting itself in all the arts and sciences governing the individual industries; yet the arts and sciences are but the development of the natural purposes.

The tendency of all this progress is to substitute mind for muscle, in all the lines of industry: to lessen the need for the individual labor, while increasing the quantity of the production; for machinery is neither more nor less than mind power: that is, a contrivance of the human intellect, by which some natural force is employed, and so directed as to secure a manifold production, at the saving of the muscular strength and skill, formerly requisite to a more limited production.

Of course, some manual labor will always be required; but as these inventions or improvements are constantly improving in efficiency, a means must be devised whereby the human can still be enabled and retained in his usefulness; and yet further be the

medium of completing the purposes of an inscrutable yet bounteous and beneficent nature.

In all this marvelous yet evidently designed purpose, whereby the growth of the natural bounties is constantly being enlarged and magnified, intelligence of production is being substituted for brute force. Mind is steadily supplanting muscle. It is eliminating from out of the life of man that brute expression which for centuries seemed to admit of no dispute "that might makes right."

That this growth of mind force over material or physical force must and should continue, is not to be questioned: it is but the consummation of the natural design.

A little learning can only become a dangerous thing when we refuse to profit by the knowledge acquired, and seek further through the natural bounties, until we realize the "*ne plus ultra*" of the knowledge that will carry the total human race onward to its perfect destiny.

These great inventions, improvements, and mechanical devices, whereby much physical labor is saved, yet a great increase of the production secured, incline many thoughtless minds to the conclusion that they are destructive to the purpose and the security of the human life.

A little reflection should quickly dispel this illusion; for in the quantities and cheapness of the pro-

ductions lies the reply, as well as the security, as to any possible dangers that could affect the life of the human race.

Famine, with its consequent sufferings, can never be the outcome of plenteous productions; but of a dearth, a destruction, or a failure of production: this obvious fact should make it apparent to even ignorant or uneducated people that the effects and the results from the application of these many inventions and machines, greatly multiplying the quantities of the productions, tend to lower the prices of the commodities produced; thereby encouraging an increase in the demand for the same, and also stimulating to a still greater production.

Besides, there is another and even a more important fact, which should not be lost sight of—that invention is education, and education is light and intelligence; and all that the human lacks is the light, and the intelligence, to utilize the grand results that all these great improvements have vouchsafed us; and through the knowledge acquired, by the gradual modification of all the economic conditions, which in any wise disturb or harshen the individual or the industrial conditions, which the rapid progress in the inventions help to disclose, pave the way toward the final securement of that acme of worldly contentment and happiness that all human hopes for.

To attain this great desideratum, the human life

must be governed by a standard of moral excellence far in advance of that which controls present civilization; yet nature itself is paving the way toward its final securement: it is true, the time may be far distant before this much-hoped for condition will be the human allotment: yet our experience should convince us that the progress is steady and continuous in that direction.

When the natural forces shall be so subject to the human will; the results sought for certain of fulfillment; the economic conditions so adjusted that the necessities of life will be always assured; then will full light be exposed to the mind of man; which will enable an unfailing bounty to all willing to subscribe to its requirements; and want and strife be but the memory of a buried past.

Slavery, or bondage in human beings, is a thing of the past: yet slavery itself indicated a regenerate, not a degenerate, growth: for in barbarous times the one who overcame another in battle (and this struggle for supremacy or control was constant even to primeval man), never thought the victory complete till he had killed his adversary.

In the next stage of development, it was discovered that by sparing him *he could be put to some use; and slavery arose as a reform.*

Though tending to stop slaughter in the battlefield, it caused fresh wars of its own; the object being

to overcome the men of feeblar tribes, and reduce them with their wives and families to servitude.

Though enslaving human beings, no matter under what circumstances, would be brutal in its nature, it was still a step in advance of an extermination. Besides, bondage would indicate that the slave was to be put to some use: it gave a property value in the slave; and this fact in itself, disclosing a covetousness and selfishness on the part of the master, would encourage the conclusion that a care would be taken to protect and preserve inviolate that which was expressed as a property; and, no matter how gross, immoral, and inhuman slavery can be admitted to be, indiscriminate destruction or extermination of the human family would exceed in immorality and inhumanity even a human bondage.

Slavery, even though an inhumanity, and brutal, had a purpose: while extermination displayed naught but a viciousness and bestiality.

This argument must in no wise be strained into an extenuation or justification of the crime of slavery: which the growth, humanity, and intelligence of the human race has crowded out of the life of man, to a perpetual extinction; but to determine that the growth of the civil or moral life (though slow, devious and inscrutable in its ways, as all things in nature seem to be, to the restless mind of man) always tends to a regenerate, not a degenerate growth.

And the conclusion is true as to all in nature: a healthy seed, planted in a good soil, does not go to waste, but multiplies: a right or a justice, once instilled in a human mind, will extend and multiply its good, as the seed multiplies its good. It is true, a good could not be extended were there not an evil to be destroyed or removed; neither could a good be known as a good, but for the viciousness or the injustice that an evil displays.

And so the human grows in virtue and morality, closer and closer to the regenerate, not the degenerate life; it may be harsh for present man to conceive that slavery could ever have been consented to as a justice; but in those ages the human was not so far advanced in the moral or regenerate life as present man displays, and discovered no error, but a justice, in the act of slavery itself.

Even present man can consent that slavery, vile as it can be conceded to have been, was more to be justified than death or annihilation; for with life hope remained, from whence could spring regeneration or a better and a newer life.

It need not be denied that the civilized life or world, as the human understands it, can best be expressed as the commercial life or world; and none can dispute its moral superiority over the barbarous life; covetousness or selfishness is after all the mainspring to the regenerate life; and although it oftentimes displays

in the individual a lack of moral sensitiveness, it stimulates the exposition of all the natural moral defects that the individual nature consists of, namely, in the display of the human passions, such as envy, malice, spite, hate, jealousy, covetousness, thereby encouraging the belief that by their contact with the higher sensibilities they would become grafted, modified, and softened; and finally become merged into the higher and more delicate sensibilities.

Yet all these progressions, in common with all the natural purposes, are slow, devious and incomprehensible to the general reasoning. The human is precipitous and compendious in most of his conclusions. He seizes upon the first proposition that presents itself to his mind, and following the egotism of a first conceit, refuses to entertain the philosophy of more enlightened and cautious minds: thus progress is slow and devious of growth, though determinate of result.

Yet, although covetousness and selfishness is the mainspring which governs and controls most of the human actions; although these passions are part of the attributes or sensitiveness, which in a great measure stimulate the ambitions and emulations whereby man strives to excel and outdo his fellow-man, in what he conceives to be the purposes of life; and which no doubt helps to advance the progress of the moral and civil life; man should always strive for an ideal perfec-

tion, in the purposes of life, whereby all these ignoble passions should give way and be made subservient to the finer natural sensibilities, in which conscience should supersede the coarser stimulants that largely govern the human action.

This desire should be expressed not only by our words, but by our actions and doings: we can just as readily express a lie by the work that we undertake, or that is apportioned to us as our duty, as one by word of mouth; and either would be resultant of the same final disastrous consequences. In both cases, that which is dishonest is a lie.

A chair, to be truthful, must be made truthful—that is, honest labor must be expended on the same; and nothing left undone or unfaithfully done that was requisite to its full and truthful completion.

It is just as essential that conscience should enter into and become part of the physical as of the mental labor; and the moment this is deviated from the lie enters into the actions of life.

Yet, as most work or labor is done it is but shifted over, so as to pass a given point. Conscience in no wise enters or becomes a part of the same.

Undoubtedly, as human affairs are managed, all parties are equal to the same deceit: in the matter of exchanges, such as purchase or sale, the one who drives the sharpest bargain, and gives the least honest values, and for which is exacted the most excessive

price obtainable, considers himself free of any wrong or injustice.

Yet the fact that conscience does not enter into their dealings means that the lie enters fully in their transactions.

To ask and take from another more than the truthful value of the property or thing exchanged is both a lie and a theft; and no measure of sophistical reasoning can change this fact.

The workingman who does not truthfully fulfill his labors is as much a cheat and a fraud as the employer, who as a consequence of a crowded labor market or supply, pays in return but one-half of the true value of the labor required.

In fact, everything connected with the labor, or the affairs of life, which conscience does not enter into and become part of the transaction, nearly always develops the same harsh consequences.

It might be claimed that this is not just or true reasoning, as affairs are conducted in a commercial world; that services, and the pay therefor, are voluntarily and consentedly exchanged; that they are freely entered into as a compact; and that as long as either party abides by his conditions, the other must honestly submit; that the conditions of the surroundings both as to supply and demand, whether natural or artificial, must be abided by, irrespective of its action on the human welfare: that it is a privilege, as

well as a justice, to take advantage of any or all conditions as we find them; that we need not consider the sufferings or hardships that others may have to undergo; in fact, that many people claiming to be conscientious may be in doubt themselves as to what equity requires, when circumstances place it within their power of deciding between their own interest and that of strangers: all this, however, can only be expressed as specious reasoning, not truthful justice.

It is true there may be a contract, in which the duty of each is expressed and enjoined; but there can be neither justice, equity, nor conscientiousness where either party to a contract fails to give a just and honest equivalent in return; value as against value: the workman, in a faithful performance of his work: the employer, in a full and honest consideration, or equivalent, for the work performed: and every deviation from this course would be a lie and a cheat.

The legal technicality or justification that might be submitted; that a contract, or a consent to an act, palliates any injustice as a result, is not worthy of a moral or conscientious consideration.

Undoubtedly the system of slavery was a moral advance over extermination, and an onward step in the march of civilization: equally so, a wage system, even with its many hardships and injustices, was a moral advance over that of slavery or human bondage,

and a further progress in the growth of the civil life.

It is only by induction, by experience, by an enlarged education, that we can grow equal to the natural progressions, and be enabled to creep further from barbarism to civilization.

Yet even the wage system is resultant of constant competition, strife, and conflict. It should not truthfully be so. If both parties to a contract, the work and the pay therefor, were equally truthful, all would be harmony and contentment; for true reciprocity would neither engender nor encourage strife; but it would seem as if strife, competition, and conflict were natural, not only to the human progress, but to all earthly development; and this fact, in itself, displays a foreordination and a wisdom sublime to contemplate: for otherwise how could we hope to attain the ideal perfectibility?

All of the world's industry and growth is a constant strife. This truly determines that growth, betterment, and progress are as essentially part of the natural design as of the human improvement: otherwise, we would abide by, and be contented with, our immediate conditions.

The wage system which now controls the commercial or civilized world is that in which capital and labor are supposed to freely and consentedly exchange services: were this a truthful condition, the principle

which governs the system would not be competition and conflict, but harmony and contentment.

The world's business is enacted on the basis of self-interest: the interest of the employer and of the employed are brought into direct collision: unfortunately, the golden rule is avoided, not encouraged: the workman wants a maximum pay for a minimum service: the employer wants a maximum service for a minimum pay.

In the purchase and sales of the interchanges of the different necessary commodities, the same conditions are but too common; to buy at the lowest possible prices; to take advantage of every possible opportunity that presents itself; to sell at the highest prices obtainable, by taking advantage of the necessities, misfortunes or ignorance of others: all this being done, irrespective of a true reciprocity, or a giving and taking of value for value: the golden rule, though constantly preached, is just as constantly forgotten or avoided, not practiced: and so the conflict is unceasing for mastery and control.

Natural or artificial circumstances at times display a seeming cessation from the constant strife, and all seems harmony and contentment; but this condition might be likened to the calm that precedes the storm; and the contest finally grows fiercer and fiercer.

These seeming calms in the struggle for mastery give much food for commentary to so-called political

economists, who claim to discover in the economic conditions then prevailing the guide that would control a lasting prosperity.

The reasonings deduced from these conclusions are not worthy of a serious consideration. Results or effects may be immediate, but the causes from which these effect spring may be very remote—for instance: An excessive crop of wheat may so lessen its disposal value as to fail to realize the cost of the production: yet it might so determine, in consequence of a failure of the wheat crop elsewhere, to realize an exorbitant price for the excessive crop: a conclusive deduction, based simply from the results secured from either of the aforementioned conditions, would not be worthy of immediate acceptation: yet mankind is generally so precipitous in deriving conclusions from immediate results that he seldom searches below the surface.

Yet he has learned by experience that a deeply bedded seed gives forth a richer and more determined production than the surface seed would develop.

In looking to nature for our guide—and none other can be so truthful—we find that results, although seemingly the effect of immediate causes, are always remote in their origin.

Take the aforementioned excessive crop of wheat: the soil in which the seed was bedded, and the labor that tilled the soil, were the only two immediate and presumptive factors; *the life that nourished and fed the*

soil to a bounteous growth; the passing atmosphere, that gives soul and being, life and death, to all things earthly, whether animal, mineral, or vegetable, was the main and the determinate factor: the immediate and presumptive factors, from which the human hurriedly devises cause, were but the passive factors or mediums; the cause was the determined factor, and was possibly wafted from the uttermost or furthestmost corner of the earth.

Had the air been laden with moisture, or parched with dryness, or had carried within its embrace armies of destructive worms, the crop would either have been rotted, burned, or made valueless, not prolific and valuable—in spite of all the labor expended, and the soil's consent to service.

How can man be credited with results in which he is, after all, but a passive factor?

How can effects, secured from uncontrollable causes, be attributed to human foresight, and an intelligent and truthful political economy deduced therefrom?

Creep a little further in seeking cause from effect. If the excessive crop was universal, not sectional, in addition to large quantities that could go to waste and destruction, the disposal value of that portion that was needed, as a reciprocal exchange for the other necessary commodities, would be so materially reduced as to seriously impair and affect the cost of produc-

tion; and this fact would not encourage the conclusion that prosperity would be the sequence, but rather disaster; yet this conclusion is also in contravention to what a human reasoning might resolve. *Per se*.

Prosperity can only be indicated as a great plenty. In the proposition just cited, there could be a great plenty: yet, as a result, much could go to waste; and that which was secured and made available would not be made to realize the cost of the production; and such a condition would not incline to what is expressed as prosperity.

Again, the passing atmosphere, that brought life and immensity of production to the section of the earth in which the wheat crop was excessive, left desolation, dearth, and famine, or a corresponding decrease of production, somewhere along the trail of its endless journeying; and this fact would indicate that in order to provide for life sustenance, the afflicted sections would be compelled to seek for relief, in what might be expressed as the favored sections.

Do not allow the term, favored or afflicted section, to be strained into the conclusion that nature, or the natural economy, displays a sensitiveness or a favoritism in its dispensations.

This exception is simply submitted to determine that the excessive crop was a natural cause, not a

human cause; that humankind was the passive, not the determinate factor; and therefore not entitled to any distinction or praise, from whence to derive the intelligence as to future action; that the results therefrom as determined from the worldly, or commercial measure of reasoning, could just as readily resolve a ruin as a prosperity.

Further, when an excessive crop proves a worldly prosperity, it could only be a sectional, not a general prosperity: as all the value that would be realized from the same, above a reciprocal exchange value (and an excessive crop, were they general, not sectional, would lessen, not enlarge, the reciprocal or truthful exchange value) would be compulsory, strained and artificial: for the exchange value could only be maintained or enlarged, through the deficiency in production of another section.

An intelligent, truthful, and faithful political economy must be broad, comprehensive, and universal in its bearings; and this can never be deduced from reasonings based upon sectional results.

Productions need never exceed a reciprocal exchange value, in their disposition, to warrant and determine a general prosperity. Undoubtedly, natural causes often result in producing an immediate excess of what can best be expressed as things or worldly possessions, in certain sections of the civilized world, over other sections; but if the effects or results were care-

fully traced to cause, it would be found to have so resulted at a corresponding impoverishment to individuals in other sections; and this fact often results in rapidly enriching certain individuals in such sections.

There is nothing absurd in saying that rapid or universal enrichment is impossible to the total of civilization; neither need this conclusion in any wise impugn the justice of the natural results: for a universal enrichment would be destructive of all incentive to a further human ambition and emulation.

In fact, the fundamental principle which governs the commercial life—and the commercial life is that which governs civilization—is competition; and competition is conflict.

If all people were honorable and just in their exchanges, this would not be so; but self-interest or selfishness, and a deficiency as to a moral or conscientious purpose in great measure controls the whole human race; and this is why there is constant collision and contention among the different interests. It is one against all, and all against one: the struggle is fierce and unceasing: each seems desirous of outdoing the other, never contented even with the goal sought for.

Yet it might truly be said that as emulation is the motive, competition is the action; and without emulation and the incentive which stimulates it to a con-

stant and a further purpose, life would determine as a bleak waste.

Still there must be a community of interest in all the final general purposes of life; otherwise, there would be no need or care for government: for government should only be likened to nature.

In nature one discovers that each parent trunk is so developed and characterized as first to protect or defend its own immediate necessities or surroundings: while the more remote the dependencies spread, the less defined becomes its knowledge or its interests: self-interest or protection in all earthly things appears as the controlling and dominant motive.

If this is true of nature, man is but part of its system: self-interest can only be defined or expressed as a perfect co-operation; and although in nature we discover a grand, harmonious, completed whole, with all its systems tending to the perfection and completion of its unity, yet in its many divisions it would also appear as a fierce struggle, an endless competition or conflict, to attain each separate goal. The storm is as natural as the calm; the thorn as the rose: the ebb as the flow; though the natural design is always single, the means that secure the design are diversified. The sun never ceases to shine, nor the clouds to come and go: from thence, we have light and shade, storm and calm: and this is constant to total nature. With

nature for the human guide, a true solution to all human problems is within the range of reason.

In nature we find constant conflict, unceasing struggle: yet an harmonious, completed whole. In the human life it is also constant conflict, unceasing struggle—the harmonious, completed whole is lacking—is this attainable?

Let us cautiously investigate the different arguments, and inquiries, in the search for the truth sought for, carefully avoiding the shoals and the pitfalls that interest, prejudice, and false political economists have so cunningly, ingeniously, and shrewdly constructed, to deceive and lure the unwary and mystify the unripe mind.

None need dispute that civilization is preferable to barbarism, and an onward step in the human life: barbarism means brutality, anarchism: civilization means humanity, government: the civilized life is the commercial life: yet as heretofore noted, the commercial life, in common with other of the natural means, is one of fierce struggle and endless conflict: yet it would seem to have but a single design—to secure the means to ease and please the passage of life to its full completion.

It has also been fully noted that to secure this purpose, labor became the imperative, supreme, and primal factor: from this labor things or property resulted. It was also imperative to primeval or barbar-

ous man to labor; but the thing or property that he sought or labored for was native, natural, and on the surface; and sought only for immediate use and purpose: it possessed no retentive value to the laborer.

Primitive or barbarous man labored only for the present. Civilized or present man labors not only for the present, but for the possibilities of the future. Primeval man labored only on and off the surface of the earth. Present man extends his labors below the surface. Though the things or properties of the earth are of the natural bounties and growth, their stored or retentive values are solely the result of the labor expended in the securement of the same: as long as a man could sustain life off the surface productions, property or values did not lie. Things or property are the product of civilized man: civilized man cannot depend for life sustenance off of the surface productions; therefore, in order to sustain or protect life, pending the natural developments, to which he is contributing his labor, he must depend upon life support to those things or properties which are the unconsumed accumulations of a prior labor.

To these unconsumed accumulations the term or name capital has been applied; it is not necessary to a truthful investigation of the facts sought for, to inquire into the validity of the present title, as to the rights to that which is expressed as capital: that can be left to a later inquiry; but the fact has been truly

exposed that capital is an accumulation of things or property, the unconsumed product of a past labor.

This conclusion determines that capital and labor represent one and the same thing: the only truthful distinction that lies between them being that one represents an effected and perfected labor, of which the result has been accumulated and stored: the other an undefined, imperfect labor, of which the result may possibly be in doubt.

Here we discover the true distinction and difference that exists between capital and labor. Capital is "*le fait accompli*," or the accomplished fact: labor, the fact to be accomplished: and this determines why capital is the aggressive factor, and labor the subservient one. Capital is the stronger and full-grown condition. Labor, the weaker and yet to be developed condition. Labor may possibly display incapacity, misfortune, and failure as to result; which condition is impossible to capital: and this is the cause of the same irrepressible conflict, the same fierce struggle, that seems to be common to all the divisions of the natural system. It is the strong against the weak. The strong are in condition to be patient: the weak will always be restless.

To primeval or barbarous man, life's support was found on the earth's surface: yet undoubtedly the primeval conditions displayed the same inequalities,

the same antagonisms: the strong always aggressive, the weak subservient.

Labor cannot subsist pending development without the aid and support of capital: yet, again, capital is in actual dependency on labor for its value or usefulness; when labor is idle, capital becomes lessened both as to quantity and value; when capital is idle, labor suffers for the necessities of life.

This clearly demonstrates an identity or community of interests: false philosophy, or individual avarice or selfishness, may distort the truthful relations that these two important factors of the commercial or civilized life bear to each other; but this will in no wise change the fact that true harmony and faithful prosperity depend absolutely on the complete enforcement and display of their truthful relations.

Both are essential and inevitable requirements of a growing civilization, while under progressive civilization neither can exist and become perpetuated, without the conjunction of the other: without the fresh products of labor, both the laborer and the capitalist would soon lack life sustenance: without capital, labor could not reach the fruits of its toil.

Besides, these two factors of the civilized life encourage the display of all those incentives which stimulate the human ambitions and emulations.

In the truthfulness of the propositions already submitted, is quickly to be discovered the inefficiency

and invalidity of the earnest and sincere proposition faithfully submitted, as to a community of interest, or co-operation between the laborers in the different individual industries, to unite in their labors, and thereby subvert and destroy the need or the power of that which is expressed as capital.

Capital and labor are already in a community of interest, or co-operation: in the present condition of growing civilization, neither can maintain their identity or usefulness without the co-operation of the other: either is as much a part of the natural exposition (in which, though the design be single, the means to accomplish the design are diversified) as the storm is to the calm; the thorn to the rose; the ebb to the flow: destroy the necessity or the purpose for either, there would be an end to the stimulus to life's purposes.

To labor, without an aim or a purpose beyond present physical sustenance; to throw one's thoughts into the vista of the future; to anticipate disease, accident or old age, with its weaknesses and possible imbecility, would be only possible to barbarism, not civilization.

Labor must have an object beyond the present, or it will cease to extend its efforts.

Capital must have an object beyond the present or it will cease to be capital.

The object in both cases is future care and provision; the design is single; it is only the means which

are diversified: labor cannot possibly exist, and reach the result or product sought for, without the possession of some stored product of some prior labor, to sustain life's purposes pending the production: and this stored product is capital itself.

Capital cannot be defined by a measured quantity; a bushel of wheat may be the capital of one: it may be the extent of the surplus product that has been stored for a future use: a thousand bushels of wheat may be the capital of another: yet both are equally capital: they only differ or vary as to degree.

The laborer, or the combination or co-operation of laborers, in any of the individual industries common to the commercial life, who can care for themselves, pending production and disposition of production, are as truly capitalists as those who largely employ other laborers to produce for them: the difference between them would simply be one of degree: this should be obvious to any discerning mind.

Co-operation, without capital, is impractical of execution: it is a chimera of unreflective minds—a proposition that seeks for and submits the unattainable.

Further, the great progress constantly taking place in all the arts and sciences, whereby new, improved and multiplied methods of production are secured in all of the many and different industries, dispensing with the requirement of an equal physical labor, often dis-

turbs and destroys the power, the purpose, the use and the effects of capital itself. To exemplify:

Ten chair-makers, with a sufficient capital to enable them to care for themselves until they can make one hundred chairs and dispose of them, co-operate in the industry of chair-making.

One man, in the same industry, devises and perfects a method and a machine, with and through which he can make five chairs, to each of the co-operative chair-makers— One chair! would not this condition clearly determine that it would be only a question of endurance, or extent of the capital employed, before the co-operative chair-makers, or in fact any individual or other capitalists, engaged in the chair-making industry, would be forced to cease from their industry, and submit to the new conditions established? Yet conditions similar to this are common, natural, and just to a progressive civilization.

The contest that exists between capital and labor, if it can be termed contest, is over the division of the profits; and over this the quarrel is endless: yet it can never be of an even measure.

Capital submits to a fixed and given quantity as to the outlay, in order to reach the production, or the result; yet this result is often indecisive and incomplete, and may determine as a loss: yet though the dispute is perpetual as to labor not receiving its full share of the profits, it never becomes urgent as to a

partnership in the loss; and this is truly inconsistent.

It may be true that there is always a net profit in the total of the productions; but this may apparently be very unevenly divided among the individuals, some securing more than an equal proportion: yet this seems to be true to all in nature.

There is the physically strong, as well as the physically weak; the mentally strong, the mentally weak; and so on through all its subdivisions: there is never a contention for a larger share or proportion of the ills or ailments of mankind. Will the quarrel ever cease, as to the rights to a greater proportion of the presumed advantages?

It is barely possible that a small community might repudiate the idea of a right to hold property at all, except it were held in common: viewing the human race as a brotherhood, whose rights and interests are inseparably connected: and holding that the earth and its fruits are the common inheritance of all mankind: that no individual has the right to appropriate this or that article as his exclusive property: that all have an equal right to what is needed of everything, even to the services of others: and that no one has a right to compensation to services that may be rendered to others as a compensation—that is, the rights of an individual to the services of others are the same, whether any service is rendered in return or not.

They reason upon the principle that the person and personal efforts of an individual are not their own, but the property of the race, in the same manner as light, air, water, the earth and its products: therefore, they propose that mankind shall form themselves into groups or communities, of such numbers as may be found most economical and convenient; to have as many persons in each community, so that all the various necessary trades, professions, and branches of industry that may be economically pursued in any particular location may be carried on in each community; that each individual should labor as much as he pleased, at any kind of work that he pleased, and take what he pleased for his own use and comfort, not as a compensation for his labor, but because he needs and wants it.

It is argued that holding individual property, and trading therein, makes men selfish, and produces all the thousand evils with which the race is afflicted; and that having all things held in common cuts off and destroys all inducements to fraud, theft, murder, and the host of crimes that now blacken and disgrace the human character, and mar the happiness of man.

This exposition just submitted no doubt fairly exemplifies the views commonly entertained and expressed as the Socialistic or Communistic views; and as their conclusions are advocated in the sincere belief that a great and lasting good would be secured by

their general acceptance, all objections to the same should be answered with candor, respect, and truthfulness.

It can at once be conceded that the social and economical advantages of associated effort are great; but whether a community of goods or things is the best means of making these advantages available, is open to serious and great doubt.

We think with our own minds, feel with our own nerves, digest with our own stomachs, and act to gratify our own desires, and if ever one apparently acts to gratify the desires of another, the original motive is a desire for personal happiness.

The idea of loving your neighbor as well as yourself may be rationally entertained, provided one can taste with a neighbor's palate, digest with a neighbor's stomach, think with another's mind, and perceive another's joys, pains or sorrows as keenly as one's own.

It might as well be consented to at once that this would be a physical impossibility, and therefore unworthy of attention. Neither can one feel the same inducement to exertion in another's behalf as in one's own.

Besides, nature itself has put an irrevocable veto upon the possibility of such a condition of affairs. Nature, in all its designs, works by antagonisms:

whatever there is of order and harmony in the universe would be lost but for antagonistic forces.

The opposite forces of attraction and inertia preserve the planets in their orbits. Attraction or condensation by cold, repulsion or rarification by heat cause the vapors to ascend, and the showers to fall, without which vegetation and animal life would cease; so labor is painful, but its results bring pleasure: without the pleasure, we would never undergo the labor: without labor, we could not enjoy the pleasure.

The more immediately and directly these antagonistic principles are brought to bear on one another, the more speedily and certainly will their legitimate results be produced. The hope of consequent happiness alone will induce the human voluntarily to undergo pain; and we are so constituted that the more directly and speedily the consequent is to follow the antecedent, the more readily will we submit to pain or inconvenience as the price of consequent pleasure.

The communist or socialist concedes that it is the duty of all (who are able) to labor, and the right of all to enjoy the fruits of labor: and this being true, why not make our duty and our interest the same, and make the performance of labor a necessary condition to the right to enjoy its fruits?

The only valid objection that will lie to the system of individual property, and exchanges for equivalents, and which system is common, acknowledged

and justified throughout all civilization, is the liability to abuse—that is, that some people will take advantage of all circumstances that present themselves to get more than an equivalent for their services and property; and this will always continue to be so as long as the human is selfish, sensual, and short-sighted.

And it would be difficult to determine how the human nature can be subverted by a change from the present to the communistic system.

One who does not feel inclined to give a full equivalent for what he receives, but is willing and desirous to enjoy the fruits of others' labor, without laboring as much for the benefit of others, would certainly make a bad member of any community where all things are common.

Besides, there can be no such thing as an absolute independence between the different communities: no more than there can be of absolute independence as between the different individuals: for no one person or persons can be positively assured of being able to supply all their own wants: for natural causes might arise which may make dependence a necessity to life.

Besides, a set of people of such moral excellence as would be absolutely necessary to the harmony and happiness, not to say existence of a co-operative community, would experience no inconveniences from the abuse of the equivalent system: and no doubt need

lie that full as much food for envy, jealousy, selfishness, and other dissocial vices, would exist in the one system as in the other.

Besides, to accomplish a sincere reform, and one from which good results might be hoped for, would be to direct all efforts to the object of improving and perfecting the system of individual property, and equitable exchanges of property and services: and this would be far wiser and practical than the endeavor to supersede a system whose principal evil depends on its abuses, by a system which, for aught that as yet appears, would be liable to equal or greater abuses.

CHAPTER VIII.

LABOR.

THE staple of conversation in the world we live in resolves itself largely as to that which is expressed as business; and the term business can be most fully defined as the creation and result of the total productions, and the exchanges and disposition of the same.

This involves all that can be contained within *the labor* necessary to accomplish these purposes: which naturally will include within its meaning the different ramifications essential to a world of civilization.

To accomplish this implies a dependency of interests as between the various and different individuals concerned in the same.

The prime interests involved can be most fully expressed by the terms capital and labor; and under present conditions of civilization neither of these interests can long subsist except through a unity and combination of interests.

The prime interests, using the terms by which they are known, can be extended to include, as the product of their measures, all the requirements known to life.

Therefore, in one or another sense, manner or condition, in which the term business can be intelligently employed, is equally as applicable to the laborer as to the capitalist; the employee, as to the employer; the capitalist or the employer representing neither more nor less than a stored labor; and the expression most common to all the affairs of the civilized or commercial world in the intercourse between the different individuals, and which carries the greatest interest and concern, is, "How do you find business?" or what is simply another form of the same inquiry: "Are you at work?" For upon that which can best be expressed as a healthy condition of business depends the ability to life sustenance.

Therefore, if a favorable answer to either of these queries was general, it would carry the conviction that a spirit of contentment was the rule, and that none were suffering for the necessities of life.

Such a condition would naturally imply that a bountiful output in all the various industries was common, which kept both labor and capital employed.

There might be various causes which could produce this effect; but whether these causes were natural or artificial the general mind will not seek to inquire into, but will be contented and happy with the result.

Reason, as to cause from effect in such conditions, seldom receives any consideration.

A well or healthy person does not occupy his mind

looking for the causes which encouraged and assured his sound condition.

Unhealthy or sickly people, on the contrary, trace innumerable causes to account for their ill-natured effects.

'Tis true, they may not seek below the surface; but it satisfies their individual reasoning.

A starving human will imagine that it would require an immensity of nourishment to satisfy his hungry cravings; but he will be quickly contented with a little.

In all this reasoning we discover a self-evident truth: that the human is easily contented with any condition that gives a sound body and a satisfied appetite: for either is a concomitant and contributive of the other.

To hope for a sound body and a satisfied appetite, labor becomes the prime requisite; for labor is the superlative and imperative condition of and to life. It is never-ending, but with life itself. It may be divided into active and passive labor; but it is endless and continuous. It may be mental or physical—voluntary or compulsory. No function of the human system can be maintained in health or growth without labor. In wake or sleep, in illness or health, in mind or matter, it is constant to nature. It may be pleasant or painful; it may be moral or vicious: whether we inhale or exhale, it is all labor. Every-

thing in life, everything pertaining in or to life, is a ceaseless labor. To the mind of man, that which we express as labor may differ, but can only differ as to degree.

That labor which is constant and ceaseless to the human life must, however, be contained within the term passive, it being the labor by which nature performs its functions.

The active labor, though concomitant and contributive to the same ends, is largely governed and controlled by necessitous commercial or worldly conditions. What are these conditions?

First: Without labor, we cannot hope to produce or secure the food necessary to sustain life.

Second: We cannot labor in order to reach this hopeful condition without a sufficiency of the food necessary to sustain life, so as to give us strength to enable us to labor; or to possess that which will secure to us the same; which might be expressed as a sufficiency of our own capital; or the assistance of a foreign capital, to enable a support awaiting the natural development.

Third: Even with the support of the necessary capital, the elements might conspire or determine to destroy the hoped-for fruits of this expended labor.

Fourth: Or, on the contrary, the quantity of the special production may be so excessive, as compared to the requirements of the consumption, as to seri-

ously impair its reciprocal power or value as to other necessary commodities, which would be destructive to the capital advanced and the labor expended in the effort to reach the production.

Fifth: This last condition can be the outcome of a bounteous nature, or a result of the great progress constantly developing in all the different arts and sciences; which latter result in many of the individual industries gives greater assurance of excessive productions than even the direct natural bounties: yet both can determine the same evil commercial consequences, *i.e.*, though all worldly productions and things have a right to be ascribed as a result of the natural bounties, the human, more particularly in a civilized or commercial world, divides these productions into classes. The one class can be defined as the truly natural class, and is absolutely dependent as to results, to causes of nature; and this can include within its embrace all those things upon which life sustenance depends: while all those finished productions of the different mechanical industries (although the base or nucleus from which they spring is also of the natural class) belong to the second or artificial class.

Sixth: The first class is as essential to life as the atmosphere in which we breathe, and is therefore the truly natural class.

The second class, though essential to a life of civi-

lization, and in true accordance with the final natural purposes, secures the distinction artificial, from the fact that it includes within its embrace all those methods and measures which discover, develop, and supply to the individual everything which can be defined as the knowledge, the comforts and luxuries of civilization, and which are commonly known as the productions of the arts and sciences.

Seventh: Without the first class, all human would soon cease to be. Without the second, the human would soon revert to a condition of barbarism and bestiality, where all human knowledge or civilization would end.

Eighth: *Neither class can be effectively maintained without a continuous and determined labor.*

In the natural class, though the human may labor with willingness and determination, the result of the production is absolutely subject to the control of the natural elements, and may determine a failure of production, a medium production, or an excessive production: and can neither be measured nor assured until the production is consummated. In the second or artificial class, the results to be secured can be measured and anticipated with an almost certainty as to quantity of production.

Ninth: In the natural class, the uncertainty as to quantity and quality of production, *and in general their perishable nature* (irrespective of the time or

labor employed to enable production), often avoids a faithful reciprocal exchange value to the products: as an excess of production or a deficiency of production, although an equal labor may have been employed, either adds to or lessens the disposal or exchange value of the product.

Tenth: In the artificial class as heretofore expressed, if the creation of its different productions were not general, but were exclusive to certain sections or individuals, their interests or selfishness would impel them to restrict or curtail the quantities of the productions, so as to maintain a reciprocal exchange value, or to compel an excessive value to the same. (Such conditions and results become painfully apparent when combinations—termed trusts or syndicates—are formed, to control and subvert what would otherwise submit to the forces of a natural condition.) As long as the creation of the productions of the artificial class remain general and not exclusive, they will remain subject to the same vicissitudes and conditions that govern the natural class, *i.e.*, an excess of production, or a deficiency of production, although an equal labor may have been employed, would either add to or lessen the disposal or exchange value.

Eleventh: But an equal labor should always produce an equal result: were there not extraneous conditions or circumstances which might intervene and affect either the quantity of the production, or the

exchange value of the same; and these conditions would disturb the validity of the conclusion that an equal labor should produce an equal result; for as heretofore submitted, it is not to the value or the extent of the labor given, to which merit or exchange value is conceded, but to the result secured from the same: and this is beyond the control or knowledge of the individual.

Twelfth: A deficient production, which will control exchange value—although an equal labor was given—may arise from an impoverished soil, or meteorological disturbances, the subjection of which is beyond human interference. An excessive production, on the contrary, is often more largely and conclusively governed through the medium of the human control; through the discovery and display of the knowledges that the arts and sciences develop, whereby the soil can be artificially and effectively enriched, and its output greatly enlarged; through the artifices, mechanisms and machineries of the different individual industries, whereby an almost unlimited production can be assured at an enormous saving of the need of a comparative increase of the human labor.

Thirteenth: This fact being conceded, the cause at once becomes apparent, why, in the productions of many of the different individual industries, a great disparity lies, as between their reciprocal exchange value, as to many of the other commodities, where

the improvements and facilities of production were not so manifest.

Fourteenth: Because the disposal value of the product is not only governed by the quantity of the output, but also by the fact that the truthful factor, from which value is controlled, is quantity of production as to needs or demands of consumption, and the least amount of human labor used in *the production*; for it is only to the human labor or service to which an exchange for service or result can in any wise be demanded or conceded; all the other factors to the productions being natural and spontaneous.

Fifteenth: 'Tis true, value can never be extended beyond *the usefulness* of the thing valued; and although this usefulness can in no wise be added to or lessened, by the measurement of the production, the perishable or destructible nature, and deteriorating properties of nearly all of the completed or natural productions, limits and detracts from their possible usefulness, from their date of being, to their elimination: therefore, the immensity of a production (a consequence of the impracticability of a completed usefulness) affects and disturbs the affected productions from what would otherwise have a truthful value.

Sixteenth: If the truthfulness of these facts were firmly impressed upon the mind of labor, and the reasoning not divested from the acknowledgment that labor, and that which is defined as capital, were com-

pulsorily and necessarily the one and the same creation, the distinction of term simply indicating time of creation, past or present, the invidious and subtle distinctions that vicious and interested selfishness had instilled into the human conceptions to harshen, embitter, and encourage a direful antagonism would soon give way to a truthful combination and unanimity of purpose, that in conformity with the displayed natural purposes would perpetuate a greater fullness and betterment of all the uses and usefulnesses that can improve and humanize the end and aim of all life's purposes, carrying with it, as a necessitous accompaniment, a constant and ceaseless need for an increased and continuous *human labor*.

Labor should always be compensated with regard to its skill and ability. If A can learn a trade in one year as well as B in three years, there is no valid or intelligent reason why he should not receive an equal compensation to B, for services rendered.

In fact, no other rule would be just or practicable but that of allowing compensation for the same kind of labor proportioned to the amount and quality of the work performed. This affords an inducement to the individual to seek out and select those branches of business for which nature has best adapted them; and to make themselves as competent as may be in those branches. By this means the general good is advanced without any particular evil or inconven-

ience. For the humblest person may have capacities adapted to one of the most useful employments; and if he acquits himself well therein, he is as much entitled to the benefits that he can secure from the practice of the same as any who might claim greater distinction, and therefore excessive pay for their services. Besides, there are as many of the different professions, of every kind, in proportion to the business requiring their respective service as there are farmers, mechanics, and manufacturers; and the numbers in each one of the professions would be as readily doubled, with members equally as competent as those now in them, if the certainty of employment would warrant the increase. And, even were it otherwise, why should the scarcity of a particular quality of character entitle the possessor to great wealth, while his neighbors drudge in poverty? More particularly, when that very wealth is produced by the drudging toil of those same poor neighbors.

For instance, why should a very small dwarf, or an extra-sized giant or any other freak or *accident of nature*, enjoy large fortunes drawn from the curiosity or necessity of those who either from fortune or misfortune have nothing remarkable in their proportions or abilities.

For curiosity is one of the human senses; and at times is almost as insatiable in its desire to be gratified, as appetite. Now, curiosity secures no equiva-

lent return for the labor or the cost expended; which means painful labor to that extent, in gratifying or satisfying its sensations; and no one likes to suffer for the benefit of those who do not suffer an equal amount for them in return: therefore, the amount of suffering should, in the majority of cases, be the proper standard from which to graduate the just amount of compensation for labor.

Yet under the contrariety of the human nature, and the differences in the natural qualifications or ability that the different individuals display, it would be impractical to determine the value of labor by the time expended in the same; but all compensation would have to be adjudged by the different results accomplished.

There are some considerations connected with the propositions just submitted that to many minds might appear absurd or preposterous: yet they are well worthy of a serious thought, if only for the purpose of enlightenment and the discovery of a truth.

Yet it need hardly be disputed that in the great majority of cases the true ground of rendering compensation, just and proper, should be based upon the amount of painful labor or suffering expended.

Still it never enters the human mind seriously and conscientiously to claim pay for pleasure, excepting that such pleasure would represent the earning of a livelihood on the part of some one: for instance, if a

neighbor should invite another neighbor to join him in a meal, and then should ask him to pay for the food which he had eaten, every one would consider the whole thing as a joke; or if not a joke, they would consider the party asking for the pay as an irrational being, or as totally unfit to be regarded as a fit member of society.

This seems to invite the conclusion that we pay for labor because it is painful; therefore it would seem that the amount of pain should graduate the price.

But pains cannot be computed mathematically. Therefore, the standard appears to be defective; besides, as heretofore submitted, one person may be so constituted that labor is twice as painful to him or her as to another.

Further, a child may suffer as much in performing one day's labor as an adult would in two. It would not appear just that in the cases just cited the pay should be adjusted to correspond with the pain or labor expended; but that the results secured should control the value of the service.

These queries are somewhat perplexing, and serve to show that moral science is far less plain and certain in its principles than the mathematical and physical sciences.

Nevertheless, a fair investigation may accomplish much toward rendering even moral principles clear and satisfying.

Our idea of justice in the rigid sense would seem to require that one should suffer as much in behalf of the other as the latter suffers in behalf of the former.

Yet, on the other hand, justice would seem to require that each should derive *equal benefit* from the labor or suffering of the other. Hence, how can the matter be adjusted?

People who are constantly preaching of conservatism would undoubtedly say, by compromise; but compromise is not necessarily justice, but is more often a begging of justice.

One party will be a loser by a compromise; and calculating selfishness will not be induced to an exchange injurious to itself. Nor should a rigid justice demand it.

Compromise, as practiced by the human race, is more often a compact with a wrong than the securement of a justice; but in consequence of the lack of a moral discernment, and to hasten an enlightenment to an ignorance perpetuated by custom and habit, it is often compulsorily resorted to as the most effective means to hurry the securement of a desired end.

To resort to compulsion, or force, even in the effort to enforce a rigid justice, does not always attain its purpose, and right may be forced to submit to might; but an appeal to the conscientiousness of the individual, and the securement of a consented, even though

it be only a partial concession in favor of a justice, is certainly a movement toward a betterment.

Rigid justice might say, "Truce with oppression, never;" but throughout the history of civilization, every advance movement of the human race has been effected by a truce with oppression: for were there no oppression there would have been no cause to encourage a compulsion to secure a concession.

From that which precedes, the conviction becomes assured that labor, using the term in its broadest and most complete significance, must abide by the condition that nature establishes; that although it is imperative to life sustenance, natural and worldly conditions and acceptations may so determine as to limit the demand or absolute need for its total use.

That capital or stored labor is as greatly dependent on further labor for its growth, continuance, or utilization as labor is dependent upon capital for its ability to continuance.

That as labor suffers, and dies for the want of application, in the same degree capital suffers and dies from the equal want of application.

That the interests and life of both are interwoven and inseparable.

That a plentifulness of all the productions can only determine a growth to the increment, value or usefulness of capital, by an equal plentifulness for the requirement of the human labor.

That the same plentifulness of all the productions, which would determine a growth to the increment, value, or usefulness of capital should equally add to the enjoyment of the needs and luxuries of civilization to all who labor.

That to add a further labor to already overladen industries (in which the ability to production, a result from the many new methods and inventions developing in all of the arts and sciences, greatly exceeds the actual necessities and exchange power of the consumption; in addition to displacing a corresponding requirement for the human labor toward effecting the production), so as to enlarge an abundant plentifulness, would not only display a uselessness, but in addition thereto would further degrade capital (as stored labor), and also deny and lessen the need or use for further labor.

That an education, a security, a comfort, or a luxury can be made as much a desire to the human life as that of the actual necessities.

Therefore, to avoid the increasing harshness that the inability to labor displays in the many different individual industries, which were already overabundant, both as to labor and productions, and to yet further add to the total wealth, all unemployed and desirous labor should be constantly employed, at any and all of those public acquisitions which could add knowledge, security, comfort, and luxury to the

human existence; and by such means, not only maintaining a reciprocal exchange ability to all the human needs, but encourage the desire to a further and better life, in place of the trials and sufferings to which only death seems a coming relief.

CHAPTER IX.

LAW, LEGISLATION—THEIR USES AND ABUSES.

THE maxim or creed, "Do unto others as you would others should do unto you," may be traced into all the codes of law that have ever been formulated for the regulation of society; and this principle should be the foundation of all our ideas of justice.

The truthfulness of the justice that this maxim would imply does not admit of question, but is too often made subservient, through the medium of false construction, to accomplish an evil in place of a good.

Many contend that the term justice means a return of like for like: yet calm inquiry must disturb the truthfulness of this conclusion.

The law of an eye for an eye; a tooth for a tooth; death for the crime of murder; burning for the crime of arson would hardly be in harmony with the advanced knowledge of this age, though acceptable to the civilization of earlier ages.

That we should return good for evil would be more conformable to a truthful justice than that we should return evil for good, or even evil for evil: for justice

should never be harsh, spiteful, revengeful, or likened to a vice; but always to a virtue or a morality.

It may be a first and a natural impulse to return a blow for a blow; or to inflict pain or suffering on one who inflicts pain on us; but this would more often determine that the blow was struck in a revengeful spirit, not in a spirit of justice.

If one does another a benefit it would be a justice to return the benefit; if one enjoys the fruits of another's labor it would be but a truthful justice to return an equal labor in return. The return of like for like must not be confounded as conforming to the truthfulness of the beautiful maxim first expressed; but rather a distortion of the truthfulness conveyed in the same; yet legislation and law have constantly contorted its bearings, so as to read an equal like for an equal like.

Society's laws, which can only be defined as rules that should govern society, can never be truthful or just, if they savor of revengefulness. Society should always represent the public or the combined sense; and although the individual might not be able to restrain his feelings, his natural impulse to return a blow for a blow, an injustice with an injustice, the purpose of society and society's laws should be to curb the animal spirit, which so quickly displays itself in the individual; and by wise and just measures,

grow the individual sense up to the full truthfulness of the first maxim.

We are told that laws are made to enforce the promotion of justice; and the general sense of what such justice implies is to obtain the return of like for like; or to compel the return of a benefit, as an offset for injuries sustained or inflicted; that this propensity exists and that we know of its existence should induce all to expect that others would treat us in the same manner that we treat them; and this should produce in us a dread as to committing an injury, and a desire to confer a benefit, as that which we do would be likely to be reflected in an equal measure upon ourselves.

And this conclusion is partly true, and would be more efficient, if we were positive of always receiving our full measure of like for like: for in this case we would be deterred from the doing of an injury, if our intelligence, and not our passions, controlled our actions.

Whatever is desirable is good; whatever undesirable, evil. Now, nothing can be desirable, except that it has a tendency to promote our comfort and happiness, while aught that would cause pain or injury must always be undesirable.

If the human's actions only concerned themselves, all that they would probably seek would be to promote their own happiness, to gratify the various

senses; which would include the passions, affections or appetite: and if this were the whole truth, the rules which would be necessary to control their actions would be but few and simple; but our actions, in nearly all cases, affect others having similar interests to our own.

If this were not the case, we would not give any consideration or attention to aught that we should do; except in so far as we thought what the effect would be, in promoting our own happiness.

Experience and observation carry the conviction that there is a principle in the human constitution, by which we derive pleasure from seeing others happy; and pain when we see them suffer. This fact alone should always induce us to avoid as far as possible those actions which would simply benefit ourselves at the expense and suffering of others; and rather cultivate the principle of positive justice, the most noble and worthy of all the human virtues. Many minds may be entirely devoid of this principle, or possess it in so small a degree as hardly to be appreciable; being so fully wrapt up in selfish consideration as not to spare a thought or a regard for any other being; but fortunately this class is but small, as nearly all the human race have a sympathy or a feeling for those in distress.

In some this principle or sympathy may not extend beyond those of their own kindred: in others it

extends more closely to their own countrymen; but where it exists in its fullness and virtue, it embraces all human kind: it is true, distance from the objects deserving of this sympathy may somewhat mar or lessen the intensity of this affection; but yet it exists and may be accounted as the most worthy of the human attributes.

Under all circumstances, the pursuit of happiness is the first principle of nature which controls our motives; and this fact of itself should be sufficient to cause us to shun evil, and seek all that is good. Ignorance, or passion, may often turn our efforts in the wrong direction; but where a spirit of justice lies, we will always be induced to submit to some sacrifice of our own pleasure, in order to promote the pleasure or happiness of others.

Besides, it would be almost impossible for us to secure our own ultimate happiness, if we gave no heed or consideration to the happiness of others: for there would always be consequences, even if they were remote, which might redound and act injuriously upon ourselves.

But we cannot avoid the correctness of the proposition that the natural propensity of the individual, in most all the affairs governing or controlling life, is to return like for like: yet we think it has been sufficiently demonstrated that in acts of justice it should always be productive of good results: it would be pos-

itively injurious and detrimental to the human prosperity, were we to include the return of an evil as a compensating justice for the doing of an evil: for the viciousness of such a proposition would be simply immeasurable.

A legislation, or a morality, which would encourage such a principle should be shunned and distrusted, as destructive to every principle which should inculcate the truthfulness of the first and the purest of maxims or creeds: Do unto others as you would they should do unto you; not as in the wickedness of a misconstruction, you should read it, as they do unto you.

Yet this is the principle upon which most legislation is based; retaining for its creed the wickedness of the proposition of always returning an evil like for another evil like.

A law which should have for its purpose a punishment for a good act or deed is never a requirement; for all legislation or law is based upon society's necessity to maintain virtue and suppress vice: yet as long as society upholds and maintains the principle of returning like for like—that is, an evil like for an evil like—for just so long can we look for the encouragement of crime: and crime can in no wise become changed or lessened because its medium of action has been changed.

Legislation or law, which takes life as a punishment for the taking of life; which would burn for the crime

of arson; and so on, through the various acts which the individual may commit, and which are termed offenses or crimes, in no wise encourages virtue, but oftener greater and more numerous crimes.

In the individual these unjust acts or crimes, as they are termed, are often the result of ignorance, furthered and hurried through the action of some of the human passions.

In the State, the punishment could best be expressed as the total or combined revenge on the individual weakness; just as long as this condition is maintained and encouraged, for just so long should we look for an increased, not a lessened, crime.

Besides, the nature of the punishment itself carries with it an ostracism and a disbarment to the repulsive criminal from any further privileges or communication with what is represented as virtuous society; and thus an increased tendency toward the continuance of the criminal life.

If society's laws were based upon the doctrine of doing unto others as we would that others should do unto us, the purpose of law would be to inculcate a spirit of morality and betterment to those unfortunate enough to be inclined toward a criminal purpose: hoping thereby to repress the inclination or the necessity to a further crime.

We need not enter further into the inquiry, its truthfulness must be apparent to any thoughtful

mind: yet, notwithstanding the great importance of the rule, and the very prevalent derelictions in regard to it, the latter are to be attributed, not so much to a want of conviction to the understanding and consciences of men, as to their depraved passions, which prevent them from making the proper application. To exemplify:

Now, the human being is either rational or irrational: if irrational, they would be deemed and classed as insane: yet insanity is not placed as a crime, but as a misfortune.

Society treats such unfortunates with great and serious consideration, and uses its highest knowledge and best efforts to effect its cure, and gladly welcomes the success which redeems the individual and enables his return as a useful member of society: yet the crime or injustice that the insane or irrational had committed was none the less an injury or a wrong, which demanded reparation, on the ground of a return of like for like.

Why should the rational be treated differently? The one ostracized, disbarred and virtually condemned to a perpetual criminality: the other welcomed to a renewed life?

Laws, as they exist in most countries, are twofold: common law and statute law. Common law consists of custom, or the adjudications of authorized tribunals, and statute law or the enactments of legislatures.

All law is, or ought to be, founded on justice and equal rights.

Rights are either natural or adventitious, alienable or unalienable, perfect or imperfect.

Natural rights are those rights which we possess by nature, as the air we breathe in, the fruit we raise, and the produce of our labor.

Adventitious rights are those rights which arise from adventitious circumstances, as one man has a right to the labor of another because he has paid for it, and a woman has a right to the protection of her husband because he has engaged to protect her.

Alienable rights are those rights which may be bought and sold.

Unalienable rights are those rights which cannot be bought and sold, as one's own liberty and life.

Perfect rights are those rights which may be enforced by human laws, as the rights to property and protection from assault.

The laws of the land, whether they be founded on reason, in the exigencies of individuals, or in any other circumstances, if they be not in contravention of the public welfare, ought to be obeyed: the observance of these laws being necessary to the maintenance of civil government, and the maintenance of civil government being necessary to the public welfare, the observance of these laws must be obligatory.

Law can be defined to be a rule or standard of

action; consented to and recognized as such by a community of individuals. Its object is to promote the enjoyment of just and equitable privileges by the different members of the community: also to insure united action in public measures, intended for the general good.

The necessity for laws arises from a want in some individuals of a conscientious regard for the equitable privileges and rights of others; from an obtusity of perception which prevents them from distinguishing justice from injustice; from a moral dereliction, which controls and governs the actions of some individuals; and from the necessity of securing concert of action, in order to secure benefits, which would affect the public good.

'Laws serving to promote justice and equity must be beneficial to a community, and thereby to the individual: they should be universally sustained and submitted to, whenever they are established and known, as the easiest conditions upon which can be enjoyed those securities and privileges which all must desire.

But who should make laws? and how decide what laws are just and proper?

On merging from a state of nature to one of improvement many rules would be acted on, the justness of which would be obvious. In time these rules would become customs: while their origin may be so remote as to be lost in that of prehistoric man: other

things creep in, and gain authority, the justice of which will not be so clearly obvious to a great majority: nevertheless, from these usages and customs originates what is understood and defined as the common law.

But as the community progresses in improvement and general knowledge, new conditions take the place of old ones; and new relations spring up, which require new rules of actions or new laws, to provide for the difficulties that these new conditions cause.

Now these deficiencies can only be intelligently supplied by careful deliberation and decision, upon the principles and interests involved, and the plans suitable to secure the desired objects; and all should have an equal right to a share in these deliberations, and a voice as to the plans or laws to be adopted: no intelligent reason can exist to the contrary; and this conclusion must determine that the function of the acceptance of laws resides with the whole body of the people; yet as the whole body cannot act consistently and intelligently in the framing and making of the law form, their creation and promulgation is charged to a legislative body, chosen by the whole body; or a supposed majority of the whole body, as expressive of the conclusions and wishes of the whole body.

Yet to avoid the danger of a wrong being committed on the whole body, as a means of furthering an interested selfishness, local, sectional, personal or

general, on the part of the legislative body, who might thereby abuse the trust conferred on them; such enactments should only and always become consented and accepted law, after submission to and approval by the majority of the whole community; and this would be a true and perfect justice.

If all agreed as to their justice, all would willingly abide by their own deliberate engagements: if there were different views, it is manifest for the time being, a justice would demand that all should consent to the conclusions of the majority: for any other principles of legislation would be defective and impracticable; excepting that we were prepared to consent to the justice of an absolute despotism.

Besides, there can be no free consent as to the justice of laws, unless, or until, they are submitted for approval to the general acceptance; and neither should power be vested in judicial tribunals, to subvert and nullify the majority acts: for they are, if anything, in consequence of the fewness of their respective bodies, more liable to be swayed by a prejudice, a selfish interest, a political bias, or urgent appeals, than larger or more unwieldy bodies, even such as legislative bodies.

Further, all human kind is full of conceit and error; and the tendency of all minority rule grows toward a despotism.

Judicial tribunals, to pass upon the legality or jus-

tice of majority laws, makes a giant stride toward despotic rule: as they limit the control of the people's rights to their approval or disapproval: which virtually would determine that they, the people, did not possess either the power or the sense of justice: from all points of view this conclusion would be inconsistent with a true sense of reasoning.

A majority that had the intelligence to select competent judges would certainly possess a sufficient intelligence to know right from wrong: if they all agreed in sentiment, they would consentedly abide by their own deliberate engagement: if there be different views on any subject so that all cannot agree, either the views of the majority, or the minority, must prevail: otherwise no legislation can be had. It must, however, be manifest that the legislative functions rightfully appertain to the majority, because the majority alone, has the power to sustain a law against opposition. Further, that plan of action that meets the approbation of the majority is more likely to be consistent with the principles of justice: because minority rule would or could finally resolve itself into an absolute despotism: therefore, if the legislative function exists anywhere, except in the universal assent, it belongs to the majority.

Thus we discover what should always be the legitimate and truthful source of all legislation: it must not, however, be inferred that because we concede

that the power to create legislation should only lie in the majority, that their privilege should in any wise extend to the enactment or execution of laws that would be unjust in principle or tendency: for the object of any or all laws can only be to promote the enjoyment of just and equitable privileges: otherwise, legislation would defeat its own object.

And here we discover further evidence and justification, that as the majority would be too unwieldy and large a body to formulate and enact the requirements of legislation, which clerical provision should be left to the few chosen for that purpose, the acts themselves should not become valid law, and enforced, until submitted for approval, and accepted by the direct and majority vote of the community itself: which acceptance should place the enforcement of such laws absolutely assured from any further judicial interference, control, or interpretation: and should continue as the law—*de facto*—until repealed in the same manner, by the same means and forms, that was required to secure its enactment and acceptance; and this would protect the people from the fatal consequences of bribery, selfishness, perjuries and injustice, which the present system of legislation thoroughly encourages.

Justice, or equity, should never be placed in the power of a few individuals, to justify, control, or subvert. The essence which controls all humanity, more

specially in the individual sense, can best be expressed as interestedness or selfishness.

Man perceives that the primary condition upon which he can look for any security as to his own life, and equitable privileges, is in showing an equal regard for the same rights and privileges in others; even those acts which are plauded for their merits, such as benevolence or philanthropic acts, are but another form of the human selfishness: for, although the human can seldom be found who does not feel a certain innate sympathy for another individual who may be in mental or physical suffering or distress, his total actions and doings are largely controlled by the knowledge that the mutations and variations governing the human conditions are subject to many and constant changes; and as like begets and encourages like, a good action would hope for the belief of a good return.

Reason and experience teach us that the penalties attached to the law's transgressions need not be severe, if they be prompt and sure in their execution: an injury is usually committed in the hope of securing some real or fancied benefit: a penalty that would disturb or neutralize this hope, if it could be, or were truthfully enforced, would effectually deter from the commission of the injury.

For instance, a person whose disposition was inclined to rob or steal, were he convinced that the

stolen property would be taken away from him before he could make any use of it, would be effectually deterred from even committing the theft.

Remove the motive, and the act would not be committed; but the difficulty in practice is the impossibility of making the penalties of laws so certain in their operation as not to permit a hope of escaping them; hence they must be enough more severe to make up for their uncertainty: for instance, if the chances of punishment be only as one to two, the forfeiture should be double, and so on, in proportion.

This simply is to illustrate the principle: in practice, however, this cannot be so nicely adjusted: for the chances of escape or detection, cannot always be so readily determined; but that some people of great cunning may flatter themselves that they can make the chances in their favor. That is why no system of laws and penalties has ever given perfect security to individuals from the effect of evil passions and propensities.

It does not admit of question, that the desire for happiness is the universal motive to animal action. Therefore, we refer our ideas of justice to that general propensity in man, to return like for like; and that this propensity exists, there is little room to doubt: neither need it be denied that this propensity is subject to abuse, so as to exert a harsh influence,

particularly in the retaliation of injuries, when passion is freed from the control of reason.

The human is impatient under suffering or wrong: this impatience grows in intensity, depending on the amount of injury experienced, the temperament and habit of the individual. This feeling, stimulates the desire to retaliate on the cause, or supposed cause, producing the suffering: oftentimes it stimulates to more than an equal return of the injury: an angry person will often return two blows for one, and at times will inflict the deadliest injury for trifling offense. In such a case, the first offender becomes the injured party, and is excited to retaliate the excess of chastisement received, and most pernicious consequences result.

If the first injured party could control or govern his temper or anger, and returned but an equal measure of injury, the same might be salutary, and deter the same or other individuals from the commission of unprovoked injury: at least such appears to be the conviction upon which is based the justice of the conclusion of returning like for like.

If people will commit unprovoked injuries, either wantonly or to promote selfish ends—even if they anticipate that it will be retaliated upon them when a good opportunity offers—how much more likely they would be to commit injuries, if entirely free from such liability.

What should deter persons so inclined from committing an injury—particularly if desirable objects could be secured thereby—unless it were the fear of consequent and dependant evils? And this query opens up to the mind a serious perplexity.

It might be contended that if love for our fellow-being controlled our action, none would commit an injury.

Yet love is but another term or method of expressing desire. We love, or desire, what is agreeable; and hate, or dislike, and therefore have no desire or love for the opposite.

Of course this proposition as to the expression love must not be extended so as to include within its embrace conjugal, parental, or consanguineous love; but the love that should govern the human action. If I love the fruit of another's labor better than his or her person, what is there to prevent the taking of their property, and compelling them to my service? Nothing, except that I might thereby be exposed to similar treatment from them or others, by establishing the justice of such a precedent.

We oftentimes hear of returning good for evil, and thereby producing remorse and shame; but this would be only substituting one kind of suffering for another: for shame and remorse are equally physical sensations; as much so as a blow would be, given in return for a wrong or an injury. It is true, there may be cases in

which this appealing to these special senses might be more efficacious than resorting to a more brutal retaliation: for it is certainly more congenial to the senses of an individual naturally and habitually generous and benevolent; but unfortunately there are but too many in which these individual senses are too obtuse to be sufficiently operated on this way.

Besides, it does not appear to be practical to convince the majority of the human race that suffering of some kind should not be the legitimate consequences, in retaliation for the infliction of suffering upon others; and undoubtedly, until a truthful and a more completed knowledge and education is common and general to the human family, there would not otherwise be any reliable security for man from the violence of his neighbors.

In justification of this conclusion, we have simply to note the conduct of most men toward the lower animals: those that cannot retaliate for injuries done them: at least, with any considerable degree of certainty. Were the human race equally remiss or impotent in this respect, would they be more secure from the injury and abuse of one another than the lower animals are from the injury of the human race.

It therefore follows that we do good to one another, in order that good may be done to us; we withhold an injury, so as to protect ourselves from another injury; and if these consequents were to cease to follow their

precedents, the principle which now largely governs the human action in this respect would be materially changed; it therefore might be expressed as a sense of justice, that feels the intelligence and advisability of returning like for like, in the human intercourse; and a conviction that submitting to its dictates is essentially necessary to the well-being of the race.

It is said that if people told the truth, the very foundations of society would be shaken. This is a libel on civilization: though truth, and the subtleties of the law, are not always reconcilable, the difficulties need not always be charged to the law, but to the abuses of the law.

For it is undoubtedly true that there is excessive falsehood or perjury committed by the human, through the law's medium, in the effort to deceive and wrong one another: for, in the majority of cases, one party to the law is in the wrong: and endeavors through the law's subtleties, and a studied falsehood or perjury, to secure an unjust and dishonest advantage.

And this can be found to extend itself even beyond the parties directly concerned: for it can be truly said, with regard to the law's practice and truthfulness, that it is surrounded by systematized deception, and crushed by its own deceptions.

For instance, to demonstrate a physical irresponsibility as to the commission of a crime, so-called physical expert testimony is employed, to deduce from a

possible physical hypothetical inquiry a possible physical analagous similitude in the criminal charged with crime.

Or again, to avoid the payment of a just pecuniary damage, so-called property expert testimony is employed, to lessen, confuse, or disturb a just compensation.

In neither of these conditions just cited is the so-called expert testimony supposed to be directly concerned: yet in the majority of cases, it is not a truthful, but a studied, desired, and conformed to the occasion testimony; and therefore not deserving of any credence or acceptance.

A studied and specifically created encouraging testimony cannot be truthful: and in testimony, that which is not truthful must be false, and therefore perjury.

A careful and studied inquiry, with the discovery of truth for its purpose, must always determine as a public benefit.

A studied inquiry as to the means whereby the truth can be perverted and disturbed, so as to secure an unjust advantage, must always determine as a public wrong: the testimony of a paid testifier is unworthy of credence or acceptance: for it need not admit of question that such testimony will always conform to the pay: yet the acceptance of such testimony, is of the law's greatest abuse.

Perfect reciprocity, or the giving of a like for a like, and this need not be extended beyond a like in value, when applied to the requirements of a commercial world, is the only ground on which all could meet: for on the acceptance of this principle, every one would enjoy the just reward of his labor, and no more; and this would be agreeable to the moral sense of justice, and would be calculated undoubtedly to promote the general good.

Still, general usage has in a measure sanctioned a different principle, namely, take what you can get, and every man for himself, within certain limits, depending on the consciences of individuals: which, in many cases, amounts to no very certain limits after all.

This arises in a great measure from the impossibility of regulating the thing by law; and there are unfortunately too many persons, with whom the laws supply the place of conscience; and no wonder, since the world has been so long cursed with excessive legislation, forced upon the people by a cunning and selfish few, and of course so conducted as to suit the interests of the legislators, that these people found it more necessary, and more to advance their own interests, to study what the law requires than what conscience and equity require.

The principle also is to some extent violable, without the possibility of detection: hence, people ac-

quiesce, and appear to sanction, what they cannot avoid: this sanction in connection with the circumstances affords no argument against the conscientious obligation to adhere to the principle of equity as above explained, according to our best knowledge of the facts.

In fact, public sanction cannot be said to extend to any very marked and manifest violations of these principles.

Very few persons, except professed speculators, with whom to make money, and to get money, are synonymous, can sanction in their consciences the taking of a dollar for a sixpenny loaf of bread, whenever a person may be hungry enough or ignorant enough to give it: yet no reason can be assigned for their objection, except that the loaf was only truly worth six cents, and the remaining ninety-four cents were taken without an equivalent; and if the taking of ninety-four cents without an equivalent be reprehensible, as being extortionate, the taking of one cent is just as bad, depending on exactly the same principle; and to sanction the latter, and censure the former, would be as inconsistent as to say that stealing was not theft unless the sum taken be considerable.

Yet in what sense do the acts of a mercenary legislator differ from those of a common rascal or thief? The most that can be dreaded from the latter is

a temporary alarm, or a pecuniary loss, that might be readily secured again; but what injuries might we not dread from the abuses of the law?

The love of place is the greatest check to public morals. One who solicits a public post must feel his independence sold in the solicitation: it does not avail us any to be told by the legislator that he is an advocate of liberty and of just and equitable laws; it would depend entirely on what he means by the words. We will generally find that he means freedom to himself, and subjection to others. In an affair which is of common concern to all, shall we consign the province of deciding to a part, or the legislature, or only yield to the superior claims of the majority?

The evils that arise from lawsuits are an absolute leprosy, a social cancer on the body politic: though it might be impossible to prevent men from quarreling, for this they have done through all time, we should try to avoid a third party in society from living upon the quarrels of the other two, oftentimes stirring up disputes and contention so as to promote their own interests. What litigations might be avoided, if lawyer's fees were always dependent upon their gaining the causes which they defended, and never allowed to exceed, including all costs, but fifty per cent. of the disputed claims: they would then never encourage litigation except for just cause.

None need deny that true liberty demands law:

therefore it is not to law itself that objection can ever lie, but only as to its abuses; and these abuses are largely the result of too much law or legislation. Too much legislation, like too much of everything else, is destructive of the purposes sought for. Multitudes of enactments simply encourage new devices and schemes, whereby the more cunning and unscrupulous can carry on their deceptions and injustices, through the law's meshes and inconsistencies.

Laws should be simple and few and seldom extend beyond providing for the punishment of moral delinquents.

The enactment of a law which would prescribe a punishment for an attempt at an act which were adjudged to be a crime, but which could not punish the success or completion of the criminal act itself, should be determined both as inconsistent and unjust: such a law would encourage the success of an adjudged crime, but punish the failure to carry the crime to a success; such for instance as a punishment for an attempt at suicide, or an imprisonment for an inability to pay a debt. If a wrong would lie in either of these two last mentioned propositions, it would be in the success of the suicide, when punishment could not be made effective. In the second case, the creditor is the prime factor to the indebtedness. If indebtedness can in any wise be conjured into a criminality, to the prime factor, not the secondary factor to the crime,

the excess of punishment should be meted out. There can be no debtor without the consent and assistance of a corresponding creditor: and a confessed knowledge as to an inability to payment is acknowledged in the conception of the act of indebtedness: to use community force, to compel consented to, and in many cases, the unjust doings of the individuals, as between their own acts, must also be classed as the law's abuses.

A further great injustice has crept into the law's abuses. Nothing would be more absurd and outrageous than that the legislators should enact laws, and then abstain from a sufficient publicity of the laws enacted; yet in many cases this is virtually what is constantly being done: for the publication of legislative actions is so immaterial as very often not to extend beyond the knowledge of those immediately concerned in the enactments: yet if the human do that which a legislative enactment forbids, even were he innocent of any wrong intent or knowledge, he could not escape the imposed penalty: for there is an absurdity, or an abuse of law, which says that knowledge as to the law is presumptive; and ignorance as to the truthful knowledge in no wise extenuates the penalty: yet law after all is but a rule of action, and a voluntary conformity with any rule of action, without a knowledge as to its requirements, would be impossible.

If law were at all times truthful, and would hope for truthful enforcement, it would be law that sprang from the referendum: for from the penalties of law so established, extenuation of, or ignorance, could not be submitted as a palliation.

CHAPTER X.

CASH OR CREDIT.

A CONTRACT is an agreement to perform certain acts between the different individuals thereto: the object is, or should be, to promote their mutual interest by a concert of efforts: the nature of the circumstances being such that neither party can derive the anticipated advantages, except that either of the parties thereto perform the acts stipulated in the same.

For instance, one party engages to deliver a certain amount of flour at a certain time and place, and the other party engages to pay a certain amount of money for the same: one has money, and wants flour; the other has flour, but wants money.

If the one delivers the flour, there is no certainty of the other paying the money for it, unless there is an understanding to that effect.

If the other goes to the place with the money, there is no certainty that he can get the flour for his money: for while the one is transporting his flour to the market, the party with the money may have purchased elsewhere: or the party with the flour may sell before reaching the agreed market.

Therefore, to protect each other, a mutual agreement is entered into: and this agreement is what is expressed as a contract.

For this reason, as the contract is for the benefit of both parties, and as neither would enter upon it but for the benefit to be derived from the same, it would be an injury to either party, if the other party failed to fulfill his part of the contract—more particularly, if the contract has to be fulfilled by both parties at the same time.

Further, suppose one party performs his contract before the other. For instance: A delivers the flour to-day; B agrees to pay the money three months hence; B having derived all the benefits he expects or can get from the contract, what are his inducements to pay the money three months hence? Of course, his sense of justice, his desire to do as he has agreed, might impel him to return an equivalent benefit in return for the one he has received; or a dread of retaliation from one he has injured might compel him to act justly; for he who takes and uses what another has worked hard to produce or acquire commits a wrong or an injury on the other.

Besides, he might be controlled by the fear that others will refuse to enter into a contract with one who refuses or neglects to fulfill his engagements; and this might be very detrimental to him in the future.

And these are the conditions or advantages that

conspire to make most people abide by their contracts; and this too is based upon the supposition that both parties to a contract are to be mutually benefited.

But let us suppose, on the contrary, that one party finds after entering into contract that he has made a hard and unequal bargain. Should his obligations be such as to compel him to fulfill his contract?

The answer to this query is open to great criticism: for instance, if contracts were entered into which either party to the same could abrogate at his own pleasure or profit, it might determine in great injury to the other, or the consenting or abiding party; and this fact, it might be claimed, would absolutely destroy all confidence as to contracts, and deprive the commercial world of what is claimed as the great benefits derived therefrom.

On the other hand, the enforcement of the conditions of a contract may prove by some unforeseen event to be of serious and irremediable consequences.

Now the essence of a contract should always imply mutual interest, and should not be conscientiously binding where such is not truthfully the case.

It should be unreasonable to say that one should expose life or person to great perils, not anticipated at the time of entering into an engagement, although the letter of the contract might plainly demand it.

In such a case as this, the remote consequences

that might arise from the failure to perform a contract would be of less import than the particular and immediate evils which would result from its performance; and this conclusion would lead to the conviction that one is not bound to suffer serious injury in the performance not anticipated in the making of a contract.

Therefore, as the dividing line will be varied greatly by circumstances, to form general rules as to when a contract should be implicitly maintained is a matter very difficult to determine.

In entering into a contract one generally regulates his conduct according to the provisions of the same: therefore an abandonment by the other party might be productive of an injury; and if good faith and a fair intent is maintained, he should not be subjected to injury for slight cause by the other party: for we always like others to treat us fairly.

But it can consistently be maintained that bad faith, and intent to deceive, or take unfair advantage in one party, would exempt the other from a moral obligation to fulfill a dishonest, even though a legal, bargain. Neither should a contract, extorted by the force of circumstances, or containing unjust or unreasonable conditions, or inequitable terms, be morally binding.

It might be contended that no person should ever make a contract whereby the right to violate its con-

ditions should ever be allowed: no matter how inequitable, deceptions, or unjust the provisions called for were: more particularly, where no duress was resorted to, in the making of the same; but the truthfulness of this proposition is open to grave doubts.

Suppose A contracts with B that the former shall chop one hundred cords of wood for the latter; and the latter should build one hundred rods of wall for the former; and it turns out, contrary to their expectations, that the laying of the wall would require twice as much labor as the chopping of the wood.

Can A, with a full knowledge of this fact, conscientiously insist on B's performance of the contract to the letter: suppose B discovers his mistake before anything has been done by either: would it not be a moral justice to release him from his contract?

A might say, "That would be baby play; I intend to stand by my agreement, and you must stand by yours." Although this would be law, as generally understood and practiced, it would be far from justice.

There is much to be said against the enforcement of any contract. A contract based upon equity and mutual benefits enforces itself; and if either party to the same, from causes controllable or uncontrollable, fails to complete his agreements, the other party to the contract would in no wise be injured: for any

transaction can be readily duplicated, where equity and mutual benefits are the ground of the proposition.

On what principle of justice or equity should A expect B to give him two for one: even though B inadvertently, imprudently, or through false representations engaged to do so: A will have lost nothing in the matter, if B is released: therefore there would be no grounds on which to found an honest claim.

Therefore it would be true that A would be as well off, on the abandonment of the contract as if it had never been entered into; if A had a faithful conscience, it would impel him to at once release B.

If, on the contrary, A had made arrangements to fulfill his part, whereby he would be in a worse condition after the abandonment than before the ratification, he might have a moral right to demand of B that he should make the condition of A as good as if the contract had never been made; but this proposition should only be maintained or justified if the conditions of the contract were based upon equity and mutual benefits; but would be wholly unjust if one party had entered into the contract in bad faith, or intent to deceive, or take unfair advantage.

And this conclusion is undoubtedly more fair than the legal adjudication of the proposition would be in most countries: yet there may be no doubt as to its correctness as regards a truthful conscience, as well as to its general bearing upon society.

Besides, a contract, no matter what the conditions of agreement, should never be enabled to extend beyond ability: obligation, under all or any circumstances, should never extend beyond ability: in fact, it cannot be enforced beyond ability; and the inability or failure on the part of either party to a contract should never be allowed to extend itself beyond a moral obligation, should the individual conscience consider itself bound by its provisions.

As the preceding argument disclosed, a contract in all cases expresses an agreement as to the different stipulations contained in the same, between the parties engaged therein: when based upon equity and mutual interests, an incompetency to its fulfillment cannot entail an injury to the other: in all cases its provisions cannot be, and should not be strained beyond ability: for every obligation must be limited to ability; and in no case should it be enabled to extend its purposes beyond a moral obligation as to an enforcement.

Independent of the different considerations heretofore submitted, the base of contract in many cases is the giving and the taking of what can best be expressed as a credit, or a postponement of the time when one of the parties to the contract shall fulfill the conditions that he agrees to, and are imposed upon him.

Credit encourages shiftlessness, thoughtlessness, folly and extravagance.

If the inability to an equitable exchange is immediate and present, what assurance or encouragement can be hoped for that the same inability will not extend to the future?

For no justice can lie in avoiding or delaying that which is agreed upon to be done as an equity, beyond the fact of the immediate inability of the party to fulfill the same.

For to be driven to the necessity of using or consuming property, before one has the opportunity of earning and acquiring it, is a misfortune which is always the result of accident beyond individual control; or of folly, which is still more deplorable; and it must be a depraved conscience that allows a person to better his own condition, by taking advantage of another's misfortune, arising from either circumstance.

The only losses of wealth that can possibly occur to the world of civilization can only come from fire, flood, decomposition, devastation or the consumption necessary to life's purposes. Famine can only come from the loss of anticipated productions that failed of growth.

The statement often submitted as to the loss of wealth under the condition that is generally expressed as hard times in a commercial world is purely imagi-

nary, not real: for wealth can only be destroyed by one of the first five causes: fire, flood, decomposition, devastation or consumption. Commercial failures (resulting from commercial panics) can in no wise affect the total wealth: they simply determine the inability of certain individuals to pay contracted indebtedness, but in no wise decrease wealth.

A bushel of wheat, or a certificate representing an actual storage of a bushel of wheat (and this simile can be extended to apply to everything on this earth that can be termed wealth) will remain a bushel of wheat until actually consumed, destroyed, or stolen.

If consumed, it fully accomplished the purpose of creation: if destroyed it was a loss: if stolen, it still retains its wealth, or intrinsic value, and can best be represented as a transfer of storage: and this last exemplification will equally apply to a credit of wealth.

If a merchant sells to another merchant one bushel or one million bushels of wheat, on a credit of three months, and the creditor, from whatever cause, fails to comply with his agreement or promise as to payment, there has been no loss of wealth: neither could the condition as to the truthful title of the wealth represented by this one bushel or one million bushels of wheat in any wise affect the true demand for the same, for the purposes of actual consumption: for the first sale, whether sold on terms of credit, or for cash,

could only be defined as a transfer of storage, which can in no wise imply a truthful loss of wealth or property.

Credit should always be understood as speculation; and it would be difficult to discover in what measure speculation differs from gambling. A credit or speculation, from a commercial point of view, is based upon the presumption that the debtor possesses a given wealth or property, in a proportionate excess to the amount of his liabilities or debit; that the probable losses, if any, covering the time of credit, would not exceed but a possible percentage of the debtor's own wealth or property.

If the loss of the debtor should exceed the amount of his individual wealth or property, he could not possibly pay his indebtedness; and although there can be no possible losses of wealth but those arising from the causes given above, the creditor could not possibly be indemnified from the debtor's possessions.

Yet for many centuries, in so-called civilized nations, debtors unable to pay their indebtedness were imprisoned on the creditor's complaint; while even under our present boasted advanced civilization, the power of government or force is constantly resorted to, to enforce disputed versions of individual contracts—encouraging every evil propensity of the human nature, unlimited perjury, and endless contention.

The legal allowance and maintenance of a judgment, against either a willing or an unwilling delinquent to an individual contract, is one of civilization's greatest drawbacks to a moral progression: and the injustice of its enforcement is but one degree removed in iniquity from the wickedness of that system which upheld and encouraged the imprisonment of the human for an equal delinquency.

CHAPTER XI.

PROPERTY.

EVERY social movement is but an expression of the unfolding of the public conscience.

Society, however, must first have a conscience before this conscience can express itself in law, that will be enforced.

The truthful enforcement of law can only be hoped for in the realization of such an aggressive public conscience; and law is presumptively but the outgrowth, development, and dictum of this public conscience.

As nature works by antagonisms, it is but natural that disagreement should be common to all the different walks of life; to any and all of the single affairs of humankind this is also just, proper, and natural; for how otherwise could we discover truth from error, joy from sorrow, pain from pleasure?

If all was harmony and unanimity, and life itself a serene beatitude, life would lose its most distinct charm: for everything in nature is developed and revealed through antagonisms: the human race being

not fitted as yet to assume the angel's robe. Besides, sensuality, of which the passions are the outcome, is all that there is to the earthly human life; and sensuality precludes the possibility of a serene beatitude on earth.

Sensuality need not necessarily imply but the carnal pleasures and pains; but should include the growth of all the intellectual and moral developments, which to the growing mind of man is the greatest of all the human blessings. If all that our eyes could see was the uniform blue of a clear sky, no clouds or storm to mar the harmony of its eternal continuity: if our ears heard but the warbling of the nightingale, and the constant songs of love, we would be lost to sensuality: for one color would be no color, one sound no sound, does not this appeal to our sense of reason?

All will no doubt agree about the usefulness of meat, drink, or clothes; and no doubt sincerely wish their poor neighbors were better supplied with them.

All can agree that the earth produces more of the good things of life than would afford a sufficiency for all deserving of its bounty.

All can agree that it is not the doings of nature that denies to humankind the right and the means to support life, and ease its journey to the immeasurable hereafter; but the doings of that which is called society, or government.

All can agree that as disagreement is common to

all human affairs, in the affairs of society, as to how a just and effective government should be conducted, it resolves itself into divisions of parties which propose the adjudgment of the people's rights and duties.

History and experience instruct us that even nations, as well as parties, through too long a retention of power, grow corrupt, selfish, and immoral—drifting further and further away from the principles to which they owe their being.

Partisanship, as we see it exemplified, often develops and resolves itself into bigotry, ignorance, and fanaticism, not patriotism or humanity. The seed of its life is selfishness, not manliness: the product of its doings is duplicity, not honesty: the total of its purposes always appears to be either party or individual gain, in which the welfare of the people is placed on the nether millstone and crushed out of all their rights by the grinding of the upper stone.

None need dispute that taxation is the essence or base through which government is maintained; that society could not be held in force without government and its consequent taxation.

Therefore, to enable successful and concerned industry among the people, so as to maintain the stimulus requisite to human ambitions and emulations, without which life would have to be a heavenly dream, and not an earthly hope, and the human be

lost to all sensuality, government must be: and for government to be, taxation must be.

But an immoral and unjust system of taxation always indicates an immoral and unjust system of government, and immoral and unjust government officials; and as the government deals with the people, so will the people deal with each other: for like begets and encourages like; and this conclusion leads to the following thoughts.

If a government be conducted upon unjust principles, and the essence or base upon which it is sustained is its system of taxation, any individual having no reasonable doubt on his mind as to the injustice of the tax might resist or evade such an injustice; and here a gross immorality would be at once encouraged: for to evade or resist a government measure, the individual must resort to duplicity, cunning, and too often perjury; and these are vices, the evil consequences from which would be simply immeasurable.

Yet it would appear as if there was no good reason why a person should submit to a positive injustice from another individual; and a government has no inherent right to affect an individual any differently from what an individual might affect another individual, were there no government.

If we are to have any regard as to the effect of our examples, nothing should induce us to submit to an

injustice, and thereby encourage and strengthen such an injustice.

Yet we are in a sense compelled to submit to the force of law, although we suffer a gross injustice; for without law we would compel anarchy, which would be far more pernicious in its results than an injustice to the individual. To illustrate:

A law that compelled one person to work for another without pay would obviously be unjust. A law denying to the individual the privilege of pursuing happiness, as he may see fit (without unjustly affecting others), as most legislation on sumptuary matters does, can also be expressed as manifestly unjust. It would be difficult to discover a circumstance in which the individual would be morally bound to submit to such laws when in his power to avoid them; but if such laws were in force, and the majority were determined to sustain them, the individual would be compelled to submit until he could convince the majority that justice and equity demanded that they should be repealed.

It is true that laws from their nature must be general; and in many cases a law may be highly salutary, and still act harshly and unjustly in individual cases: therefore we are compelled to exercise patience, and both act and judge slowly. It is also for the individual interest to submit to even oppressive laws, until they can either persuade the majority to repeal the

same, or make themselves strong enough to institute a successful resistance; but experience convinces me that conscience in no manner binds any person to neglect any opportunity of evading any law which is manifestly unjust and oppressive; and it is through the many evasions of unjust and oppressive laws that the demand for their repeal becomes urgent, necessary, and finally effective.

The present multiple systems of taxation now in force had their growth in systems of government that the present advanced thoughts of men will no longer admit the justice of. They sprang from the era of brute force, when might took unto itself an always right: for the divinity that formerly hedged in the rights of kings is rapidly passing out of the life of man, to the rightful gloom of that tomb that will never know an earthly awakening.

In any of the single affairs of the human life there cannot be a multiple of truths, but only a single truth; and truth will always stand unaided: it requires no artifice to support and uphold it when exposed to the batteries of a multitude of errors and falsehood: for truth has remarkable vitality; persecution promotes its growth: the more you try to stifle it, the more widely and vigorously it spreads.

A multiple of tax would clearly indicate a multiple of error; taxation, to be just, must stand on the same footing as truth: it can only be single: when the sem-

blance of truth has to apologize for its being, it is no longer truth, but error: when taxation has to resort to other or multiple taxation to support its functions, it is no longer truthful taxation, but injustice and immorality.

to tax Taxation should never be imposed on poverty, but only on property. But what is property? Is it the earth, or only the products of the earth? In what denying to the or what is commonly termed property, does value, as he truthful solution of this inquiry a just sist? for on a true most must be finally solved.

system of taxation must express or wealth, derives nearly

What men call property, from its ability to contain all its value and desirableness, we need to sustain tribute and secure for us the food to rot our bodies life, the clothing to shelter and protect his purposes, and the from the action of the different temperatures requisite habitations in which we dwell; and all things fully contribute to secure these purposes of themselves essentially to be substitute the term property.

The right of or to property may be defined things such a relation to and tenure of any of these things by any individual as the general good and the natural sense of justice require that all other individuals should respect.

A general right to property, or to those things to which can be attributed the term property, may be defined to be such a title to the enjoyment of any-

thing or condition as the general good and the sense of justice require to be respected.

The term right can best be expressed as those privileges and enjoyments which all desire for themselves; and consequently, from a sense of justice and a desire to contribute to their own security, feel obliged and induced to permit others to enjoy.

All those things which are termed, understood, and expressed as property derive their origin or creation from on or off the earth. It is true, in the first or primal condition, it may not always be found sufficiently complete to answer the acquired and cultivated requirements of the human race. Again, even spontaneous and completed productions may be natural only to special sections of certain temperatures: but in all cases the term property, or value, which are presumptively synonymous terms, should derive its worth or value from the amount of labor, or physical power, expended in transposing or transforming these things or productions, either to the form, the condition, or the place where there is a use, a service, or a requirement for the same.

Yet the justice of the question as to the proper vestment of the rights as to what is or can be termed property has been and is a source of constant disputation, strife, contention and irritation: it has fostered and engendered more of the evil spirit and passions which are part of the human temperament or constitution

than all of the other human frailties combined: it fills civilization with tribunals whose province is to adjust under certain rules called laws a presumed justice as between these disputes—encouraging multitudes of go-betweens, commonly known as counselors, to justify either party to these contentions; and too often to encourage known injustices, so as to enlarge their own property acquisitions.

Yet it must be obvious that were rights to what is claimed as property, clear, simple, and just, it could not be subject to these disputations; and even these claimed adjustments are as often false as true: for they are simply man's arbitration: and man is full of error and conceit: for tribunal above tribunal is constituted to verify or dispute the conclusions of its inferior tribunal: yet the right to property is as just and simple as the right to life itself; for both are of nature, and both are natural rights; and it is only by avoiding this evident truth that we are plunged into the vortex of error and conceit, from which strife and contention constantly flow.

As before submitted, property or wealth owes its value or desirableness to its ability to secure for us food, shelter, clothing. Beginning with the subject from its root or base, how can any right or vesture to property be established and maintained. In a natural state, all the property that ever has been or ever will be is in, on and of the earth: the food we

eat, whether animal or vegetable; the metals we employ; the fibers or the wool that we use for our covering; the materials with which we build our habitations; all that we use, whether from need or luxury, originates in nature, and not in man; and this indubitable and indisputable fact leads us to the first and original inquiry: In what sense is the title of A vested, and B disputed? What claim has A to the coat that he wears, and which keeps his body warm, and to which B is denied, and through which B suffers the pains of cold?

Let the inquiry take a simpler form: A and B are both suffering from the pains of hunger; both at the same moment see an apple-tree, on which a single apple yet remains; A, being the fleetest and strongest, gets the apple off the tree and devours it before B could reach the spot: what exclusive right to the property in that apple had A, to which B was not equally entitled? Both were equally in need of it; both having an equal claim to the title as to discovery: in fact A, being the stronger, could have fought off the pains of hunger with less risk to life than B.

In the natural state, both parties had an equal property right to the use of the apple: the growth of the apple on the tree must have been for an object, for a purpose. Now here is at once discovered the object and the purpose, namely, that it was placed there to sustain life in both A and B, yet neither

party had done ought to enable and secure its growth and utility; and the apple itself could not have grown and possessed the properties of life sustenance were it not itself enabled and nourished into life power by an earlier life.

The earth from which it sprang was filled with the life-giving power; the atmosphere by which it was surrounded and it breathed in enabled its full growth and gave it its vitality (enforced by the heat from the rays of the sun); otherwise, although fed from the earth, it would have stified and dropped into decay before it could have attained any usefulness; and this being an inevitable indisputable truth, in what manner could A have acquired exclusive right to the apple, and B suffer the resultant consequences?

It is clearly obvious that there can be no more natural value or property in or to land than there can be in or to its surrounding atmosphere, to which atmosphere human never claimed title or property: yet this atmosphere is naturally absolute life, not only to the land itself, but to all that lives and breathes upon its surface.

It might be affirmed that both A and B were in a state of starvation; and following the human instinct and the consented and primary maxim of the human race, that self-preservation is nature's first law, that A could not have avoided doing as he did do and saving his own life, although B would have to die in com-

sequence; and yet under society's enforced laws as to the rights of property, this primary maxim as to the rights which existed from the natural laws as to self-preservation, it would be found to be more often honored in the breach than in the observance.

And yet this apple, on which we base our hypothesis, in the condition in which it was sought for, was of greater human value than all the other total wealth of the combined world of man. No title can ever be maintained as to the atmosphere itself, which enables and sustains all life: yet without this atmosphere nothing could grow or exist.

In this hypothetical case of the starving A and B and the apple, the atmosphere itself is the main factor: without it the apple could not grow; without it, A and B would shortly cease to be; A and B might exist some time even though they suffer the pains of hunger; but remove the atmosphere and they cease to be at once: and this evidences the truthfulness of the conclusion that the prime factor with reference to the growth and sustenance to all life, animate or inanimate—and in this must be included everything that can be expressed as property, for nothing can be that has not grown, and growth necessitates life—is the atmosphere in which it breathes; and to this atmosphere no title can ever be valid.

Figuratively the apple has been handed down to us as the symbol from which knowledge or wisdom first

became known to human mind. This should, however, only and always be construed allegorically, and not in the literal sense in which it is so constantly expressed.

In a spiritual or ethereal life, or world, there could be no such thing as hunger: there could be no such thing or knowledge as sensuality. Man's mind cannot conceive the possibility that material life was without beginning: his individual consciousness, his faculty of thought or conception repudiates the acknowledgment or belief that a contrivance can be created without a contriver, or a design effected without a previous designer: he is therefore not only compelled to, but as well assisted, in life's purposes; as well as encouraged thereto; to let his mind wander from the material to the spiritual life, in which he finds not only comfort and solace, but also a relief from the vagaries of the human mind, when it attempts to pry into the mysteries of those deep waters of thought which man's short line will never reach. None shall see the face of creation and live, is one of those truisms which will never be denied: for the human mind whose vanity or egotism but once conceives its possibility must soon pass from the rational to the irrational state, where responsibility ceases.

In a spiritual or ethereal existence, sensuality must be unknown: for where sensuality begins, the passions

are in force, and this would be impossible to etherealism.

To follow the allegory: When hunger first came to material man, he suffered the pains thereof: he ate of the apple of the tree: it was his first knowledge: it appeased his hunger: it taught the human how to appease the pain of hunger: and such is all knowledge.

We suffer from a cause: it may be direct or indirect, it may be immediate or remote, it may be a wild fancy, that so works upon our faculties as to make us anticipate a possible suffering.

Knowledge teaches us how we can free ourselves from the suffering: when we suffer from hunger, the fruits of the earth, for all that is found upon the face of the earth (whether animal or vegetable) is of the fruit of the earth, appeases our hunger; and thus is knowledge acquired.

We seek and find what is for our good; and this is knowledge: yet this which is found is in most cases property: it contributes by its usefulness and desirability, from its ability to secure for us our necessities, a value, which value is a property. Now how can any title to this property be vested? all springs from the earth, nourished to a growth and enabled existence by the surrounding atmosphere: earth, with its atmosphere, must have been before man: for we are conscious that man cannot or could not be, without

them: yet mankind acknowledges a tenure; concedes a vested right. Can he truthfully define its base?

The apple existed before A and B: it was creation's property: A seized and devoured it, and allows B to perish: or were he so disposed, even if it exceeded his requirements, being physically the stronger, he could have retained the apple, if only for a supposed future possibility; and B would still have to perish for the want of the nourishment it contained: yet this apple can be expressed as the symbol of all property right; and the only truthful claim that A could maintain would be his need to eat the same; so that he should not perish; and did he eat the same there would be no further property, as it had ceased to be.

This conclusively determines that the natural products of the earth cannot belong to any individual; and therefore of right should not be determined as property: but we all consent that there are property rights: yet how can they be established?

By every rule of conscientious conduct among the human race, *the person of every individual, and the product of his labor, are inviolable, and must be respected.*

But the labor of the individual can only shape and modify the materials, or the products of the earth, and so convert them into articles that may supply their necessities, or in some sense promote their happiness.

Undoubtedly, whoever performed the labor has a right of property in the product to the full extent of the labor performed: but his exclusive right to the material upon which this labor had been performed may not be so unquestionable, and may be subject to grave doubts.

Let us revert again to the hypothetical case of the apple which A and B discovered simultaneously. A plucks the apple, and has possession: B comes forward and lays his claim to the same: could the point be settled by some general rule consistent with a true sense of justice, and in a manner that would promote the public good, we would in a great measure be able to determine the whole matter of what could be construed as natural rights, and the rights of property.

Yet the proposition appears to be a very simple one. B claims that the earth is the common mother of all; that its productions are natural and spontaneous; that nature intended it for the use of all; that his need was equal to that of others: but as it was impracticable for both to have the whole, he would be contented to take half as his just proportion and right.

A, on the contrary, admitted that it was true as to the growth of the apple, but that he had reached the tree first; and that was good evidence that nature had intended it for him; that he had toiled to pluck the apple; and that in its state as a plucked apple it con-

sisted of and represented two properties: one the natural production, the other the labor performed in plucking the apple; and that to deprive him of any part of the apple, he would be deprived of the labor which he had expended, which was his own exclusive property. Besides, he might need it all; and why should he be accused of an injustice, when he only claimed that which he had found: which had cost him labor to secure? besides, if the claim of B was just and proper, there could be no limit to the number of those whose claim would be equally just. How could title and consequent use ever be held good as to the fruits of the earth, if the proposition of B were a valid one?

Besides, there were other trees, and other apples: B could seek for and obtain them, by the same means that A had employed to secure his: the earth and its products were unlimited as to man's uses.

B replies that if the claim of A was truthful, he might claim title to all the apples that he by chance should see before others; that he could expend labor by encircling all, by building fences around the same; that individually he might fence in more than he could ever possibly have any use for or consume; or that if his title was a perfect one, as A contended, others would be deprived of that which they needed; that nature never intended a man should claim what was impossible for him to use; that because he reached the orchard first, all that was in the orchard should be

his: for this would indicate that priority of discovery was an evidence as to nature's design as to who should enjoy the products and materials of the earth.

Further, the labor that he had performed was done freely and of his own volition; and he had neither asked for nor received B's consent to do so; that the labor that A had expended had in no wise changed the natural relations as to the products of the earth, or in any wise B's natural rights, which were equal to those of A; that B had done nothing to alienate his claim; and that it could not be alienated except by an act of his own; that A might commit a wrong; that to accomplish this wrong might necessitate an expenditure of painful labor; that this could in no wise validate the wrongful act, or lessen any rightful or equal claim of B.

To steal would imply that labor had been expended in the act: but the thief would not be adjudged thereby the rightful owner of the property stolen: for no one has the right to take advantage of his own wrong.

A might still claim that there were other apples to be had, fully as good as the one he took: but this can in no wise lessen B's claim: besides, it is made by one in interest; and why should he decide that another is as good as the one in dispute? It were natural to presume that he chose the best.

In all these supposititious cases, and which are

nevertheless of frequent occurrence, there is much that is plausible in the pleadings of either party; and much care must be exercised in awarding a verdict to either. In all the affairs of life, although there may be a striking resemblance in many cases, we seldom can find two cases exactly alike; and that is why contention seldom ceases, and libraries become filled with the records, examples, and decisions, as to conflicting contestants.

But these voluminous compilations often add more to the complexities and difficulties to be overcome than might otherwise exist: as the minds of the men, from whom they emanated, were so various; the conditions and interests so many and complicated; the ages and the eras in which they were expressed so dissimilar, as more often to add to the confusion. In simplicity there is virtue: in complexity, confusion.

Truth can in no wise become estranged or affected by the acts of man: but men's minds are often led away from its citadel, by the sophistry of the reasonings of interested minds: and the subject of property rights, and the rights to property, is so often interwoven, and interlaced with an interested selfishness, as to call for more than an ordinary caution, to discern the home in which truth and justice dwell.

If A had plucked the apple at B's request, the most that he should ask in return should be that B should perform an equal amount of labor for him: but if A

plucked the apple of his own volition, and without B's knowledge or consent, the query would be, Did he exceed his rights and infringe on the rights of B?

The truthful question to be determined in the hypothetical case submitted would be: Has B been truly injured by the doings of A, or could he not just as truly serve himself as well as A did, by expending an equal amount of labor, and thereby securing an equal result, without disturbing the rights that A claims to be justly his?

The earth produces more than enough to sustain all life, and the differences necessary to obtain it in one place or another are so immaterial, with the knowledge as to production that the human possesses, that the sense of justice in the human race concedes the truthfulness of the ruling that he who collects of the spontaneous productions, or he who labors, and cultivates the productions of the earth, is rightfully entitled to the unmolested enjoyment of the product so secured.

How any truthful vested right can ever be maintained as to the earth itself, which does not include the right to the exclusive use of its surrounding atmosphere—which atmosphere is never fixed or permanent, but constantly changing through the action of the natural elements—I have as yet failed to discover. Man may be ingenious enough to discover a method of locking up a portion of mother earth, and

claiming it as his exclusive property: but the moment he does this, and divests it of its atmospheric life, without which it can never have or give value, as property, there would be nothing left but mold: has he yet learned how to box in this life-giving atmosphere so as to make it a marketable commodity; retain its virtues; distribute it sectionally; and give it a just reputive value?

Property title and right to property in and to the earth itself can never be an inherent justice. Neither can it have value, so as to be properly deemed property, except as to the product thereof and the improvement thereon; and this product or improvement can only be the result of the labor expended to secure the same.

If the earth is belabored with culture, it yields up its productions: but neglect it, and it will overgrow with brakes and thistles; and the better the soil is, the ranker will be the weeds; and this being the truth, what value or property rights should exist as to the earth itself? None, whatever.

It is only the products of the earth which can be of use or pleasure to the human life; and this is what gives it value or property; and these products can only be secured by painful labor; and this labor is man's undivided right and property, which enables him to provide for his own sustenance and care.

To carry this hypothesis still further: Man might

expend much painful labor on this good mother earth, in the hope and desire of securing an earned and merited return: while nature, in the furtherance of its own inscrutable purpose, might visit that portion of earth so belabored, with drouth, flood, or frost, which would destroy man's earnest efforts. Such a condition would display the injustice, inequity and unworthiness of that pretended political economy, the purpose of which is to make all taxation single, and imposed on land and the improvements made on the land; such a tax would punish the unfortunate human still further. Not contented with the affliction that nature itself had exposed, the justice of which man's limited mind cannot fathom, would be added a further unmerited human punishment by taxing that which had not only been non-productive, but had also cost much painful labor in the effort to enable production.

It would be much more in harmony with the natural law and the natural purposes, to not only free the land itself from all taxation, so as to avoid the possibility of adding an unmerited punishment to an uncontrollable dispensation of the natural exposition; but also to free all of the individual productions from taxation until individual man had secured from these products, the result of his toil, all the uses and pleasures that the purposes of life afforded. Taxation should only be applied to the surplus of the individ-

ual results, after life's needs and pleasures had been accomplished.

There could be no value or property to the surplus to the individual, were it not for other factors which created and gave it value. This surplus secures its value or property, through the fact of the existence of society or government: therefore, society should only tax that to which it had given its service or property value; and this would be simple justice; and the more value or property that society enabled the individual to secure, the greater proportionally should be the percentage of the tax; for beyond the individual's own needs or expenditures, on which no tax should ever lie, the surplus might have no value but that value which it secured from the purposes of total society.

Besides, an excess of wealth or property can be of no other possible use or interest to man, except either to hoard for the requirement of a future sustenance, a possibility which may never arise (for the tenure of life itself has no fixed period, and may be suddenly terminated), to display an excessive vanity, or to destroy other men's purposes. It can in no wise be considered as an essence of human ambition, but only of human vanity; and human vanity should never be allowed to conflict with the general human happiness. It cannot be true delight that most men find in the possession of excessive and useless wealth, but only

the false shadow of joy: there can be no true pleasure in it.

Under any and all circumstances, to avoid a possible injustice, taxation should never be based except upon that which might be expressed as the presumptive revenue or income of those taxed: and a true measurement with relation to the value of land or land productions would be impossible of a truthful enforcement: and this fact would be fatal to the truthfulness of any tax, either on land values, products, rentals, or presumptive revenues: for such values, rentals or revenues, might constantly vary through causes of nature, as before exemplified, or through the different variations and mutations consequent to the world of commerce: and this would necessitate constant readjustment.

A single tax would always be a uniform tax, if it were a truthful tax: and for this to determine a truthful taxation, and enable the required purposes of government, which would maintain a necessary diffusion of the total production, the tax should grow as the final net result or profit of the individual grew; and as this can only grow either through the amount of labor expended, in order to secure the result; or the beneficence or accident of nature allowed; or special class legislation enabled; or a lack of moral conscientiousness encouraged the acquisition of, the equity of such a tax would be quickly displayed.

Besides, taxation, even if single, can be as immoral as multiple taxation, if it ever so resulted as to impose the penalty of a tax on that which had already passed out of the individual possession or control, and which might be expressed as the individual's losses: whether these losses were caused through the individual's ignorance, misfortunes, vicious habits, accidents of nature, or actual requirements of life: for to tax a benefit would be a justice, to tax that which had determined as a loss would be a crime.

Besides, knowledge to the human as to the ability of the growth of the products has kept pace with the natural progress, removing all the dangers from want, as to life sustenance, which was common to more primeval man.

The reasonings that have been applied as to the tillers of the soil will appeal with equal force and truthfulness to the toilers and dwellers in the cities. The earth, there, gives up none of its products: it is but used as a foundation on which dwellings or business structures are erected: nothing is produced from these structures; they simply give comfort, security and pleasure, to those that dwell in them or use them for commercial purposes: in their erection they accomplish a further good, in the fact of the labor expended; in the intelligent and natural utilization of the products employed: in many cases they may secure a

rental, in exchange for their temporary uses; but a rental is in no wise a production, or a new wealth.

For new wealth can only be those properties or things secured through the effort of labor, the base from which they are secured or produced being natural or earthly productions. Property or wealth can only be, therefore, the improvements made upon the natural material. 'Tis true, some wealth is of a complete and spontaneous production, such as many fruits and vegetables: but to make these of use and service to the human wants, the human must expend labor in gathering, picking, and securing the same: though these natural and spontaneous productions represent wealth, as valuable as those equal productions to which much labor has to be expended. Both the spontaneous and the cultivated productions belong to that class of wealth that nature intended for early use, in order to sustain life; and although it is of the most important and valuable of all wealths, to further the natural purposes, it exemplifies the truthfulness of the adage, as to "the wings of wealth."

Besides, why should improvements or buildings erected on land be taxed? Their erection could do no harm to society or government; but rather a benefit, a good: it gave employment to those engaged in their erection: and employment avoids idleness: and it is only idleness which tempts to vice.

Further, the human, also, has a necessity for the

same: it shelters them from the excesses of temperature: and this is a requirement of nature.

To tax him on his individual needs, as present systems of taxation often do, and which a single land tax would perpetuate, could often determine as an injustice.

But if after supplying one's own needs, which need not extend beyond the homestead, there still remained a surplus, to which a value or a property could only be given by and through society, society should tax that, and that only, to which it had enabled a value: and should increase the percentage of the tax as the net profits of the individual grew through the needs and the purposes that society itself enabled.

Besides, habitations might become more numerous than the needs of population, and thereby revenue become greatly curtailed therefrom. Our sense of justice should teach us that in such a case a single tax on land values or land rentals would result in a great injustice; for although the tax might be based upon a presumptive revenue, society itself failed to enable the revenue.

(A further exemplification of the truthfulness of this statement will be found in "The Way Out," an exemplified philosophy, pp. 372-383.) It need not be denied that there can be no inborn or innate title to land; as land must have been before man's creation, so as to enable and sustain life to the human race—

but there is a consented title, which man through all ages and growth has freely submitted, defended, and granted a justice to; and although in many cases the original title may have been secured by force, fraud, and corruption, in many other cases title has been made valid, truthful, and consented to, by and through the labor expended upon the same by the individual: through improvements made, which cost either painful labor, or through the results from an earlier painful labor.

Further, the doing of an injustice can never resolve itself into a justice. Present title is either largely the result of a labor expended, which all civilization has freely acknowledged as an inviolable right, or of general consent, which should be equally inviolable. It were just as intelligent to deny the individual tenure or right to landed property as to deny the right of title to the product of the individual labor; for there can be no product of labor which does not secure its base of production from the land itself; and if we denied to the individual the title to the land, which would secure to him his right to the improvements made on same, we would virtually put an estoppel to the progress of the human race; and such would be the culmination of a single land tax, either on land values or land rentals.

The only truthful title that one can acquire to that which can be expressed as property is from the result

secured from the toil which had been expended in transposing the product from the earth to a state of adaptation, suitable to the different wants of the individuals in their different circumstances; and this is without question a truthful concession, as it secures to the laborer the fruits of his toil, and affords an inducement to his exertions. If this were not a justice, the idle or vicious, when opportunity offered, would seize what the industrious had accumulated; and this our sense of justice would forbid.

This conclusion must not, however, be extended so as to justify a monopoly, in any case that would produce suffering to others: for the only absolute title to property that one can acquire is that secured from the result of one's labor—employed in reducing the earth's production from a natural state to a state of adaptation requisite to the individual wants: yet this can only give a right to exclusive enjoyment, if there is enough of the raw material, or of the natural products, to supply the wants of all; or where the value or the usefulness of the article produced depends upon the labor of a particular individual.

A man may cut a forest tree into firewood, or work the same into some other useful article, and this being his exclusive labor, and there being enough left for other individuals to do the same if they desire to, we would look upon it as robbery to take from him the fruits of his labor; or if one collected fruit, which

would otherwise inevitably go to waste but for his labor, and preserved the same, his title to the same should be perfect: for the product would have lost its usefulness but for his individual labor. A more valid title would be difficult to conceive.

On the other hand, one should have the right to demand any natural product of the earth which might be essential to his enjoyment, but which article might have been monopolized by another, by making a tender to the holder of as much labor, or its equivalent, as had been performed in its procurement and preservation, provided the latter did not actually need the same for his own requirements.

Having thus expressed the principles upon which title to property can be acquired, without inquiring into the means by which much of it is centralized, let us examine the principles as to its disposition.

Undoubtedly, that which belongs truthfully to the individual, he should be rightfully at liberty to dispose of as he should see best. The only right that society could have, as to any interference, should not extend further than where its disposition would be injurious to the general welfare, or the peace and security of society.

As the object and aim of the different arguments submitted in this work is the elucidation, justification, and verification of what is claimed as the natural system of taxation (upon which hinges the truthful-

ness and morality of all society's systems of government, as well as the individual's duty), any diversions from the direct philosophy of the different subject matters exemplified is to enable a truthful inquiry as to their different bearings on this all-important subject.

A widespread but erroneous conclusion is prevalent, that wherever the term property is expressed from a governmental sense, it implies the soil, or the land itself: and this is in a measure verified by the fact that nearly all systems of government impose a tax on land, as well as on land's improvements. Out of this springs that school of claimed political economy based upon single land taxation; to the inefficacy and sophistry of the pleas that it advances occasional reference is made.

Thus we have shown how the materials and fruits of the earth may become the property of individuals upon principles consistent with the total good, and with the sense of justice acknowledged as such, by the major part of the human race.

When we regard the vast amount of accumulated property in the world, which is continually drawing all things to itself by means of monopoly and extortion in its various forms, so as to double itself every few years, we can but be struck by the exceeding amount of toil it must force upon the producing classes to supply its demands; and the frightful

amount of effeminate luxury and extravagance that would be necessary to dissipate the accumulating mass, and prevent it from draining the source from which it derives its supply. And to show that such would be the result, but for the dissipating tendency of luxury and extravagance, even at the rates and customs established in nearly all countries, it will be sufficient to state that the price of a single day's work at those rates would, besides paying all expenses usually incident to the transaction of such business, in a few centuries absorb the net products of all the productive industry on the earth.

Thus, the man of the present day, whose ancestor in the year 900 had bequeathed to his heir that should be in the year 1900, the increase of one dollar, at compound interest, say at five per cent.—that man would now be lord proprietor of the whole earth with all its wealth, and have abundance of floating capital in addition thereto for other speculations. Such a case never actually happened, consequently the earth, and the property upon its surface, has at the present day several proprietors.

CHAPTER XII.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE NATURAL TAX.

CONCEDING the truthfulness of the natural tax, as submitted in "The Way Out," an exemplified philosophy, the query might arise:

How can the net profit of the subject be determined? If determined how can that which has been submitted as the natural tax be truthfully and effectively enforced?

Although these queries are entirely irrelevant and foreign to the truthfulness or falsities of the propositions submitted in this argument, the novelty of the proposition itself entitles the queries to a truthful reply.

Whatever is just in theory will prove itself just in practice, or the collective wisdom of mankind would be of no avail. All wisdom, all progression begins with theory: and if once conceded as theoretically correct will seldom if ever fail of the fullness and completeness of final perfection.

All laws are unpopular that interfere with what unreasoning people call their individual liberties.

Yet collective man insists on enforcing their laws as just and beneficial to the whole, though restrictive to the individual that complains.

An enactment of a just law, intentional evasions of which would subject the offender to imprisonment, as well as confiscation of estate: but, if not discovered until after death, with full confiscation of estate, would tend largely to make even the knave honest: just men would avoid no law: and knaves would dread and fear its penalties.

A law which was single, uniform, and universal in its bearings could never be fairly construed as inquisitorial or a hardship, but would always determine as an equity and a justice.

A government which would enact just and equitable laws, and had neither the power nor the desire to justly enforce its own enactments, would be unworthy and unfit the name of government.

Besides, it cannot be admitted, that subjects would perjure themselves to avoid the execution and exaction of just laws: for true law can only be enacted by the majority consent: those who favored the law would certainly favor the enforcement of the same, while the minority would be compelled to a truthful acquiescence.

It may be true that perjury is sometimes committed in order to avoid the payment of tax; but this can only be true to a very limited extent: for

otherwise the revenue would be largely deficient. If perjury to avoid taxation were common, it could only be attributed to the fact that the laws of taxation themselves were immoral and unjust, encouraging an equal injustice and duplicity on the part of those people inclined to deception: but when the assertion is made broadly and without reserve, that perjury to avoid taxation was the rule and not the exception, the statement is unworthy of acceptance or consideration.

It is true, wickedness and vice may exist under the most beneficent system of government: but the great mass of society will always be pledged to maintain, uphold, and execute the laws.

The tax which we claim as the truthful and natural tax, and which is designated as the single graduated net profit tax (as suggested and exemplified in my work "The Way Out"), suggests a minimum tax of one per cent. on the net yearly surplus or profit of every subject or corporation, advancing by a systematized scale to the maximum tax (the limit of which is only to be controlled by the public need) as the subject's or corporation's net profits tallies or equals with the scale adopted; or as it might be more simply expressed, each increased rate of taxation to be applied to the amount of net surplus or profit, in excess of the amount applicable to the preceding rate.

To avoid any further remarks than those already expressed, as to the absurdity and weakness of the

queries themselves, how can the net profit of the subject or corporation be determined? If determined, how can the natural tax be truthfully and effectively enforced? The following exemplification is submitted:

The letter A, which can either represent an individual or a corporation, submits a voluntary sworn statement, which is made a matter of record, that on the first day of a given year, his or its total wealth, which must be specifically tabulated, represented a total value of fifty million dollars.

This large amount is assumed as a base, to verify the truthfulness of the proposition submitted, as to the working and result of a natural single tax.

On the first day of each succeeding year, a voluntary sworn tabulated statement must be rendered, which is made matter of record; which statement stipulates the entire wealth or possessions of the party or corporation submitting the same.

The difference between the yearly statements submitted, when they show a profit or an excess over the preceding year, would be the amount subject to taxation.

All valuations of property submitted must be retained in succeeding yearly statements, or until the property has passed out of the individual or corporate possession.

This can in no wise impose an injustice or a hard-

ship to the individual or corporation (a consequence of the mutation or change of reputive values consequent to the commercial world), for the tax, being a single tax, and imposed only on the yearly net profits or possessions over the preceding year, any changes in value, until the property is actually disposed of, can in no wise be made a matter of further tax.

As wealth consists of things, which necessarily includes money (though it would be immaterial as to result if it were all gold), let it be assumed that these things were represented as follows:

Gold or other exchange money, \$10,000,000; twenty dwellings or other structures, \$10,000,000; government or State securities bearing a fixed percentage of interest, \$5,000,000; stocks and bonds in various industrial enterprises, \$5,000,000; ownership in various mines, \$5,000,000; ownership in various agricultural industries, \$5,000,000; ownership in various commercial enterprises, \$5,000,000; personal property used by the individual for necessities, pleasure or luxuries, and also to enable the display of great wealth, and thereby give vent to the human vanity, \$5,000,000; the holdings of this large wealth have been distributed so as to justify the trite saying, "That wise men do not carry all their eggs to market in one basket."

The above holdings, let it be assumed, submitting to the various vicissitudes and mutations that all human

affairs are subject to, yield a net surplus of four per cent. interest, premium, or profit, which would be equal to two million dollars.

Under the system of a single graduated net profit tax, as exemplified under the table of tax submitted in the work "The Way Out," p. 405, this amount of two millions net profit would yield to the government treasury \$1,671,150; there still remaining to the individual or corporation \$328,850, or a final net profit of about two-thirds per cent. of the total capital: which would be forever freed from any further taxations.

If the corporation or individual again reinvested this \$328,850 in further enterprise (and this reinvestment of the gains seems to be the bugbear which disturbs the peace of mind of the single land tax advocates), and the result or succeeding yearly gain was maintained at a four per cent. net surplus, the result would be equal to \$2,013,154; the government tax on this amount would be \$1,684,304, which would but return to the individual or corporation two-fifths per cent., in place of four per cent. on the increased surplus of \$328,850, for on this \$13,154 the increased net profit from the reinvestment of the \$328,850 the government tax would be \$11,838.60, the individual final net profit, \$1,315.40.

Thus the neutral and impartial hand of government could be made to stem the current, whereby under present economics all wealth tends to intense

centralization: disturbing society's purpose, increasing the hardships of poverty, avoiding the stimulus to the human ambitions and emulations, society's only safeguard to the unfortunate, as well as the yet-to-be born of the human race.

Under the enforcement of a single graduated net profit tax, as just exposed, a limit could be reached as to the wealth hoardings: when the ambition to further increase the hoard would be lost; as the energy to be expended and the risk that might have to be assumed (for in all human ventures there will always be a risk) would exceed the pleasure of the purpose that might be acquired.

Take the further extreme, and expose its bearings to the poor and the middle classes. Let the first year's net surplus to the individual be \$1,000, either gained from actual labor or the result of gains from the investments of previous results of labor.

The government tax would be \$10: the final individual gain \$990: let the second year's net profit be \$2,000: the government tax would be \$30: the individual net gain \$1,970: let one of the following years to the same individual even reach the handsome net yearly profit of \$100,000: the government tax would be \$31,150: the individual net final result \$68,850: which result should be amply sufficient to cover a necessary stimulus to the human ambitions and emulations, without which society could not maintain its purpose.

It should be borne in mind, that under the submitted workings of a single graduated net profit tax, the tax on the first thousand dollars of the final yearly net profit of any individual or corporation would be the same to the one whose total net profit was only one thousand dollars as to the one whose total net profit would be one million dollars. Each additional thousand dollars of increased net profit would be subject to the same amount of tax, no matter in whose possession the net profit accumulated. Thus would a uniform and equitably adjusted tax be maintained, the percentage of increased tax only growing with the increase of the final net profits secured.

To the extremely wealthy, or the monopolist, a single graduated net profit tax would throw out its flag. It would bear the inscription, So far can you go, no further: beyond this it is no longer human ambition, but human vanity: and human vanity should not be allowed to conflict with the general human happiness. Thus the justification of the natural tax is exemplified, as it maintains the stimulus necessary to accomplish the purposes which seem to control the human life, while at the same time it avoids and draws the line as to where the centralization of wealth is stopped, or loses its purpose, as soon as it can become a menace to the furtherance and welfare of total society.

To further exemplify the propositions that have been submitted: A yearly voluntary sworn statement, specifically tabulated as to the individual or corporate total possessions, would be a fixed requirement. The difference between the yearly statements would either show a profit or a loss: if a profit, the tax would be a percentage tax, according to the grade or table adopted: if a loss no tax would lie.

It might be claimed that this would be impossible of a truthful securing and thereby enforcement, as the individual could misrepresent values: but this could not be done as long as the possessions of the previous year had not been disposed of. To illustrate: In the first voluntary statement, which the government could always accept without inquiry as a truthful statement (as any falsification could not avoid redounding to the maker's prejudice, not the government), A represents that he possesses a house, giving size and location, valuation \$10,000; 100 shares of specific stock, valuation \$10,000; 1,000 barrels of flour, valuation \$10,000; deposits in bank or mortgage, valuation \$10,000. Until these possessions have been disposed of, the valuations have neither right nor need to be changed: for the house, the stock, the flour, the deposit or mortgage still remains the individual or corporate property; and as long as no tax is due thereon, except that there be an excess or surplus above the last statement, there could be no incentive

to falsehood, as falsification could not avoid redounding to the maker's prejudice, not the government's.

This same ruling could be applied to the merchant, in taking yearly account of his stocks, or making up his balance sheet. The merchant might claim that the reputive or market value of his stock had depreciated: but it might also appreciate after the submission to the government of his yearly statement. It must therefore be clearly obvious that no change need be allowed, as to valuations, until possessions, which can be represented by either stock or bills receivable, were actually disposed of: for neither the individual nor the government could be prejudiced by such a ruling. This disposes of the first feature.

Now, we will investigate the feature that acts like a nightmare to those minds that fail to grasp the simplicity of the proposition itself: first, men, to display an inordinate vanity and boast of a superior ability and capabilities, are more apt to display a gain, and not a loss, even if by doing so they had to pay an extra tax, than to belittle their possessions or gains in order to avoid the payment of a just taxation; besides, the penalties and punishments that can be attached to a falsification of the individual or corporate statement would unquestionably secure truthful reports: while the danger that would be the accompaniment to a false statement would absolutely secure the government against fraud or loss.

The punishment should always follow the property, even after the death of the individual subject, until its just confiscation as part of the penalty. If an intentional false statement be made by the subject and discovered during the life of the maker, the penalty should not only confiscate the individual property, but also imprison the individual.

A discovery and verification before a competent tribunal to the falsity of any of the individual or corporate returns, in order to escape the payment of a just tax, to entitle the complaining or discovering party to one-half of the property confiscated, the other half to revert to government: there would be no harshness in this, but simple justice: for no sympathy need ever be expressed for the evil-doer.

The securement in all cases of all the government rights can be made absolute, as no property or title should be acknowledged, either through will, inheritance, gift, or purchase, except the same had received the government certification as to tax payment.

The natural tax carries with it a further and an exemplified justice. The duplicity, cunning, and moral dereliction of many men make them constantly conspire how to defraud, rob, and cheat other more innocent, simple, and unwary people out of their hard-earned gains or earnings.

In all such cases, although there may not be any actual or increased total earnings, there would be

increased gains to these moral derelicts; and these increased gains would also be subject to the same tax as the actual increased surplus possessions.

Under the steady progress constantly manifesting itself in all the arts and sciences, the surplus wealth or possessions are steadily growing; and a natural tax on this surplus alone would accomplish the total purposes for which society is organized; and by the means thus secured enable full employment to all desirous of the same; and a consequent peace, prosperity, and security to all—maintaining thereby the full stimulus to the human ambitions and emulations, without which life itself would be but a barren waste, a trackless way through a great desert, without a single oasis to vary its dreariness, and cheer us on to that sleep to which human never yet sounded the awakening.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE WORKING OF THE NATURAL TAX.

	Total Capital After Payment of Government Tax.	Net Profit at Four Per Cent.	Govern- ment Tax.	Net Individual Profit.
Original capital.....	\$50,000,000
Capital end of first year...	50,398,850	\$2,000,000	\$1,671,150	\$398,850
End of second year.....	50,659,015	2,013,154	1,669,969	390,165
End of third year.....	50,990,501	2,026,361	1,694,875	331,486
End of fourth year.....	51,323,318	2,039,690	1,706,806	323,812
End of fifth year.....	51,657,437	2,052,933	1,718,780	314,144
End of sixth year.....	51,992,088	2,066,296	1,730,817	305,461
End of seventh year.....	52,329,761	2,079,718	1,742,865	296,893
End of eighth year.....	52,667,981	2,093,190	1,755,080	288,170
End of ninth year.....	53,007,454	2,106,717	1,767,194	279,523
End of tenth year.....	53,348,335	2,120,296	1,779,417	270,861

Though the principal as above illustrated would increase about six and seven-tenths per cent. (in spite of what many might claim to be an excessive tax), the final net profit on this increase would attain but two-fifths of one per cent.

Besides, if the single graduated net profit tax be conceded to be the truly natural tax, the principle

governing the tax can as well be extended, should the necessity demand, to the one hundred per cent. limit, or grade; at which point no further incentive can lie to seek for further acquisition.

Further, it must be impressed upon the mind that the tax would not lie upon first income, but only upon final net profit, and could therefore never be distressing, injurious or detrimental.

It might be claimed that the final net profits of a community might not be sufficient to defray the required governmental expense of community, and this claim may be worthy of truthful inquiry, more particularly as the tax submitted being single, upon the property of which, it having been once taxed, a further tax would not lie, provided the same property remained in the same individual or corporate possession.

It might be answered that such a condition would be hardly a probable one: but if such were the case, an increase as to the percentage of the grade and tax would quickly dispel such a possibility. But as in all commercial communities property is constantly changing possession, there would always be many individual losses, which would imply equal individual gains; and on these gains, though not real as to the total net surplus, the tax would as truly lie as on the actual net surplus gains. To further illustrate: A owned 500 acres of land, which he valued at \$5 an acre, equal to \$2,500, which he submitted as his year's net

profit, and on which he paid his tax. B owned \$5,000 in money, his net yearly profit, on which taxes had also been paid. B purchases 200 acres of A's land, paying for the same \$8 an acre, or \$1,600. Now, though there would in reality be no increase either in the acres of land or of the money, the property of both A and B, and on which the truthful tax had already been paid by both A and B, there would be an actual increase or net profit in A's possession of \$600, on which a tax would have to be paid: for A would still possess 300 acres of land, which he could not value at less than his own appraisement, namely, \$5 an acre, equal to \$1,500, and \$1,600 in money which he received from B—which would equal \$3,100, or \$600 more than he had returned the previous year—while B would still value his possessions at \$5,000.

This demonstrates clearly the truthfulness and justice of a single graduated net profit tax. In the proposition just cited there was neither an increase of acres, of land nor of money: neither could either party admit a loss: there was an unearned increment, or increased reputive value to A's land, which reputive increase could only be attributed to population and government, and from which unearned increment government should secure its share of support.

It might be contended that A might claim that the 300 acres that still remained his were lessened in value, so as to avoid the payment of any additional

tax: but such an act would be both inconsistent and unintelligent; for in addition to the fact that part was sold at a great advance, the individual could prejudice his own interests, and need not be allowed a change of valuation until the property was actually disposed of; or the government, to avoid a possible fraud or deception, could reserve the right, where the deception was flagrant, to take the property at the false valuation and sell the same at the market value; and even if this were not done, the deception would react in the final disposition to A's loss as the tax would then be on the difference between the lowest appraisement and the price realized.

And exchanges, or trades, similar in effect to the proposition heretofore cited, would be constant to all the affairs of the individual and commercial life: which would determine large revenues to the government, and could in no wise work a hardship to the individual, as the tax would be but a graded percentage of the final yearly net profits.

An inheritance tax, or a graded inheritance tax, is often submitted by claimed economists as a just measure, whereby governmental revenues can be greatly enhanced, no hardships endured, and a justice effected: as the devisees under an inheritance often secure large wealth, for which they never labored, and which becomes theirs simply through the accident of birth or preference.

Such a tax, however, could never be an effective one, or one that could always be enforced with a uniformity as to all inheritances: for should a devisor wish to have his property escape the payment of the tax—and this inclination seems to be very popular with many persons of wealth—the property could be given or deeded to the different beneficiaries before the devisor's death, thereby escaping all taxation.

Now this would be impossible to the natural tax, as each and every new possession, no matter whether obtained by will, inheritance, gift, purchase, labor, discovery, deception, or by any means whatsoever, just or unjust, would be compelled to the full payment of the tax.

CHAPTER XIV.

MONEY—ITS ORIGIN, PROPERTIES, FUNCTIONS; ITS
USES AND ABUSES—GOLD, SILVER, OR
PAPER—JOINT METALLISM.

To secure a desired want, or to trade or exchange a surplus product for another product of which one has greater need, is a constant purpose of the human race.

Among the people of civilized nations, these are called exchanges or commercial transactions; and as this purpose is interwoven with all the affairs of the human life, and can only be successfully and peacefully enabled by a close adherence to just and equitable principles, a study of the subject and of the principles which should govern and regulate its transactions are worthy of a close consideration.

In the present condition of what is expressed as civilized society, possibly not a tithe of the property produced in the world is ultimately consumed by those whose labor directly produces it.

When the natural wants of humankind are supplied, the inherent restlessness of the human character soon creates artificial wants.

To supply these artificial wants, the pursuits of

labor naturally became very extensive and diversified. The rude hut of the savage gave place to the convenient and more luxurious dwelling of civilization; the original implements of husbandry were succeeded by those of more improved construction; the wants of taste and luxury were added to those of convenience and utility, till it became impossible for each individual to practice all the trades and professions with either skill or advantage which his multifarious wants put in requisition; and it did not take long to discover that by one person following one branch of business, and another a different one, they could be much better and more economically supplied than if each one undertook to supply all of his own wants.

Yet although the advantages of this subdivision of labor are undoubtedly many, the evils are not few.

First, it affords a choice of occupation, each choosing that most congenial as well as adapted to his nature—besides, where one gives his undivided attention to one pursuit, he discovers new modes and implements of production, whereby great improvements are secured, and often more and better work produced with an equal labor; thus a greater number and variety of the luxuries and conveniences of life become possible than could be secured and enjoyed otherwise.

Yet this system of subdividing the different labors and pursuits creates a necessity for a great number of

exchanges so as to facilitate and make possible and convenient all the necessary interchanges; and in these exchanges great opportunity offers and is taken advantage of, to practice fraud and deception upon the simple, honest or unsuspecting, by those who are unscrupulous or cunning.

Yet it is undoubtedly true that the advantages secured by and through the commercial systems in vogue throughout the different civilized nations, and which encourage the interchanges of the different commodities, far exceed all the disadvantages arising and accruing therefrom. In examining this subject, however, by the word or term commerce, one must imply all exchanges by a mutual agreement of labor or labor's products; and although we cannot avoid in consequence of the great individual selfishness, and a lack of moral discernment that is common to many natures, a practicing of chicanery and deception in many commercial transactions, in general its effect is good; and its tendency is to bind nations as well as individuals together, by interests and dependencies which are decidedly averse to flagrant derelictions from honesty and integrity; and that propensity which exerts itself in endeavoring to secure the best of the bargaining in a commercial transaction would probably, under other circumstances, simply want what others possessed without giving anything whatever in return.

Undoubtedly the conditions governing the present world of commerce have absolutely changed the relations and pursuits of mankind from what they were in earlier ages. Then each individual had to supply directly his own wants, collect his own food, prepare and make his own tent; or where men had gathered together (and this desire for society is inherent in the human race) this work may have been done by clans or tribes. It is somewhat difficult for present man to conceive that this original condition ever existed; where each individual or clan had to supply each and every of their own wants.

The agriculturist has no doubt departed less from the forms and methods that primitive man employed than any of the other callings; and this arises from the fact that his productions can be directly produced from the earth *by simple labor*, and are the first necessities requisite to sustain life.

Of the other trades and pursuits, the members labor scarcely at all for themselves directly. One labors for many, and many for one: for instance, he who wants a loaf of bread need not necessarily plant the corn, watch and care for it until it matures, then gather and grind it and bake it for himself. He can make a basket, a shoe, or a hat, or any other useful article; and although neither of these articles will answer as a substitute for bread, he will generally find no difficulty in securing an exchange with some of his neighbors,

who have a surplus of breadstuffs which they had produced on purpose to be exchanged for other articles or products which they wanted, and which they found it more to their interest to get by exchange, rather than manufacture them themselves or dispense with them. No doubt this system of exchanging the different productions works well, and is also a good one. Of course, like thousands of other good things, it may be abused, or it may be extended too far.

To illustrate: One man has bread, and another brooms; the one with bread may need brooms, but he can dispense for awhile at least with them; but the other must have bread, and at once. Now it can truthfully be said, though it might be humiliating to the sense of justice and humanity that should govern humankind, that there are many people who would take advantage of the necessities of others in just such cases, to compel the giving of a broom for half a loaf of bread; when in truth and equity and regarding the labor it cost the one, or its utility to the other, it is worth a whole loaf of bread.

Yet the proposition just submitted is a very simple one, and one that is very largely practiced by many whom the majority express as shrewd and smart people in a commercial world, where the force of circumstances is taken advantage of to extort and secure unjust and inequitable exchanges of labor and property.

And it is difficult to avoid this system from being carried to an excess, more particularly when one suffers himself to become dependent upon others for those services and articles which he could directly supply himself with by his own labor, at less cost than he could procure them from others.

Besides, one may devote himself so closely to a particular pursuit as to disqualify him from any other pursuit; improving one set of faculties at the cost of all the others; so that if by some unforeseen conditions which might arise, his special branch of business becomes depressed, he may thereby lose his only means of support.

Besides, a person whose knowledge as to materials or values does not extend beyond that of his own individual pursuits is always liable to be imposed upon; and must frequently spend more time in procuring other articles or services, besides paying excessive prices for them, than would suffice to perform the service or produce the articles directly by one's own labor.

It may be contended for with a certain degree of justice that in an open commercial community, these differences would in a large measure tend to adjust themselves; that competition in all of the different pursuits whereby each would strive to secure the ascendancy and the selfishness in the individual to increase his own gains would operate so as to maintain a just measure of value as to the different pro-

ductions: it might also be contended for with an equal degree of truthfulness, that one man or even family cannot become proficient in all of the different pursuits and purposes by which they would thereby be enabled to supply and care for all of their wants; neither could they produce their many different requirements as good, as conveniently, or as economically as those with whom each special production was their special pursuit or occupation; whereby they could at all times be striving so as to lead in their own pursuit, to better the production as well as the means of producing the same.

Besides, exchange of the different pursuits and purposes of life came in with the growth of civilization—they increased as civilization increased—it evidenced the distinction between primeval and present man—between barbarism and civilization—it indicated the growth of knowledge, of inventions, of improvements. Primeval or savage man had no needs or wants but those requisite to sustain physical life; his wants were few—his opportunities to support those wants many. He was in nowise sensitive as to the measures that he would employ to secure his wants; for the savage mind would always consent to the justice of physical superiority.

With the subdivision of labor, which with it implied the individualism and the multiplication of all the different pursuits of life, men grew into the exchanging

of the different products of their different pursuits; and this encouraged the humanizing or the betterment of all life's purposes. Yet here was confronted the first difficulty that man had to contend with in groping toward the civil life: how to secure the principles of exchange, whereby equity and justice could be enforced and maintained with relation to these exchanges. If A performed a day's work for B—B should in justice perform a day's labor for A—but here a difficulty would at once be encountered; if it was simply to exchange the time that was employed in the service, the exchange could be readily effected; but the time itself might be the least factor. It is the product, or the result secured from the time employed, that is always accepted as the true factor.

Let us presume that A and B were makers of shoes: A being physically the strongest, most willing, industrious and able in the pursuit of which he was employed—with only an equal time at labor—might be able to produce two pairs of equal shoes to the one pair of B's, who might be physically delicate or not inclined to toil; in such a case as this, the exchange of B's labor for that of A's would neither be consistent or equitable; yet both employed an equal time at labor and both might possibly have been equally inclined to labor; but nature itself might possibly have endowed A with thrice the capacity as to endurance and ability.

Yet as we do not subsist directly by our own labor or agencies, but are greatly dependent upon exchanging our own labor and products for those of others, the principle upon which these exchanges should be conducted should not be subject to miscarriage.

Suppose A was to furnish a day's labor, and B had naught but wheat to pay for the labor in return, the point of equity might still be more difficult to determine. Yet as one is labor and the other the product of labor, the quantity of wheat that should be given for a day's work should be as much wheat as a day's work would produce, after allowing what might be considered proper for the use of the land. Generally speaking, this would be agreeable to justice and equity, not only with regard to wheat, but to all other products of labor; and would unquestionably be wholly truthful, if the products of labor were uniform in amount, and the ratio between them more easily determined. But failures of crops, either total or partial, and the fluctuations, mutations, and uncertainties attendant on all business or pursuits, often makes equitable rates of exchange difficult to determine: besides, any of these conditions enables the fortunate ones to place the unfortunate ones at their mercy.

Selfish people will always take advantage of their neighbor's necessities when opportunity offers; and even people claiming to be conscientious may be

in doubt as to what equity requires, when circumstances place it within their power of deciding between their own interests and that of strangers.

Generally speaking, in the exchanges between individuals in similar conditions, the tendency is toward equity; therefore the customary rates of exchange, on an average, cannot be far from what a strict regard for equity would demand. We may therefore conscientiously regulate our dealings with regard to the customs so established by general consent.

This would in nowise, however, justify us in taking advantage of violent or extraordinary fluctuations or our neighbor's particular necessities, to extort unreasonable or excessive prices from him; for this will in nowise stand the scrutiny of a just or truthful conscience.

If in order to supply our different wants we could always find ready and convenient opportunity of exchanging our own productions for that of others which we might want, the operation would be a very simple one; and there would be but little opportunity to practice fraud and deception in the interchanges of the different commodities; for generally speaking, where neighbors deal with each other, they as a rule understand the value of one another's products: but in the great majority and multitude of cases, direct exchanges cannot be made so as to accommodate their different requirements. A shoemaker may want a

hat, but the hatmaker may not want shoes; in such a case he would not be willing to make an exchange, although the exchange offered was an equitable one. But there may be a third person who may want shoes, but who has no hat to exchange for the same—and no doubt there would be many cases in which a great many exchanges would be required before each of the different parties would get those articles which they severally wanted in exchange for their own production.

Besides, certain productions are congenial and natural only to certain temperatures. Metals and minerals are only to be found in certain strata; and this fact would often determine the necessitation of going great distances at great cost of time and labor, in order to be able to secure all of the different wants.

These natural conditions as to the productions carries the conviction that except man was never to have emerged from the savage or barbarous life, no single man or family could ever supply all the individual wants and luxuries, which was natural and necessary to the encouragement and development of a higher and a better civilization, and which was the true incentive to all human life—which made its ambitions and emulations its chief aim.

To facilitate and accommodate all these various exchanges, that these interchanges would require, and to avoid as far as possible the many complications that

would arise therefrom, required the adoption of certain plans and devices, whereby these exchanges could be intelligently and equitably effected.

Hence, from time immemorial, to secure this purpose, a circulating medium or currency has been in use to which the term or word money has been applied. Independent of the reasoning heretofore submitted as to the origin, necessity, and cause, for the use of this circulating medium, or money, as it is termed, money would be of no real value or purpose to the human life, as it could in nowise assist or be necessary toward furnishing food for sustenance, habitation for shelter, or garments for coverings! In fact it would be a very difficult matter to determine in what manner value to money was at first apportioned; whereby a certain weight of metal, more particularly an almost useless metal, should represent, by a decided weight, a given equity value as to all of the exchanges necessary or convenient to life.

If the weight of the metal to which an apportioned or an appraised value had been given was based upon an approximated labor expenditure, an appropriate solution to an otherwise undecided and unexplained origin might be conceded. That is, if it required as much time, and equal labor, to produce one bushel of wheat as it would to produce and secure one penny-weight of gold, these given quantities could be accepted as an equitable exchange value between these

two productions. If it required one day's labor to produce one bushel of wheat, to give a name and value to labor or service (for no right lies to affix a value to the natural products; and all earthly productions are natural; and both wheat and gold are earthly productions; the value lying only in the labor expended to secure these products) it could with justice be agreed to, that a day's labor to receive a base as to exchangeable value could be placed at a unit which could be expressed as one dollar; therefore, one pennyweight of gold being appraised to have a truthful value of one day's labor, and that an equal labor expenditure would produce one bushel of wheat, the one pennyweight of gold could also be expressed as one dollar, and thereby a measure or standard of value could be arrived at which would submit to a universal application; for in the given quantity no question need arise whereby a standard of purity and a given weight to a metal which was uncorrosible should at any time or place change its purity or weight.

The primary requirement of a good currency or circulating medium should be, that it should consist of something that should maintain its quality; that it be valuable and desirable to everybody, so that everybody should and would readily receive it in exchange for whatever they may have to exchange or part with; and that its weight and intrinsic properties should be retained.

Besides, its value should also be very considerable in proportion to its bulk, if only for convenience of transportation; for bulk as to an acquiesced representation of value, and convenience as to transportation, forms a decided factor in selecting the metals to which has been conceded the money or exchange power; for it can readily be consented to, that as the universally accepted money metals are of the least useful of all the metals, to assist or further the absolute purposes of life, that there should be good and sufficient reason for the approval and selection of these metals, even if the consent being so universal were only an acquiescent one. With perhaps the iron money of Lycurgus, and a few other unimportant cases, gold and silver have been almost universally used as a medium of exchange, and have always been held in high esteem; no doubt on account of their brilliancy and incorruptibility; which render them specially applicable and desirable for purposes of ornament.

Primary man had few wants; personal ornament being undoubtedly the first artificial want invented: to secure which they would no doubt readily consent to exchange any surplus they might possess of actual necessities, for metals so desirable for ornaments.

No doubt gold and silver were originally sought and esteemed for their own sakes; that is, because they were more desirable to then existing man than any-

thing except the actual necessities. To-day they are sought, not from any special desire in the individual to possess them, but because any useful or desirable article can be anywhere and everywhere obtained in exchange for them.

The laborer who toils hard for a dollar's pay does not value the dollar for its own sake; but his mind is upon some other necessary and desirable article that he can exchange it for. It is as if all of the different productions or properties of the world were put together to be drawn upon by any individual, according to the amount and the value of the labor that he performed toward the accumulation.

The dollar is neither more nor less than a certificate of deposit, which certifies that the bearer has performed a day's work (allowing the dollar to be the acquiesced and the consented base as to the value of a day's work), and that as he has not consumed the products of his labor, he is entitled to draw the value of the same out of any of the unconsumed properties that are left in the common stock.

If he exchanges the dollar for a bushel of potatoes, he transfers his claim directly or indirectly over to the farmer who raised the potatoes. When in the hands of the farmer, it then becomes an evidence that a certain amount of labor has been performed by him, of which he has not yet consumed the fruits: it need not specify that this labor was performed in the field

or in the workshop. It is the consented credit that is given to the dollar, and not because the possessor values the thing itself that makes it desirable. He knows that with its possession he can exchange it at any and all times, for any surplus of any valuable property that any one else may have on hand.

Yet any other bill which was equally accredited is just as good, and just as readily and eagerly sought for and accepted as gold or silver is; this shows that in the shape of coin it is not the intrinsic value of the precious metals for which it is generally sought; for in fact, it seldom occurs that the receiver or holder of a banknote expects or wishes to receive the gold or silver that his banknote calls for; in fact it would seldom be received, if it could not be exchanged for something else than the metal which it purported to represent.

Where money is employed as a medium, the exchanges are expressed as purchase and sale; that is, the exchange of a commodity for money is called a sale; the exchange of money for a commodity is called a purchase; therefore two exchanges will enable any person to acquire what he needs, for what he possesses of an equal value.

For instance, the farmer can sell his potatoes to any one who may want them; and with the money received purchase whatever he desires until the money received from his sale is expended.

The price or the sum of money paid for an article should be the same as would be paid for the labor required to produce it; and the relative prices of the different articles should be in proportion to the amount of labor and skill required for their respective production.

If this is true as to the value of the productions themselves, it is equally true as to the value of the money, with and through which all of the necessary exchanges have to be effected.

Value can only be truthfully given to any article, commodity or convenience necessary or desirable to life's purposes, by computing first the labor expended to produce the same, the skill necessary to the faithful performance of the labor; the use of the implements and the materials that might be essential to assist in the securing of the production; the destructibility or the non-destructibility and the usefulness of the article produced; and what often becomes the most important factor as to the given value, the difficulty of securing, the risks to be taken, and the scarcity of the article sought for; which in itself would determine a growth as to a consented or conceded value, often greatly in excess of an equitable or a truthful value, if computed simply by the labor expended in securing the production.

Therefore the matter of value cannot always be made subject to exact computation, but is, in fact,

largely governed and controlled by acquiescence. Now, value to be truthful must be consented to, while acquiescence is better expressed as submission to.

For instance, as a general rule, the market price of a commodity should be regarded as the fair and equitable price, and may conscientiously be adhered to, in both purchase and sale. But circumstances often conspire to raise or depress the current prices of commodities, quite out of proportion to the labor required to produce them; so that one party in a transaction has the power of obtaining hard and oppressive bargains of another. In such a case one acquiesces to the value, because he is either ignorant as to values or it cannot be avoided; but were the value truthful he would consent to it.

A short crop may raise the price of provisions out of all proportion to the price of labor. In this case it is proper, beneficial, and just, that the price or value should be higher than when crops are abundant.

First, because the course and the causes of nature was the cause of the failure of the crops; further, the amount of labor necessary to produce a given quantity is greater than when the crops are full and provident; and besides, to be on a line with the natural results, a greater price will naturally produce greater caution in the use of provisions; and this would enable the short crops to go further toward comfortably sustaining the community; whereas if the price did not advance,

people would not feel the necessity of exercising a caution in the use of these necessities, and distress would be the consequence.

Therefore there are many occasions where an advance in the price of commodities is not only just and proper, but may also be necessary and beneficial to life's purposes and society's security; but an unlimited advance, or limited only by the extent which a neighbor's pressing necessities will enable it to be carried, is evidently neither just nor proper.

It may be contended for with some degree of plausibility, that the right to whatever man produces by his own labor, or that which his money has purchased, is his individual and inviolable property; therefore he may fix his own price upon it, and another may purchase it or not at his option; but this conclusion is not strictly true, for the individual is also a part of the community; and the community or total rights are always superior to and must supersede the individual rights.

Besides, it is beneficial to all that labor should be distributed among different trades and professions; and although no articles of stipulation are formally entered on the subject, there is a tacit agreement or understanding, that as no one man or family is able to produce all of their several or many wants, that persons of different trades and callings will exchange

the products of their labor respectively between one another on equitable terms.

Besides, to equalize the results of those productions or callings in which great time, labor, and skill had to be first employed, so as to enable an intelligent result; the price of labor in such trades or callings should be greater according to the difficulties to be overcome in the acquirement of the same.

Therefore, considering the propositions just submitted, all exchanges as between the individuals with relation to the surplus of their individual productions, must not be left to a game of chance; but must be as a compact, based upon principles of just reciprocity; otherwise there would be no confidence, but constant strife and discord.

Besides, we all agree about the justice of the golden rule, of doing as we would wish to be done by, even if some do not live up to its truthful teachings. Many, no doubt, in the fullness of their own conceit and egotism, think that they can avoid the punishment of having evil returned for evil; and sometimes they may even deceive themselves into a belief that they are acting conscientiously; and doing as they would like to be done by, when they take advantage of their neighbors' necessities or hardships, and exact extortionate prices for their surplus products, and of which their near neighbors might be in need.

The truth is no one likes to be cheated or to have

the fruits of his toil extorted from him under the force of adverse circumstances; and although he might be compelled to acquiesce, it is always with a rankling discontent in the pretended submission.

Therefore, as everybody would have others deal justly and equitably with them, they cannot conscientiously neglect to do so by others.

No man would want to give the price of two days' work for the product of one day's similar labor; and although circumstances and his own need might compel him to submit, he does not do so with a willing consent.

To further exemplify: Let us refer to a short crop of wheat. Suppose a given amount of labor only produces two-thirds the usual quantity; the price should be fifty per cent. more than the usual price, and no more; and from a proportionate point of view this would be truthful. For let us accept one dollar as the price of a day's work, and a day's work sufficient to produce a bushel of wheat, whatever may be received beyond the one dollar for the bushel of wheat would not be equitable; and this would be so at all times where a greater amount is received for an article than a fair and full price for the labor required to produce it.

It need be borne in mind that in submitting these different propositions, seeking to establish true and equitable value, all the incidental outgo (which in

the course of the commercial exchanges in seeking a market become part of the cost of production, such as transportation, care, handling, commissions, and natural waste) has been absolutely excluded; as it need not affect the base upon which equitable value should be founded.

Suppose a traveler unprovided with food becomes lost in a desert. He meets another traveler who is well provided. The one proposes to purchase his needs. No one need deny the right of a seller even in such a case to take a just and fair price for the food wanted. Now what should determine the price—the necessities of the purchaser, the full cost to the seller, or the mean between the two? Suppose we say the necessities of the purchaser. Let it be an extreme case where all that a man hath will be given for his life. The man with the food might say in that case: You may do as you please about purchasing my food. I shall charge you a thousand dollars for a loaf of bread; if you have not got as much with you, or the amount is in excess of all your wealth or possessions, give me all you have; and whenever we get out of the desert, you may work for me until the unpaid balance is canceled at a wage of one dollar a day, which is the current rate of wages. Would this be conscientious dealing as between man and man? Yet this is after all the legitimate consequence of the premises.

All will allow the justice of demanding the full cost

of an article, which should include all labor and incidental expenses or charges; but whatever is taken beyond this, is taken without an equivalent. And if one cent may be conscientiously taken without an equivalent, any amount may be as truthfully taken.

Now whenever we establish any other standard of value or price for a commodity than its cost, taking the cost in the most extended signification of the word, we are driven to the same monstrous consequences by which nobody could abide.

Yet it can with justice be affirmed that it is from just such premises as this, that most men acquire what is known as great wealth.

The principle of regulating the prices of the different commodities by their cost, and not by the necessities of the purchasers or the sellers, is in accordance with the principle that every person should be allowed to enjoy the products of his own labor. Now whoever has performed ten days of labor, worth let us say ten dollars, and has the money in his pocket as a certificate that he has performed the work but has not enjoyed the fruits of his work, is entitled to enjoy the full amount whenever he may need or desire it; and no one has the right to take advantage of his misfortunes or other circumstances, to extort his money for less than its whole value; for by doing so he would deprive him to that extent of the fruits of his labor.

Suppose a man in company with a neighbor should

fall down in a lonely place, or should meet with any accident which would prevent him from getting home without assistance; could his neighbor conscientiously take this opportunity to extort an exorbitant recompense for rendering him the necessary assistance, and thus derive a benefit from a neighbor's misfortune? If the accident had been the result of sheer folly, the case would not be materially altered; for a man who is foolish is certainly unfortunate, in the fact of not being the possessor of intelligent judgment; and we should regard these mental misfortunes with sympathy, rather than with a desire to take advantage of them for our own benefit and to the injury of those who are sufficiently unfortunate already.

If we have no right to take advantage of misfortune or necessities to drive a hard bargain, neither have we a right to take advantage of our neighbor's ignorance, and induce him voluntarily to relinquish his property to us, under the belief that he is receiving the full equivalent, when he is not getting half the value. The truthfulness of this proposition must be obvious to any discerning mind.

Any person who is pleased with being cheated in the price of articles he knows not the value of may conscientiously take similar advantage of the ignorance of others.

From the premises submitted it can readily be conceded that there is great difficulty in discovering the

means of honestly accumulating property without labor, or in sums greatly disproportioned to the amount of labor performed; and this gives us good grounds to distrust the means employed, whereby large fortunes are suddenly accumulated.

This need not necessarily determine that possessions, or even large possessions, cannot be honestly obtained by any other means or any faster, than by manual labor, at say a dollar a day—for in large cities alone there are many instances where the simple freak of population as to special location or other uncontrollable or unexplainable conditions or circumstances so increase the market, or salable value of land, to which the owner had given neither time, attention nor consideration, as to enable quick growth of fortunes.

Yet I think it has been truly shown that the misfortunes, necessities or ignorance of others cannot conscientiously be taken advantage of for that purpose.

Money, whether considered as a convenience or a necessity, being acquiesced in as the circulating medium or currency whereby all the necessary and desirable exchanges can be equitably and effectively consummated, must stand in no other relation as to its true value than the article itself for which it is given and taken in exchange.

For itself, that is, for its own intrinsic worth, as has

been fully exemplified, it is neither sought for nor desired; yet a consent or even an acquiescence as to value would not be so universally abided by were there no truthful cause to give it character, merit, value and acceptance.

No doubt the adoption of the consented metals gold and silver was largely due to their incorrosibility, as well as their compactness of bulk as to weight, as compared with the other metals; but the main factor in determining all values or commodities that are necessary to the human purposes is the amount and class of labor that has to be expended in the production, as well as the scarcity and consequent difficulty of securement.

An unproductive or short crop of wheat, as we have seen, would cost an equal labor to cultivate that a full crop would; but the price or value of the products would relatively diverge or vary as the deficiency or increase of the product was determined.

Nature itself in this wise decides the mediums that mankind should adopt and abide by, to further and encourage life's purposes—and gold and silver are undoubtedly the metals provided in the natural storehouse to further the purposes to which they have been adapted. Yet here we encounter a very perplexing proposition.

The medium of circulation or currency wherewith the exchanges are to be effected, to accomplish its

true purpose should represent an equitable value to the articles bought in exchange.

With the currency represented by two metals this would be impossible of faithful performance; unless the metals themselves represented a truthful and equitable ratio of value as between themselves.

Besides, it would be impossible to establish any value, except the base is first conceded and acknowledged by and from which value can be estimated; and as before demonstrated, though the product in nowise grows or diminishes in inherent or intrinsic virtue in consequence of excessive production, or of failure or scarcity of production; it grows or diminishes in exchange value in the ratio that the excess or the scarcity bears as to the visible or discoverable quantity requisite to secure and answer the purposes of the human demands or requirements.

We use the term visible or discoverable quantity, advisedly; to establish the conviction that artificial means can be resorted to, to distort or mystify the knowledge as to the truthful quantity of the production, in order to enhance the demand or exchange value.

And such a falsification can be more readily and effectively consummated with money, or the medium of circulation, than with any of the other productions or commodities.

First, its relative proportion of value as to bulk is

such that it can readily be covered from sight. Second, its natural properties are such that time or temperature in nowise diminishes or destroys its quantity or quality. Third, after the care and cost of its production when in circulation as a medium of exchange, or if laid by for future use, it can in nowise become seriously affected or impaired by additional cost for storage, care, protection or waste; and this fact in itself was undoubtedly a great factor which determined why the two metals, viz., gold and silver, were always, no doubt even in the days of prehistoric man, in use as the medium of exchange as between the different commodities. Yet it cannot admit of question, that the base from which all value must be computed, in order to maintain a truthful equity of exchange, cannot be extended so as to embrace the two metals, except that either metal was as costly to produce as the other. As before shown, labor as to cost is one of the factors in determining value; but failure or shortness of production is another factor. If it took ten hours of labor to mine and produce one pennyweight of gold, with unmined immeasurable quantities in sight—if an equal ten hours of labor would readily mine and produce twenty pennyweights of silver with an equal ratio as compared to the gold metal of unmined immeasurable quantities also in sight; according to the measures in use for appraising and determining value, it would with consistency

be conceded that it would require twenty pennyweights of silver to be of an equal exchange value to one pennyweight of gold; and any different measure of value that might be compulsorily imposed by legal methods or otherwise could only be expressed as dishonorable and disreputable.

Yet although this measurement as to attaining and appraising exchange value as between the different commodities is a truthful and an equitable one, as already exemplified, men often resort to artificial and forced conditions and methods to extort excessive, inequitable, and dishonest values in their exchanges; but these actions in nowise affect the truthful values.

Although gold from its inherent, intrinsic and retentive properties is unqualifiedly the primary metal, and silver equally so the secondary metal, a base must be assumed from which even their repulsive value can be computed, so as to equitably effect their purposes. As the medium of exchange between the different commodities—value as to an article can only be computed from its relative cost of production and its necessity to the human requirements; as compared with that of another article also necessary to the human purposes, required or desired in an exchange. To agree to exchange a bushel of wheat for another bushel of wheat, or an ounce of gold for an equal ounce of gold would require no appraisement or computation as to value; neither could any purpose be accom-

plished thereby; but to equitably exchange a given quantity of wheat for a given quantity of gold, a just measure of value must be consented to and abided by.

Though gold and silver are conceded as the primary and secondary of all the metals, we cannot appraise a rate value to gold simply from the cost of its production; or from the scarcity of the gold metal itself; nor from any approximations based from the silver productions; as but one base can be assumed as to the exchange value, and that base must be the relative relation as to cost of the primary metal and the other necessities and its requirement to the human need; with this base equitably established as to the primary metal, the exchange value of silver or the secondary metal can be readily and equitably effected.

As value indicates usefulness, and its appraisement can only be realized by its comparison to another usefulness, and this must be largely governed by the majority consent as to what the term usefulness itself in the different individual sense implies, a truthful base as to gold value as the primary metal can only be attained by its comparison to the base or inferior metal; which consented to, and conceded inferior metal must also be of those things which possess a usefulness. Assuming this to be a truthful conclusion, iron would be the base or inferior metal and gold the primary or superior metal as to all the useful metals. Therefore, the computation as to gold value

should be rated from its comparison as to the *iron* value.

Iron being of the most useful and necessary metals to the purposes of the human life, by adopting it as the unit from which value can be computed (and a unit must first be conceded before computation as to value can be consummated), a truthful and equitable ratio of its exchange value as to any of the other articles can be readily secured; and this would of itself determine a just measure of value, whereby all the necessary interchanges requisite to the natural purposes can be equitably and truthfully adjusted.

Let it be assumed that the result of the production of either of the three following articles to one day's labor, of ten hours' service would be:

One bushel of wheat,

Fifty pounds of iron,

One pennyweight of gold,

And that the incidental outlays in addition to the hours of service required to the above quantities of production were of uniform cost. This would not only at once determine that the equitable and truthful exchange as between either of these three articles should be based upon the above given quantities, but if the current rates for a day's labor of ten hours' service, including the incidental outlays as before mentioned, was allowed as one dollar; the base from which all value should be computed as to all the dif-

ferent interchanges, taking gold as the primary metal to which the medium of circulation as a currency was universally conceded, would be, that each pennyweight of gold represented an exchange value as to all of the interchanges of one dollar.

There cannot truthfully be two bases or two metals as a medium of exchange from which an equitable exchange value can be founded, except that the actual cost as to the production of either metal, the quantity found of either metal, and their intrinsic merit, was equally the same in all particulars.

Were this true, there would have to be two primary metals; and this is impossible to nature. There are no two things of separate growth or formation exactly alike as to all their properties; there might be a semblance of agreement between them, but not a completion of agreement. One must contain more or less of certain properties than another, and this distinction or difference gives to either its superiority or inferiority to the other.

Yet it is only to the primary metal to which the claim of superiority can be conceded, and from which a base as to exchange value can be computed.

An exchange value as to the secondary metal can only be truthfully consented to by the actual as well as relative relation that it bears to the primary metal.

If the production of one pennyweight of gold, or the primary metal (and which for the purpose of defin-

ing the value of the exchange was denominated one dollar) were equal to the exchange value of one bushel of wheat, or fifty pounds of iron; and an equal cost of production would produce twenty pennyweights of silver, the exchange value of twenty pennyweights of silver should also be denominated as one dollar; as the value of the secondary metal can only be established by its ratio of value as to the primary metal. If this distinction as to facts or true exchange value were not strictly adhered to with regard to the secondary metal, it would absolutely destroy the equity, honesty, or truthfulness of all exchange; for a deviation or a variation from a positive truthfulness where the metals are concerned as the medium of exchange or the currency, would positively destroy the efficiency of the primary metal by debasing its truthful value.

There can be no such thing as a compromise with truth or virtue so as to make it more truthful or more virtuous. Nor can a compromise with a falsehood or a vice determine either as a truth or a virtue.

Robbery, as it is defined, is neither more nor less than an inequitable as well as an illegal or compulsory exchange of possessions; and whether the amount of the theft were one dollar or one thousand dollars, it should in nowise affect the viciousness of the act; for the amount stolen would probably be the extent of the victim's immediate possessions.

If the primary metal, of which there can only be

one, were gold, and silver were conceded to be the secondary metal, and the truthful exchange value as between the exchanges were as to:

One bushel of wheat,

Fifty pounds of iron,

One pennyweight of gold,

Twenty pennyweights of silver,

No matter what denomination so as to express value was given to the one pennyweight of gold, any variation as to these given weights that might be submitted in exchange for the given weights of the other products, can only be expressed as inequitable and therefore dishonest; and with equal consistency a grain of gold, or a pennyweight of silver, or even a grain of silver (which might also be submitted for a grain of gold) can be submitted and enforced in exchange for a bushel of wheat, or fifty pounds of iron, or for any other of the productions of an equal value; and the sequence that such a condition would encourage would be the entire disruption of all commercial interchanges as to the different productions, with the primary and secondary metals as the currency or the medium of exchange.

The primary metal would thereby become entirely corrupted, debased, inefficient and disused as a medium of exchange; as it would not submit to the cost of production; being totally incompetent to an equal exchange with the secondary metal. Yet this

would necessarily be the logical sequence, if there were not a truthful exchange value or base to the primary metal, from which all consequent or concurrent exchanges were truthfully governed.

Yet although it is an undoubted truth and justice, that there can be but one truthful base from which to estimate or compute exchange value; or, more clearly expressed, one base from which all consequent or subsequent mediums of exchange must be computed, as their truthful exchange value, so as to maintain a parity of result as between any of the different mediums of exchange or currency and the many interchanges sought for, it might with consistency be claimed that the base of exchange, even if primarily truthful, is liable to gross corruption, disturbance, and consequent inequity, as a result of the great progress that is constantly taking place both as to the methods and quantities of productions; whereby and wherefrom as gross an injustice as to inequity and dishonesty can be perpetrated by or through the primary metal as one of the mediums of exchange, as through a corruption practiced through the secondary or subsequent metals, used as a medium of exchange when they are not truthful as to the proportions to the primary metal. To illustrate: let original or primary exchange value be based upon the equity as between:

One bushel of wheat,

Fifty pounds of iron,

One pennyweight of gold,
Twenty pennyweights of silver,
And the moneyed denomination as to value given
to the one pennyweight of gold expressed as one dollar;
habit and custom become so inveterate and fixed
as to the human consent or acquiescence as the result
of time's impression, that the one pennyweight or the
weight of the gold, which was the only and the true
exchange equity, becomes absorbed and lost sight of
in that which is expressed as the denominated value,
viz., one dollar. Yet the fact is that the denomi-
nated value—one dollar—was meant for and intended
to convey the knowledge that its intrinsic worth and
exchange value consisted in the assurance that the
one dollar represented one pennyweight of gold,
which was equity to:

One bushel of wheat,
Fifty pounds of iron,
Twenty pennyweights of silver.

Let the conditions of production, a consequence of
the progress that is constantly taking place both as to
methods and quantities of production, determine in
result the following as to equity in exchange:

Thirty-six grains of gold,
One bushel of wheat,
Fifty pounds of iron,
Twenty pennyweights of silver.

The denomination at first accorded to the one

pennyweight of gold as a truthful equity becomes the means of a gross inequity and injustice, and of a disturbance as to value very difficult of correction.

Value and equity can only be truthfully given through the comparative and relative cost as to labor and other outlays to the quantity and quality of the production; and were this the truthful measure not confused or distorted by and through the denominated value, the base of exchange value given to the medium of exchange or currency could always be equitably maintained.

It is of the greatest moment that the base of exchange value should be kept positively free from any taint of corruption or distortion; and this could always be attained by conceding to the primary metal the base of computation as to exchange value, and the exchange value determined by quantity and quality and its comparative cost of production as compared to the other necessary productions, and not by denomination.

Conceding the truthfulness of the aforementioned propositions, there is a vital and a serious perplexity as well as danger connected with the primary metal being the single medium of exchange from which exchange value would be computed as to all of the interchanges; even if represented solely by quantity and quality, and without denomination.

The primary metal, in common with all of the

other metals, can only be of the natural productions. The human is in nowise party to its formation or creation. It was undoubtedly placed in the natural treasury to secure and further a total, not an individual, purpose; and is no more entitled or deserving of any exceptional care or protection than any of the other individual productions secured and drawn from the natural bounties. Its value lies in the cost of its production, that is, the cost of the labor expended (with the incidental outlays) in order to secure the product, together with its comparative scarcity, as well as its usefulness to a human purpose. If it were enabled or accorded a sole control as the medium of exchange or currency, *it would be encouraging a monopoly of a special production by the individual*, which the individual selfishness, coupled with the opportunities that its exclusiveness would allow, could readily determine its use as a total or a public detriment. To avoid such a contingent possibility when used as a medium of exchange, the primary metal should always be compulsorily united with the secondary metal, but at a truthful parity as to their actual relations to each other; first, however, conceding the truthfulness of the equity of the primary metal as to its exchange value as to the necessary commodities. Whenever either the primary or secondary metal was submitted to government to accomplish the purposes of the medium of exchange, the government

or society's purpose should determine the weight, the purity, the security, and their truthful relation to each other; and it is these conditions only which would give to the currency its virtue and a truthful consent.

The actual medium of exchange or the circulating currency should not consist of the metals themselves, but of a paper receipt that acknowledged and guaranteed the weight and the purity of the metals which it represented, and which the government which issued the receipt would be liable for.

The metals are neither desirable, sought for, nor necessary to secure the purposes of exchange; but only in representing an equitable and actual exchange value as to all of the other commodities, they secure the accomplishment of an essential purpose. A governmental paper receipt guaranteeing a truthful delivery of the metals at special times, and in a truthful and equitable exchange value, would be far more efficient, convenient, and desirable toward securing the same purposes.

The properties of the metals themselves make them tiresome, inconvenient, and cumbersome for the purposes of direct exchange. The weight of the metals demanded in exchange for all the necessary interchanges should not come within the government province, but should be solely adjusted by the commercial conditions, and the individual agreement.

To avoid a monopoly or an injustice, which could resolve itself into an extortion, neither the primary nor the secondary metal should be allowed the government sanction as the medium of exchange; unless they would submit to being compulsorily united at a truthful parity of value in the redemption; *not in an amalgamated metal*, but in the just proportions that the metals truthfully bore to each other. A single metal is unavoidable as a base of computation from which to establish the relative relations that the different commodities, whether metal or otherwise, truthfully bear to each other; but beyond that one fact, it should not be enabled a supreme but only a conjunctive power.

This need not imply that the superior metals would in any wise be disturbed in providing for any of the individual purposes that the demands of the arts and sciences should call for; for being individual possessions and commercial commodities, their exchange value as between the individual would be controlled by the same laws or conditions of supply and demand that would control any of the other commodities.

The individual possessions, and rights as to the control of the same, are in a great measure and sense inviolable; and must be so upheld if society wishes to maintain its effective purposes, and yet further encourage the human race to the ambitions pre-

requisite to human progress; but when any of the individual possessions, such as the currency metals are, are submitted to, and to be put in force as the universal and compulsory public medium of exchange or currency, they lose their individual identity, and become merged into the public or total rights, and should therefore consent to the total or the public requisition.

Both the primary and the secondary metals, if denied the purpose of a medium of exchange, would at once lose the greater part of their exchange value; as the quantity securable is greatly in excess of all commercial demands for their use in the arts and sciences; and although it may be true that the cost of the labor of their production, as well as the comparative scarcity of the two metals, as compared with the discoverable quantities as well as cost of production of the other metals, should greatly increase their value, *their limited necessity or demand for commercial uses, as compared with the quantity produced, would materially affect their exchange value.*

This clearly establishes the conclusion that the excessive value given to both the primary and the secondary metal is not only the production of or the result of the labor expended in the mining and consequent securement by the individual owners of the mines of the currency metals, which is the only true and equitable criterion by which value should be

adjudged, but is a value largely conceded by and consented to by the community or the public; and to which the same community should have an unquestioned and indefeasible right, as to its manner of disposition as a medium of exchange.

As long as the individual owner retains the production of his own mines for his own individual purposes, or to dispose of in an exchange for any of the other individual commodities, his rights as to the disposition or exchange value that he places on the same is inviolable, and should not be interfered with or disturbed; although his individual conscience or lack of conscience might encourage him to take advantage of his neighbors' necessities and demand an extortionate value for his exchange; but when he demands the public approval, protection, and value as to his individual productions, which approval, protection, or value has never been conceded, or demanded by any of the other owners of the individual productions, he must consent to the public rights and demands which would secure to the public that which they would consent to be an equitable exchange in all their interchanges.

The people or the public give to the currency metals their greatest value and use; the same public have an incontestable and indefeasible right, when these same metals are to be employed for currency purposes, to adjudge and determine their exchange or currency

value and the methods by which they should be accepted of and employed.

The individual owner of the currency metals should not be compelled to a surrender of his individual possessions to the public uses, on the public terms; but should he consentedly do so, it should only be accepted on the public conditions. If the owners of the mines of the primary and secondary metals could dispose of the total of their productions to the individual, the same as is usually the case with the other productions, they might not submit to the conditions of acceptance for their surplus productions that the public might impose on them; but both the primary and secondary metals could not possibly retain their acquiesced exchange value, if deprived of their purpose as the medium of exchange. Therefore, to avoid a monopoly or an abuse of the purposes of either the primary or secondary metals, when put into use as a medium of exchange by the individual owners of either of these metals, when the metals are submitted for public acceptance or usage, they should be *compulsorily united* in the method of redemption by the public.

This could only be successfully assured by the acknowledged and accepted medium of exchange being a paper currency (which is the most convenient, satisfactory and intelligent form), which represented the actual metal deposits held secure by the government, and its redemption in the metals to be guaran-

ted by the government; the redemption of each piece of currency to be in an actual equity proportion of both metals. Thus would an actual *joint metallism* as to the medium of exchange be secured, avoiding a single standard, which must always be a menace or threat to the people's security through its power of monopoly or extortion; a bimetallism or a two-metal currency, which two-metal currency would always be subject to contention and disputation, in consequence of the extra merit conceded to the superior metal; or an amalgamated metallic currency, which would entail the corruption of the superior metal, and avoid it later use if so desired in the arts.

A joint metallism, as the proposition heretofore submitted exemplifies, would avoid the possibility of a monopoly or an extortion by the mine owners of either of the superior metals; enable, if so desired, a complete utilization of all the surplus product of these mines for currency purposes—secure to the public a medium of exchange far more convenient, intelligent, and practical for the securement of the actual interchanges than the use of the direct metals to carry out its true purpose, and thereby secure an always equitable and just medium of exchange.

It would undoubtedly carry in its train the possibility of a profit or a loss to any current currency; a consequence of any commercial changes which either of the metals might display; but as a truthful currency

is a public necessity, which currency should be guided, protected, and controlled by the neutral and impartial hand of government, the profit or the loss that its truthful maintenance might entail should be either added to or charged to the public account.

Thus would joint metallism be enabled to secure the true purposes and requirements of a medium of exchange, avoiding any stultification or corruption of the superior metals; forcing both metals to their truthful parity; forcing both metals, when submitted to the requirements of a medium of exchange or currency, to a unity, a truthfulness, as well as a combination of purpose.

The exemplification. The individual owner of a gold mine assuming the unit one as a base from which equity is to be computed after his production had secured for him all of his own necessary exchanges finds himself in possession of a surplus of one pound of gold. To make a purpose or use for this surplus, he deposits it in the public treasury, receiving in return a receipt, which receipt is current as the medium of exchange or currency. This receipt or currency is redeemable, if so desired, at stated times, at the public treasury, in what at the time of redemption is conceded to be an equity proportion of both gold and silver. The surplus products of silver of the individual owner of the silver mines can also be deposited in the public treasury, who also receives a receipt

which is also current as the medium of exchange and redeemable at stated times if so desired at the public treasury in what at the time of redemption is conceded to be an equity proportion of both gold and silver.

The parity of the currency metals to be adjudged as well as maintained by the public treasury, to which public treasury are to be added to or deducted the gains or losses that the maintenance of the truthful parity might occasion. If the individual owners of the surplus gold products refuse their consent to such a disposition of their surplus product, their market for the surplus would be lost, and they would not only depreciate the market value of their own product, but they would also thereby enhance the market value of the secondary metal by enabling to it a larger field of usefulness. Besides, the individual owner of the surplus gold could in nowise prejudice or lessen his individual possessions, as the parity or exchange value is maintained and guaranteed in the redemption. If the owners of the surplus silver product should feel encouraged in consequence of a full ability or disposition to force the output of their mines, they would at once materially reduce the exchange value of their output (which they would carefully avoid), as the government would correspondingly reduce its parity as to the gold metal.

Both of the metals would be compelled to a truthful acceptance of a joint metallism as a medium of

exchange or currency. It might be contended that the surplus superior metals would be submitted to foreign governments, in consequence of which the home government and people would be despoiled of its need and usefulness. This proposition, however, is illogical and unintelligent, and will not submit to a careful scrutiny or inquiry. The metals are only of principal use as mediums of exchange. If submitted to foreign governments or sources, the owners would have to accept in exchange other productions or represented securities, of which an equal or a better production or security can be obtained at home with a more assured guarantee as to redemption. Whenever governments or individuals have a need for or buy metals, they must pay for the metals so desired or purchased, an exchange of some other productions that the owners of the metals sought for, are willing to take in an exchange. When purchased by a government the exchange is generally in a promise to pay or return the same metal at a fixed future time, with a rated per cent. or premium for the use of the same until the metal is returned or, as it is expressed, the promise redeemed. This may also be true when the purchase is made by the individual; but generally in the individual case it is a purchase and a sale or an exchange of productions to accommodate the different requirements.

This conclusion clearly demonstrates that with a

joint metallism in force as to the disposition of the surplus superior metals, it would all remain at home to fulfill the purposes to which it was by nature adapted. The proposition is often strongly contended for and always submitted as of vital import that a scarcity of a medium of exchange or currency is destructive to the public contentment and prosperity. This proposition does not admit of any serious or considerate belief. The quantity of the exchange or currency can in nowise affect the question of production, and it is only to the quantity of the productions that the public prosperity or contentment can in any wise be attributed or affected. Exchange or currency among the people themselves, to effect the purpose of the interchanges of the commodities, need never be expressed as an absolute necessity, but rather as a convenience.

The productions only are of the necessities; the medium for the exchange of these productions being simply of the means that the intelligence of the human enabled him to resort to, so as to facilitate and make convenient the many desired interchanges. As before exemplified, exigencies in the life of man might arise where the individual might consent to the giving up of all his possessions, including his medium of exchange or currency for a loaf of bread. It is true the currency must have a truthful or a labor cost as to value in order to give it equitable or reciprocal value

in the interchanges; but it does not possess the intrinsic or the inherent value to the life of man, that the wheat from which the loaf of bread is made possesses.

Could the individual just as conveniently exchange his surplus product for the surplus products of other individuals who were in need of and desired the same, currency would be a uselessness. But in most cases this would be neither practical nor convenient, for the obvious reason that direct interchanges would be both cumbersome as well as in many cases too costly to be efficiently or intelligently consummated; that it might require a number of exchanges before each party would secure the product that either required; that the innumerable productions that the human cultivates and has use for require too great a knowledge as to the value of the different productions to protect and secure an equitable value in the interchanges; that these conditions made it imperative to establish a medium of exchange or currency *which should not belong to or be of the necessities of life* to enable and secure the purposes of exchange; that the medium of exchange *should be represented by or consist of a natural product* which possessed retentive properties, superior to those contained in the necessities, namely: brilliancy, incorrosibility, indestructiveness, compactness of weight as to bulk, and greater individual cost as to the amount or quantity produced than would

apply to any other of the necessary productions, so as to give to it an actual if not an intrinsic reciprocal and equitable value to faithfully effect all of the interchanges: that it should be found in a sufficient quantity to secure the fulfillment of its purpose.

It must be obvious to every discerning mind that to practically secure such a medium of exchange, the base must be tangible and equable as to exchange value, not imaginary or represented by a paper promise, which was not protected and secured by a property more real, reciprocal and equable as to true cost than simple credit; for conditions often arise which might encourage even the owners of a good credit to repudiate their most solemn promises and obligations.

It is truly perplexing to the thoughtful mind, how any method of reasoning can be so perverted as to encourage the conclusion that a promise to deliver a special thing at a future time can be as good as an immediate delivery of the same thing.

A promise given in exchange for a valuable consideration to do a certain thing at a certain time can best be expressed as a credit given and a debt assumed. The term credit must at all times imply an inability to an immediate payment of an admitted obligation. Necessarily; if present conditions were such as to call for an extension of time to enable payment, future conditions might display still greater embarrassment.

No medium of exchange will ever command an equable and reciprocal exchange value, but such a one as is expressed by a product itself, which represented an actual comparative cost of production to the production desired in exchange, or one truly secured by the deposit or storage of such a product; and any proposition submitted which avoids this condition, and seeks to create a medium of exchange which did not represent an actual equable exchange value, would be necessarily dishonest. There might be occasions when necessity might compel the issue of an actual unsecured medium of exchange; equally so there might be occasions when the taking of human life might be justified; but in either of these cases nature's first law, self protection or self preservation, must be the plea or the ground of justification.

CHAPTER XV.

COMMON SENSE.

TRUTH can only enter the understanding of the human gradually, and in proportion as opposing errors are removed; and errors can only be removed, so far as the human acknowledges, freely and rationally, that what was believed to be true, was false.

In the language of common life, the mental process, which we term reason or judgment, appears to be the same, though the facts on which it is exercised may be different. A reasonable man is one who both in the formation of his opinions, and the regulation of his conduct, gives due weight and influence to all the facts and considerations which ought to influence his decisions.

A man of the opposite character is one who takes up his opinions upon slight, partial, and inadequate grounds; and then cannot and will not admit the impression of facts or arguments, which are calculated to correct these unsound deductions; or who in the regulation of his conduct is led away by hasty impres-

sions, or feeble and inadequate motives; without giving due consideration to those which are calculated to lead him into a different course.

The former, we call a reasonable, considerate, thinking man; the latter we say is an unreasonable, inconsiderate man, who cannot or will not think.

It also very often happens that the latter, having formed his conclusions, is obstinately tenacious of them; while the former is still open to the true and full impression of any new fact or argument that is proposed to him.

A wise man has expressed in a very striking manner the leading feature of two such characters, namely, of the man who takes opinions with little examination, and then adheres to them with inaccessible pertinacity; and him who forms them only after full and candid examination; and with a clear conception of the grounds on which they are formed.

"The sluggard is wiser in his own conceit than seven men that can render a reason."

The process of mind that we call reason or argument therefore seems to be essentially the same, whether it be applied to the investigation of truth or the affairs of common life. In both cases it consists in comparing and weighing facts, considerations, and motives; and deducing from them conclusions, both as principles of belief and rules of conduct.

In doing so a man of sound judgment proceeds with

caution, and with a due consideration of all the facts which he ought to take into the inquiry.

Having formed his conclusions, he is still open to the influence of new facts, by which they may be corrected or modified; but he is not to be shaken in his confidence by trivial statements, or frivolous objections.

Opposed to this, there are two modifications of character, which present an interesting subject for observation.

Both form their conclusions hastily, and without due examination of the facts and considerations which ought to influence them; but their subsequent conduct is different.

The one is shaken in his conclusions by every new fact that is presented to him, and every slight objection that is brought against his inductions; and the consequence is that his opinions and his principles of conduct are constantly changing.

The other, having framed his opinions, though on grounds the most inadequate, adheres to them with inaccessible firmness, and seems totally proof against the force of any facts or arguments that can be brought against them.

The former is the more hopeful character of the two, his error consisting in a want of attention rather than of judgment, or, in a habit of framing his conclusions too hastily.

By education or attention on his own part, his habit may be corrected in a greater or less degree; but the latter appears to labor under a radical defect of judgment, which makes him insensible to the due force of the considerations and arguments which influence other men.

In the affairs of life the former, after perhaps committing various indiscretions, acquires wisdom from experience; that is, by having the fallacy of his conclusions in many instances forced upon him. The latter remains unchanged, retaining the same confidence in his own conclusions, and the same contempt for everything that can be opposed to them.

This unfortunate condition of mind, though it may have its origin in peculiarity of mental constitution, or deficient education, is fostered and increased by indulgence, and by a neglect of cultivating the important habit of calm and candid investigation.

Such a person seems at last to become totally insensible to the motives and evidences which influence other men; and the more striking and convincing these are to others, the more remarkable appears to be the condition of that mind which does not feel or estimate their importance.

In every exercise of judgment it is of essential importance that the mind shall be entirely unbiased by any personal feeling or emotion, which might restrain or influence its decisions.

Hence, the difficulty we feel in deciding on a subject in which we are deeply interested, especially if our inclination, and the facts and motives presented by the case, be in any degree opposed to each other.

Thus we speak of a man who allows his feelings to influence his judgment, as biased; and of another, of a cool head, who allows no feelings to interfere with his decision.

Any particular emotion, which has been deeply indulged and fostered, comes in this manner to influence the judgment in a most extraordinary degree.

It is thus that a vitiated and depraved state of the moral feelings at last misleads the judgment in regard to the great principles of moral rectitude, and terminates in a state of mind in which a man puts evil for good, and good for evil; and is left to the influence of strong delusion, so that he believes a lie.

Imagination tends in a most material manner to prevent the due exercise of those nobler powers which are directed to the cultivation both of science and virtue.

The state of a mind which has yielded itself to the influence of this delusive habit cannot be more forcibly represented than in the words of an eloquent writer:

“The influence of this habit of dwelling on the beautiful fallacious forms of imagination will accompany the mind into the most serious speculation, or

rather musings, on the real world, and what is to be done in it and expected; as the image which the eye acquires from looking at any dazzled object still appears before it wherever it turns.

"The vulgar material that constitutes the actual economy of the world will rise up to its sight in fictitious forms, which it cannot disenchant into plain reality, nor will even suspect to be deceptive.

"It cannot go about with sober, rational inspection, and ascertain the nature and value of all things around it.

"Indeed, such a mind is not disposed to examine with any careful minuteness the real condition of things.

"It is content with ignorance, because environed with something more delicious than such knowledge, in the paradise which imagination creates.

"In that paradise it walks delighted, till some imperious circumstance of real life calls it thence; and gladly escapes thither again when the avocation is past.

"There, everything is beautiful and noble as could be desired to form the residence of angels.

"If a tenth part of the felicities that have been enjoyed; the great actions that have been performed; the beneficent institutions that have been established; and the beautiful objects that have been seen in that happy region could have been imported into this terrestrial place, what a delightful thing it would have

been to awake each morning to see such a world once more.

"To indulge the power of fiction, and send imagination out upon the wing is often the sport of those who delight too much in silent speculation.

"He who has nothing external that can divert him must find pleasure in his own thoughts; and must conceive himself what he is not; for who is pleased with what he is?

"He can expatiate in boundless futurity, and culls from all imaginable conditions that which for the present moment he should most desire; amuses his desires with impossible enjoyments, and confers upon his pride unattainable dominion; the mind dances from scene to scene, unites all pleasures in all combinations, and riots in delights which nature and fortune with all its bounty cannot bestow.

"In time, some particular train of ideas forces the attention; all other intellectual qualifications are rejected; the mind, in weariness of leisure, recurs constantly to the favorite conception, and feasts on the luscious falsehood whenever she is offended with the bitterness of truth.

"By degrees the reign of fancy is confirmed; she grows first imperious, and in time despotic; then fiction begins to operate as realities: false opinions fasten upon the mind; and life passes in dreams of rapture or of anguish."

Obligation and reason can largely be construed into synonymous terms. When we perform an action, we have been induced to do so from reasonings that lead us to believe that it is proper; therefore these reasons are the obligations we are under to perform the same. We are obliged to do a thing, when our reason teaches us that it is proper and just.

The base upon which the reasons for human obligations lie has been defined as usefulness: the reasons for abiding by the customs and laws of the country in which one lives are governed by our innate sense of what is just and proper, the nature and fitness of things, and the general good.

No human can intelligently or willingly act, contrary to the constitution of his nature.

Take all of nature, from its grandest conception to its lowest types, the purpose and power of each individual creation *is graded* to conform to the purposes for which it was adapted.

Public opinion is an invisible and mysterious power, which it is impossible to resist: nothing is more unsteady, more vague, or more powerful: and capricious as it may be, it is nevertheless just and reasonable, more frequently than is supposed.

If the influence of material power be great, the power of opinion is still greater; it is magical in its effects.

Sensus communis, or common sense, can only be

truthfully defined as the sense of the common interest; and it is the most beautiful truth in morals that there can be no such thing as a separate or a divided interest as to the prosperity and happiness of the human race.

In the total welfare lies the individual welfare; and by the choice of the broadest paths, to secure the common or the total good, we may hope to attain the prosperity and happiness of all.

To attain this possible condition, reason should always be the grand and fundamental law which should govern the human actions. To illustrate:

Nothing can be self-creative; for self-creation would imply an absurdity; a something contrary to reason or the human intelligence.

The human cannot reason and conclude differently than that the ultimate, the efficient cause of all things, must be self-existent and eternal.

We might by sophistrous reasonings infer that results were attributable to secondary agents or causes; but such a conclusion avoids the truthful fact that secondary causes must be dependent on primary causes.

The firmness and stability of a structure depends upon the firmness and solidity of the bottom stone.

If D depends on C, C on B, B on A, all virtually depend on A.

A would therefore be the primary source to which all would have to look.

It would also imply an absurdity to reason that human life, or in fact all life, of which human life was the highest type, was purposeless: for creation itself implies purpose.

Reason indeed recognizes the operation of general laws, both in the physical and moral worlds; but its perception of their individual application is inadequate. Events, in its view, are produced by a regular succession of natural causes; and though these causes are supposed to be productive of good in their ultimate results, they are excluded from special reference to single objects.

The course of things is believed to be inevitable, and inherent in the constitution of nature.

None need deny that nature carries on its works through secondary causes, and that, too, in many instances by very remote instrumentalities, both in the natural and moral world.

Neither does it appear doubtful, as far as the human can perceive, that the means employed for the accomplishment of its purposes, though slow in their operation, are chemical processes.

Geology has already proved by physical evidence that the surface of the globe has not existed in its actual state from eternity, but has advanced through a series of creative operations, succeeding one another

at long and definite intervals of time; that all the actual combinations of matter have had a prior existence in some other state: and that the ultimate atoms of the material element, through whatever changes they may have passed, are and ever have been governed by laws as regular and uniform as those which hold the planets in their course.

Yet if that which is expressed as fate, and not as far as the human can determine, might be termed accident, opportunity, conditions, governed the human aspirations or the human development: applying this proposition simply to the material world; it would be useless to even make an effort to avoid what was sure to be: for by placing the child in its cradle, it would develop its growth and purposes without any attention whatever; and education or knowledge would be a useless anxiety, or necessity.

Men should act as brothers should act, with a feeling and concern for each other; and this is all within the range of reason and probability, and in accord with the natural purposes and ability; for in fact all humankind are brothers: no matter what might be their diversity of color, their mental or physical distinction, or their place of nativity.

If sex is a physical circumstance, beyond all human control, so is birth, nativity, mental and physical distinction, equally so: and this self-evident truth is beyond dispute.

The learned may dispute as long as they please, whether the different races of men have proceeded from one man, or from many men: their debates are of no practical importance to us.

The brotherhood of man is established upon too solid a basis ever to be endangered or shaken by the inquiries of science: for the unsophisticated mind is oftener much nearer to the truth than even the learned man, who is spoiled by his systems, and inflated by the love of his own intelligence: for the former follows the impulses of his heart, while the latter gives himself up to the conceits of his understanding.

Unfortunately, or fortunately—the term is difficult to choose—the primary requirement to a betterment of the human life is an enlarged and more liberal knowledge of the growth and necessities constant to the natural exposition: for to dry up the streams of vice and ignorance, we should commence our labors at the fountain head.

To secure this a compulsory educational system (freed from the narrowness and formula common to present systems), broad, comprehensive, natural, must be the securement of all, not only of the accidental few.

'Tis true, a full measurement of success is not to be hoped for as an immediate attainment; for the human after all is but a bundle of habits; and these

habits are so closely and stubbornly interwoven into all things connected with life's purposes that their release from false acceptations, and the growth and enlargement to a higher and better purpose, can only be of slow and imperceptible movement.

It may be true, as the submitted and different arguments herewith disclose, that accident, and circumstances beyond the individual control, may be in large part the measure that controls the human action: that they may be actuated thereto by the foods wherewith life is sustained, which supply the system with certain elementary properties, all of which are chemical, and which act beyond the human control: that animal food may so act upon the human system, to encourage a degradation, not an enlarged conscientious or moral growth: that it is reasonable to conclude that as a like encourages a like, that the human temperament will resolve itself and display certain of the propensities that their food encouraged.

That when the early races of men subsisted almost exclusively on wild animal food, they displayed a harshness and a brutality that was in keeping with the food that nourished their systems: and destructive and exterminating race wars were the chief occupation of the different races of men.

Then, as now, almost imperceptibly, the harshness that controlled the human conditions was gradually

modified so that few could appreciate the truthful transformation.

The change from the nomadic to the pastoral life was a compulsory one, but must have been in keeping with the natural design.

The hunt was not equal to the growth and the requirements of the human sustenance.

The pastoral life modified and softened the harshness of the earlier human temperaments: *it lessened the need for animal food.*

That the constant new developments that the arts and sciences develop, whereby mechanical inventions display an ever-growing ingenuity as to increase of productive power: and chemistry, an ever-growing knowledge; as to an equal power of increased production, through the discovery as to the utilization of the separate elementary properties.

This still further lessened the need of animal food, by greatly increasing and bettering all of the vegetable productions.

The human race is selfish, and will naturally be governed in their actions, not only by their needs, but also by their conveniences. As they developed the pastoral, which culminated as the civilized or commercial life, the question of calculation, or as it is sometimes understood, economy, entered into, and became a factor, as to all their affairs. Now life from the hunt, growing more and more impossible, and

passing from the human life, for the hunt implied the wild animals; it was only to the domesticated animal that attention had to be directed as to food; and this carried as a consideration, that the animal had to be cared for and supported, awaiting its usefulness and economy as food.

And this fact in itself took the question of consumption of animal as food, except on rare occasions, out of the life of the masses.

To them, peas and porridge supplanted what the hunt formerly supplied.

Thus nature displays its otherwise inscrutable workings.

Imperceptibly, its wonderful designs slowly but surely tend toward a complete humanity.

Other animal life, when its usefulness passes out of the human life, seemingly, as far as identity is discoverable, becomes extinct (for it is to usefulness only that growth is permanent; to uselessness, waste and decay); but the human life resolves toward an increased growth, and an advanced moral perfectibility.

As food as well as a convenience, comfort, and consequent usefulness, even domestic animals seem to be passing out of the human life, for their usefulness and need are also becoming lessened: and this is undoubtedly the natural purpose in all the wonderful developments that the mechanical arts display; which encourages a greater result from a lesser need of the

animal; thereby displacing its usefulness; on which its existence and continuance depend.

Neither is it absurd to conclude that the passing of the animal life from its usefulness to the human purpose is encouraging to the growth of the moral conscientiousness; for a uselessness inevitably leads to a waste and decay: and decay would imply that it was the design of the natural purpose, that the final use of even the domesticated animal, first as a human service, then as a human food, would eventually pass out of the human life; and with and through its passing, eliminate from out of the human system the different vestiges of brutality that its taking into the system encouraged.

As the argument disclosed, and the history of civilization revealed, as the wild animal passed out of the human life, its wild essence of brutality passed with it; comparatively, the entry of the domesticated animals modified and softened the harshness of the brute; for reason need not deny that what the human feeds his system on reacts and displays its attributes in the actions of the individual, as the different human temperaments expose: with the complete passing of the need of the animal to the human existence, the attainment of the moral perfectibility might be hoped for.

Passing from this argument to that of economy, co-operation, labor, the facts are disclosed that labor

is essential, *not only to the sustenance of life*, but to the welfare, prosperity, contentment, and *wealth* of civilization: that it is paramount to every other consideration that the human ingenuity or possibility can submit; that the plea that it must be conditioned to the dictates of that which has been defined by the term economy is a human sophistry and fallacy, unworthy of intelligent attention: that labor under every condition *must increase the total wealth*: that it is the life and the being of all wealth: that wealth consists of things, and labor creates and produces these things.

Therefore, labor can never be a waste, but must always be a gain; yet conditions might so determine that in consequence of the great progress constantly being developed in the different individual industries (which furnish and supply all of the many wants and luxuries that the human race has become habituated to, which habit might be classified as a second nature) which enable and multiply these productions or wealths, at the saving of the need of the human labor formerly needed for a much smaller production: and this condition displays the most serious problem connected with the commercial or civilized life.

It creates increased wealth, at a correspondingly great saving to the requirement of the human labor. Yet the need of a total and constant human labor is necessary, so as to maintain a reciprocal exchange

value to all the different interchanges of the human commodities.

With this labor denied, although there may be an increase over the prior total productions, it lessens its combined usefulness, thereby depreciating its exchange value.

It would not answer to a human intelligence to still further depress industries, where the productions already exceed either the needs, the usefulness, or an equivalent exchange value, by forcing further labor into the same channels.

Still, it has been repeatedly submitted that labor is the imperative and superlative condition to life itself; and as it cannot enter direct into the over-burdened individual industries, how can the overflow be relieved?

By injecting the effects of the results that can be secured from this surplus of labor into the fevered industries, through a devised labor, that should be created, guided, and supervised through the collective or governmental agency.

Yet it may be strenuously and truthfully urged that there would be no concerned or interested industry displayed by or through the collective agency; but rather a carelessness, corruption, and extravagance that would absolutely destroy that which must be conceded to be a truthful service, in the different labors performed; whereby a reciprocal exchange value as between all the different services can be maintained,

encouraging the human ambitions and emulations to their highest stimulus.

But this condition can be conscientiously avoided by simply conceding to the collective agency or government the guidance and supervision of this employment, as expressed in the earlier arguments; the different works to be submitted to and controlled under governmental restrictions, by and through the individual industries, *subject to the individual competitions*; absolutely retaining a reciprocal exchange value as between all of the different services.

It does not admit of any intelligent or discerning contention, that nothing is wanting toward securing as happy and contented a community as is possible to the civilized or commercial life, but a full and constant employment *of whatever possible kind, at any thing which can be made applicable to the needs, desires, or luxuries of the human life*, as long as a reciprocal exchange value, is truthfully maintained as between the different services.

And here we fully and freely discover, that a full and plenty labor is the only intelligent *Way* to secure the fulfillment of the natural purposes.

But the *Way* is not sufficient to complete the purpose.

In a commercial or civilized world, the *Way* cannot be intelligently or effectively consummated without the means to enable its fulfillment.

And this question of the Means is the cause of most of the contention, discontent, and turbulence that disturbs the civilized or commercial life: for it is grounded on that which is expressed as the economic question.

Yet, from a truthful measure, the Ways and the Means *are in line*, and must conform to and be subservient to a united purpose.

'The end and aim of all life can only resolve itself into the securement of the general good; which can best be assured through a truthful Ways and a truthful Means, of which the Ways being conceded, the Means should quickly follow.

As the arguments disclosed, all the wealth that civilization possesses and enjoys is of the natural creation and purposes, and is intended without discrimination or favor to secure the purpose and design for which it was created—that is, for the sustenance of all life, and the securement of the desires and luxuries, to which the human has become habituated.

As all are entitled to equal rights and privileges, and to secure a faithful enforcement of the natural gifts, and the protection and retention of that which is expressed as wealth and property rights, society was formed.

But society's dictum simply implies a consent to equal rights and privileges; not necessarily equity or

justice: and if this dictum infringes upon the natural law, it determines a tyranny and a brutality.

Truthful title to wealth cannot be made to extend beyond the actual labor expended upon the natural product, in order to secure and develop the use of the same.

An exchange of different labors, in exchange for different wealths, in nowise affects the truthfulness of this proposition.

But society and society's laws have established other measures as to wealth, title, and property rights: and as long as society so adjudges all should truthfully submit to its requirements.

To maintain society and society's laws, so as to prevent each and every individual from enforcing the whims, conclusions, and convictions which any might display, and which could more often determine injustice, tyranny, and arbitrariness than equity, society, or collective individual forms itself into government: and although government is also liable to great error, *it is flexible in its nature*, and therefore might be molded toward a right.

Yet to maintain government and secure the truthful purposes for which all government should be formed, viz., the securement of the public good, taxation, or the Means, which will enable the fulfillment of the Ways, becomes the matter of primary importance.

Now taxation, to be effective, must be truthful and single, and not multiple, confusing, and difficult: for truth is never invidious, subtle, destructive, or multiple: but always simple, lucid, invigorating and *single*. And taxation must be on a line with truth: and should therefore never be enforced, but out of the natural bounties, and be in keeping with the natural results: for it is to the natural bounties and the natural results only that the ability lies to secure the "Means" to pave the "Ways."

Yet although government is collective, the tax must always be individual: and the individual who would avoid or deny the payment of a just tax—a tax exacted out of a conceded natural beneficence—is unworthy and unfit the collective or governmental consideration.

It is often contended for and strenuously maintained, that any tax, just or unjust, which was objectionable to the wealthy few, would result in the withdrawal of their wealth and persons from the governmental jurisdiction; and that such a result would be destructive not only as to the tax itself, but also imperil thereby the total security.

The puerility and absurdity of this contention hardly deserves a passing thought.

Wealth can never be extended beyond the term things.

Things can only consist of anything or everything

that can in any wise be made a usefulness to any of the needs, desires, or luxuries common to the human life.

All things are of the natural bounty: made serviceable to the human uses by the labor expended in completing and determining their usefulness.

The things of the wealthy few usually consist of those things which are best expressed as of determined and least-perishable properties: such as lands, structures, government or corporate bonds, stocks, mortgages, public franchise, etc., etc.

Now these things are fixed and permanent and not possible of withdrawal so as to deny the government tax: therefore one could not withdraw the thing which gave knowledge as to claimed ownership: while as to the withdrawal of the person, as they are in nowise producers or creators of wealth, their departure might be accepted as a public acquisition or gain.

Besides, a tax, to be single and natural, as it is compelled to be individual, should be graded so as to relatively correspond with the different individual natural results.

The individual through the results of his individual or personal labor, and which would be the only truthful and equitable result, cannot acquire large wealth: large wealth can only be the securement of accident, of special (therefore immoral) legislation, or of cunning or chicanery, which might be expressed as a lack

of moral discernment: which enables one individual to despoil others more simple or honest.

If the securement were by accident, or of a lack of moral discernment (for inheritance would in nowise change the means of its original securement), not having been acquired through an individual labor, or exchange of labor: it should be chary about denying the public rights to that which was not faithfully or honestly earned.

The Way to a truthful and a natural charity and blessing is through a full labor to all the people: which labor should not and need not interfere with the individual industries, or the stimulus essential to the human ambitions and emulations.

The Means to enable this natural and truthful charity is through the natural, single, graded net profit tax: which can only be imposed on the natural beneficencies: where accident, the law's inequities, or a lack of moral discernment enabled the acquirement of an inequitably enlarged and therefore useless apportionment.

It is true that in the constitution of different individuals there is a great variety of temperament: and in some there is naturally more amiability than there is in others: but in every one there are tendencies to evil, of some sort or other: and the subjugation of these tendencies is with great difficulty accomplished.

We all have a full portion of infirmity: and the

proper management of that infirmity under exciting circumstances demands unceasing diligence.

No one can more effectually degrade himself than to yield without resistance to his appetites and passions: surrendering as he does the dignity of human nature, he descends to a level with the beasts.

Nor can it be denied that the feelings and dispositions of the heart are the elements of happiness or misery.

Language fails to describe the agony and bitterness of mind which result from the want of self-government: envy, pining at the prosperity of others: malice, forming its many plans for the ruin of its hated objects: anger, like the fire of a burning mountain, feeding upon its own substance: pride, irritated and mortified in not receiving its demanded homage: ambition, in its restless efforts pulling down disgrace upon its own head: and avarice, seeking, obtaining, and never satisfied, tends to spoil life.

Bitter and sarcastic abuse will often be the apportionment of him who, denying past or accepted false philosophies, on account of their lack of moral rectitude and conscientiousness, submits a new and novel proposition, not based upon the narrow principles of partisan views, but upon the broad ground of true philosophy and common sense.

But declamation is not syllogism: and when the human resorts to abuse, as an apology, a denial, or a

defense, as against the opposing argument, he but displays the weakness and falsities of his own acceptations.

Man, like everything else in the universe, has prescribed for him a certain orbit: and a divergency from that orbit is shown to be productive of mischief and confusion.

His orbit is outlined, in the growth and development of the natural exposition.

He must conform to and accommodate himself to the changes that this exposition displays: from this arrangement there is no appeal: it forms the grand nucleus around which the universe is built: it enters into the essential composition of man, and can no more be suspended than his being.

Ignorance, duplicity, or selfish motives might try to stem the current through which truth flows into practice: but the natural exposition and purpose will in nowise be disturbed.

It might be contended for that the theory (for all is classed as theory that has not as yet been tested by practical experience) submitted in the foregoing argument, though plausible to the understanding, would be impractical of purpose, though ingenious of design.

The term ingenious, however, is too often misapplied: if construed in a broad and liberal sense, it would imply invention, novelty, discovery, a new

thought: in a narrow and circumscribed view, a cunning or deceptive conclusion.

In nature, we might say that the development of the butterfly displayed a wonderful ingenuity: yet not to be able to explain cause.

The creation of the mechanism of a watch also displayed a great ingenuity: but in the case of the watch, effect as well as cause is readily consented to through the human knowledge.

Now theory, with reference to mundane or human affairs, will submit to as an intelligent a knowledge or discovery as the acknowledgment that we consent to, as to the cause and the effect that controls the watch, not the butterfly: and as the effect is always before us, we have simply to trace cause. Yet it would not be wise in adopting theory, in explanation of cause for effect, and precipitately accept same without having maturely examined and seriously digested it: yet if it satisfies the intelligence that it offers a more encouraging hope, and much to be preferred to anything that has been accepted or taught up to the present, on so serious and grave a subject: that it would remove false economic difficulties, and give much more elevated and sound ideas to that which might be expressed as the truthful purposes of life than any that have hitherto been presented, it certainly would be worthy not only of our immediate attention, but also of adoption.

Politicians, legislators, and represented economists have made the questions connected with this subject so intricate and contradictory that the great majority of people do not seem to be able to form a conclusive reasoning, but allow themselves to be swerved by their individual habits, associations, and traditionary or inherited convictions: for where our convictions are not the outcome of a conclusive reasoning, unfettered by a bias or a prejudice, they cannot be said to extend beyond what the individual hopes for as a probability or a possibility.

But to believe upon probabilities, when everything in this world leads us to indulge our selfish propensities and wishes, is not sufficient to give us a firmer resolution to resist that which is wrong.

Does not everything that passes daily before us prove this to be a fact?

But let a man who has hitherto had but a vague idea that he is right, become certain of it, and very soon a happy change will be wrought in him.

Suppose that instead of speaking to men in uncertain, confusing, and contradictory terms, respecting the proper method of conducting themselves—which of itself would quickly extend itself to the method of conducting government, for government is but the combination of the individual—demonstrate to them, by showing them in what a beneficent and just system of government should consist: and by answering truly

and knowingly all the questions which any one should honestly make on the subject, with a view that a complete conviction would secure the most salutary of revolutions as a result—a revolution far superior to those to which have been conceded the securing of much good, since it can be made without commotion, misery, or bloodshed.

Such a revolution, induced through their firm convictions, would at once remove the indifference (influenced by pure selfishness, as to the total welfare) which governs the majority of men.

Instead of regarding our fellow-beings as so many rivals, which our present system of economics encourages, we should look upon them as fellow-humans, entitled to all the rights and privileges that a beneficent nature enables.

Selfishness, envy, or hatred should give way to the desire to do unto others as we would wish to be done by: 'tis true, it will not do to hope that the human will be exempt from faults, for this would not be a natural conclusion: yet this does not determine that the human should live in constant strife with his fellow-human: for none could be so inconsistent as not to regret the doing of an evil, when the doing of a good would secure far more permanent and desirable good.

Everything proves that man's conduct depends on the principles that he has adopted: and if these prin-

ciples are based upon truthfulness and not falsity, none need question the certainty of the result.

'Tis true, this certainty may not be obtained immediately, for there are many obstacles to overcome: most men's minds have been so completely shrouded and mystified through the teachings of false economic reasonings that they can only perceive the light of truth, in the degree that the clouds or the falsities are removed, that disturb and confuse their reasonings.

Though there may be little good-will and perseverance in most men's minds, toward endeavoring to reason this subject out to a sequence, they will finally succeed in disengaging themselves from all false convictions: and the true conviction will become gradually established, and afterward become so firm that every additional reflection and observation will concur in enforcing the truthfulness of the conviction.

We should not conclude from this that we might reach complete truthful economic conditions (for economics are simply worldly and must submit to worldly vicissitudes and mutations): that we might anticipate a millenium existence (for the sentient being would not be a sentient being were there no sorrow, but all joys; no vice, but all virtue; no thorns, but all roses; no bad, but all good): for how would we determine a right from a wrong, a justice from an injustice, were the human race so designed as to be either all good or all bad?

If there are so few people who interest themselves about the true study of economics, it is largely from a false knowledge of its truthful bearings derived from the teachings of interested and therefore unworthy sources. The pretended economists, in submitting their propositions and conclusions to public consideration, being governed by the same motive that controls most humans—that is, a selfish purpose to individual betterment: yet this they cannot hope for, if they submit propositions at variance with all accepted conclusions: for the human is chary of novelty, and fearful of its determining a prejudicial personal result.

Besides, as a result of false economics, the generality of people have fallen into a gross sensualism: and the wants of natural life, the perplexities of business, and the propensity to worldly pleasures have diverted their minds from the necessity of its truthful knowledge.

Yet let some event happen which will fasten its seriousness and necessity upon the general knowledge, it will at once command their attention: and you will see all willing to devote themselves, as far as their intellectual abilities will allow, to the serious meditations which the subject demands.

It may be possible that many of these pretended economists are sincere: that their intentions are pure, and their labors conscientious: but can this excuse

them, when past and present experience is sufficient to show them that they must be pursuing a false course: that in following in the wake and footsteps of their predecessors, they are meeting with nothing but failure: and from the results of the practice of their teachings, men neither become better nor governments more truthful to the purposes for which governments are formed and exist, namely, to secure the contentment and welfare of all the people.

After so many deceptions, following continually one after another, can they, without being charged with want of foresight, expect to be more successful than their predecessors, especially when they adopt the same errors?

They continue to wander in the same crooked paths in which the people have been misled so long.

Why do they not enter new ways, to seek for the truth—from a pure love of truth: the old has been proved false; why insist on its teachings? The answer is easy: to use a common phrase—*their seat is made for them*. They cannot be made to forget what they have learned, and begin their studies anew. To do this requires self-denial enough to acknowledge that the writings and sayings to which they owe their reputations, are contrary to truth: and to do this, they would have to struggle against all the exigencies of self-love.

Unfortunately, as a consequence of causes heretofore expressed, there are too many people simple enough to judge men by their writings and sayings: and to believe that those who establish themselves as instructors of the people are beings separate from and superior to the greater part of human weaknesses: but experience daily proves that to many of those to whom is given the distinction of being learned, more than the ordinary men, are governed by a passion which produces in them most serious results.

This passion is the love of their own expressed conclusions: it is this that, even when they know it not, directs them in nearly all their actions: this constrains them, as it involves their reputation, *to abide by error, and deny truth.*

But though truth may be obscured by an array of error and sophistry, its character remains unchanged: though no doubt cunning and designing persons can raise a thousand quibbles upon the subject, and start such a host of arguments as almost to deceive the whole world, and even their very selves.

It may be claimed that the propositions submitted would destroy the end and aim of the acquisition of property: but it is not true, neither can an uninterested and unbiased judgment so determine: if it reduces somewhat the motive to inordinate accumulation, so much the better.

It secures every valuable aid, for which a virtuous and benevolent mind should desire its possession.

It secures a competence for every truly valuable and laudable enjoyment and pursuit.

It secures all, or at least any reasonable amount of the means, for the promotion and preservation of health, for the acquisition of knowledge, and the strengthening of wisdom.

It affords the man of wealth an almost unbounded field for the exercise of benevolent and social propensities, by enabling him to engage in projects for the public benefit, and thereby gain the esteem and gratitude of his neighbors and fellow-creatures generally.

It is for these, and like objects alone, that great wealth should be regarded as truly valuable and desirable: and these alone for which the benevolent and conscientious should consider themselves justifiable in employing it; considering themselves in a manner trust agents, rather than actual owners of any large amounts of property acquired by such usages as are of doubtful justice and morality.

Neither need it be questioned that all large fortunes, with scarcely any exceptions, are either of this class, or of a class and character still more exceptionable; for it is simply an indisputable truth that all wealth is the product of labor performed upon the materials and products of the earth; and that the

accumulation of large wealth would not be possible to the individual by the actual performance of the necessary labor; or by conferring equivalent benefits upon those who actually did perform the labor.

From that which precedes, in speaking of the vices, which more particularly appertains to the rich class, it was a compulsion more particularly to refer to them without wishing to make an invidious distinction; for from the nature of the case, that in speaking of the acquisition of property, those moral derelictions liable to be met with would show themselves most frequently in those who had been especially and successfully engaged in accumulation.

But it does not follow that the rich are more morally culpable or vicious in that respect than the poor: for if the latter have practiced those vices to a less extent, it might be attributed less to a want of *opportunity* than to a want of *disposition*.

As a general rule, poor men appear to be none the less ready, or less eager, to make an advantageous bargain, or speculate out of their neighbors' necessities, than the more wealthy.

Therefore, although the rich have been more conspicuous in the practice of many deplorable moral derelictions, it is not to them alone that we are to look for reformation, and a remedy of the evil.

All mankind needs to become better informed in regard to the subject of acquisition.

They need to become imbued with the sentiment, or fact, that by cultivating the feeling of kindness toward one another, *and a greater regard for the welfare of their neighbors*, they can enjoy a vastly greater share of happiness than by cultivating and exercising an inordinate degree of acquisitiveness.

We often hear: Well, if the world is full of unfortunate humans, what is that to the fortunate, or to those who are strong, active, and healthy? The strong, active, and healthy persons are truly not chargeable with the misfortunes or weaknesses of the others.

Justice is cold and mute on this subject, but the small still voice of benevolence and sympathy might whisper: Mortal, beware. That unfortunate person's condition may some day be yours; and yours may be his or hers.

We are all but mortals, and what one has suffered another may suffer.

Be careful how you establish a precedent of apathy and disregard of the sufferings of others, lest some day, when you yourself may need sympathy, Justice may answer: You showed no sympathy, none shall be shown you.

An enlightened and prudent selfishness would answer: Conscience, I'll heed your warning; and say to those unfortunates, were our conditions reversed, I should desire that you should make my burthen as

light as may be—at least, *without essential injury to myself.*

It is fit and proper, humane and intelligent, to set an example that may some time determine a return benefit. Now, every one requires the fruits of various kinds of labor: for instance, a certain amount of heavy labor and a certain amount of light labor is necessary for the support of each person: in fact, some can perform the heavy labor with as much facility and comfort as others the light labor: they are constitutionally adapted to their different labors; and their different labors can be exchanged: thus by equal suffering each could procure equal comforts and enjoyments: by this means, since nature has cast a heavier burthen on some than on others, the more fortunate ones should lessen the burthen, more particularly, as they need not increase their own.

The consciousness of doing good, and the sense of greater security from the effects of any misfortunes that may befall one, should be a sufficient compensation.

None would suffer any inconvenience, directly or indirectly, by doing that which is just, proper, beneficial, and necessary; and the idea of a compensation in the doing of a justice, beyond the fact that it would not entail an injury, would be absurd.

It need not be said that the human acts in a great measure from the impulse of established habits and

feelings, which depend for their origin upon general principles, and the natural idiosyncrasies and tendencies of the individual; and it could not be otherwise; for if the individual could accustom himself to reflect and calculate in each particular case, and thereby control each and every of his actions, his individual nature would not lie: besides, even were this true, there would always be great danger of forming mistaken conclusions, from the fact of overlooking, under the excitement of the occasion, some important circumstance that may have a serious bearing on the case in question.

But if we endeavor to acquire and cultivate general habits, and these habits do not discriminate in their bearings between the fortunate and the unfortunate of the human race, we will attain the true purpose of life.

There is no part of life attended with more unmixed enjoyment than that spent in social intercourse, the friendly interchange of thoughts, feelings, and sympathies, when it can be had under favorable influences.

In the society of agreeable companions we forget the fatigues of labor, the cares of business, and often even bodily suffering to a certain extent.

This being so, if we would be wise unto happiness, it becomes our duty, as well as our pleasure, to exert our thoughts to the utmost, toward improving and cultivating this source of enjoyment.

It not only gives us instant pleasure, but when it is of the right kind, improves the mind and feelings.

Thoughts and impressions are communicated from one mind to another; sympathy and good-fellowship are excited and strengthened; and the whole life and character is enlarged and made brighter.

In this wise, knowledge is gained from the experience of others, while in addition thereto, by communicating our own thoughts and experiences, they become more deeply impressed upon our own minds, and are often reflected back with valuable additions and improvements.

The advantages derivable from the social intercourse are simply innumerable. The grand secret of making these advantages available is to cultivate and exhibit those qualities and traits of character which we are conscious of admiring and esteeming in others: at the same time not being too negligent in regard to things which though comparatively indifferent to us, owing perhaps to some *peculiarity of organization*, are nevertheless esteemed by others, and innocent in their nature.

It must not be inferred that social intercourse should be restricted to persons perfectly congenial as to character and tastes; for although it is in a sense true that the greatest source of enjoyment lies in a sympathy or community of taste and feelings, it is none the less true that a great and salutary influence

may be exerted by the intercourse and commingling of very opposite characters: for by such intercourse bad traits may be corrected, and good ones confirmed.

It is true that a person inclined to virtue, but of weak characteristics, may quickly yield to the force of bad examples; more particularly if associations encourage the same: for instance, in a community of rogues, the encouragements to honesty and sincerity will not offer great inducements.

But it is reasonable to anticipate that in the associations of total society, virtue will always be in excess, and vice abhorrent; otherwise society could not maintain itself.

Unfortunately, exclusivism, or class separation, is largely responsible for the deprivation of good and wholesome example from the more unfortunate and ignorant portions of the human race.

The human is a great mimic, and imitative of good as well as of bad qualities: if the poor, the unfortunate or the ignorant had freer access to the society that was more intelligent and enlightened, they would quickly discover the advantages that an improved and virtuous knowledge enabled and encouraged.

Without the flux that the growing and advanced mind supplies, how could society ever fuse into an harmonious whole? How could it adapt itself to the constantly-shifting mold it is called upon to accept and fit into?

The only authority which, unquestioned can command the obedience of mankind, is the desire of happiness; and mankind usually perceiving, as it were by instinct, that certain modes of action, are absolutely necessary to the well-being of the race, they have adopted the habit of saying that such and such actions *are right*—that is, that they are ordered and directed by the general sense and consent of mankind, as the only probable means of securing happiness.

The lack or perversity of human consciousness, that is so insensitive to humanity's needs as to justify or uphold the viciousness of the conclusion, "Every one for himself," or as some more vicious or ignorant express it, "The devil take the hindmost," simply expresses the immorality as well as the brutality that animal nature can display; and is many degrees removed from the completion and harmony of that sensitiveness which approves of and upholds that most beautiful of all the human maxims, "Do unto others as you would others should do unto you."

What is wanted is union in a good cause, so as to overcome prejudice, prostrate the wicked usages of ages, and give a new direction to the mental and moral operations of society.

A careful observer will not be driven out of his conclusions, or from his confidence in its truth, by being told that he knew nothing at all about the matter that he submits: he knows enough for his argument. He



knows the utility of the end; he knows the subserviency and adaptation of the means to the end.

These points being known, his ignorance of other points, his doubts concerning other points, affects not the certainty of his reasoning.

The consciousness of knowing little need not beget a distrust of that which he does know.

True fortitude of understanding consists in not suffering what we know to be disturbed by what we do not know.

If we perceive an useful end, and ways and means adapted to that end, we perceive enough for our conclusion.

If these things be clear, no matter what is obscure, the argument is finished.

THE END.

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


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